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Preface
The idea of this edited volume emanated from the conference ‘Redefining Regi-
ons in Europe’, which took place at Danube University Krems (Austria) in January
2019. This conference was the kick-off event to the project ‘REGIOPARL I Regional
Parliaments Lab’, an international research project located at Danube University
Krems that is supported by and conducted in cooperation with Forum Morgen.
REGIOPARL is a multiannual comparative research project that focuses on the role
of regional actors in the EU multilevel system of governance. At the same time, it
aims at contributing to the ongoing debate on the future of the EU from a regional
perspective.
The conference’s main objective was to open the field by gathering various ap-
proaches to the definition and study of regions in Europe from several scholarly
disciplines. This interdisciplinary perspective was deliberately chosen at the be-
ginning of a project that is mainly located in political science. The various contri-
butions to the conference clearly revealed the importance of questions related to
collective identity – and regional identity in particular – when studying the mul-
tifaceted role of regions within the larger political and legal framework of the EU
governance system. This is the reason why the issue of regional identity also is a
key point of reference in many of the contributions to this book.
This edited volume is the third publication within the ‘Krems Publication Series
on European Democracy’, edited by the Department of European Policy and the
Study of Democracy at Danube University Krems. We would like to thank Forum
Morgen for the cooperationwith Danube University Krems and for funding the RE-
GIOPARL project, including this publication. Furthermore, we express our thanks
to Graeme Currie for proofreading as well as Michael Heber and Fabian Landes for
taking care of formal adaptions of the manuscript. Finally, special thanks go to the
authors of the individual contributions to this book, who add some fresh insights
and unorthodox thinking to the contemporary study of regions in Europe from an
interdisciplinary perspective of political science, sociology and legal studies.

European Regions
Perspectives, Trends and Developments in the 21st Century
Elisabeth Donat, Sarah Meyer
Introduction
In the early 21st century, Europe’s regions find themselves on a continent that is fa-
cing deep political, social and economic change. The financial and economic crisis
has left its mark all over Europe, the ongoing Brexit process is causing unprece-
dented uncertainty among citizens and in various economic sectors, andmigration
and climate change are just two examples of policy domains posing a challenge to
the unity and cohesion of the EU and its member states.
These upheavals, however, also offer an opportunity to change the role played
by regions in the EU’s multilevel system of governance. Facing the political vacuum
induced by member states’ blocking of major decisions at EU level, there are even
resurgent calls for a ‘Europe of the Regions’ – or, as Abels and Battke (2019) suggest
it, ‘Europe with the regions’ –, in the hope that regions might be more rational and
reliable partners in EU decision-making processes, as it is in cities and regions
where the costs of political inaction will be felt first.
Hence, while sub-state entities could be viewed as declining in importance in
an age of globalization and increasing rivalry between EU member states, regions
nonetheless frequently have centre stage in European affairs, as was the case, for
instance, for Wallonia on the issue of the EU’s ‘CETA’ trade agreement with Ca-
nada in 2016. EU political leaders also increasingly acknowledge the importance
of taking local and regional perspectives into account more systematically in the
EU policy process, as exemplified by the follow-up activities to the 2018 report by
the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less More Efficiently’.
Though the involvement of regions does not automatically guarantee more effec-
tive or better governance, there is a lot of expertise among regional actors in the
implementation and application of EU legislation, which often takes place at the
regional or local levels within member states – and this is increasingly recognized
by EU institutions and member states.
Regions also serve as significant objects of identification to their inhabitants.
Due to their (perceived) ‘closeness’ to the people, regions are often understood as
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fulfilling an important linking function between citizens and ‘upper’ levels in the
political decision-making process (c.f. Chacha 2013). In this regard, it is easy to un-
derstand why many consider regions and regional political actors to be well placed
to overcome the EU’s democratic deficit by bridging the gap between citizens and
‘far-off Brussels’. This seems even more important at a time when citizens (and
political elites!) are not easily convinced of the advantages of multilateralism, let
alone EU supranational governance. It is not surprising that in recent years much
of the political and public discourse on European integration was accompanied by
reference to a crisis of legitimacy of the EU political project. It is in this context
that regions have yet again received more attention as potential facilitators of Eu-
ropean democracy. By strengthening the role of regions in the EU political process,
the argument runs, ‘higher’ levels of governance could profit from the strong levels
of identification as well as their expertise in policy implementation, thus boosting
the overall legitimacy of the EU (cf., e.g., Panara 2019).
Region as a Fluid Concept
Compared to the rather static construct of ‘the state’, ‘region’ is a far more flexi-
ble, fluid concept. Rather than being composed of a number of largely undisputed
defining features, region carries a broad range of different meanings in both scho-
larly literature and politics. It is used, for instance, to refer to whole continents
in international or geopolitical contexts (e.g. Europe as a region) and to particular
parts of the world map that cross state borders (e.g. the Balkan region or the EU
macro regions) as well as to sub-national political units (e.g. the German Bundes-
länder or Spanish Comunidades Autónomas). In addition to these mainly territorial
and geographical understandings of region, several recent approaches rearrange
the classification of regions according to administrative and economic indicators,
including the NUTS regions or regional typologies of what ESPON calls ‘functional
areas’.1
Regions can thus be defined using a range of criteria – territorial, functional,
historical, and many others. While this can clearly lead to analytical ambiguity, it
is also one of the term’s strengths. Battke and Abels (2019: 236), for instance, ar-
gue that regions should be defined ‘as “soft spaces” that are subject to continued
rescaling processes’. By broadening the classical territorial perspective towards a
functional understanding of regions, scholars account for the fact that the defini-
tion and boundaries of regions are socially constructed and, thus, not static (cf.
ibid.)
1 https://www.espon.eu/tools-maps/regional-typologies, 1 September 2019
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While a broad understanding of the concept of regions certainly has its merits,
the main empirical focus in this volume is very much on regions as sub-national
political units within Europe. Because they are strongly related to the constitutional
order of (EUmember) states, the boundaries of regions in Europe as defined above
seem to be clear and largely stable. However, European regions have obviously been
affected – and continue to be so – by major political changes and ‘experiments’ in
recent decades: The EU’s external borders have changed considerably as a result of
several rounds of enlargement; and internal borders are still shifting (consider, for
example, Brexit or the shifts in the Balkans) or remain contested (e.g., Gibraltar
or Piran Bay). Territorial shifts have also been witnessed within EU member sta-
tes, often accompanied by decentralization and/or the re-organization of regional
political units (cf. Keating 2013). Finally, regions are not only affected by such ter-
ritorial dynamics, but often become decisive actors themselves: Some regions (or
more precisely: regional political actors) strive for political independence while si-
multaneously desiring continuity in the form of ongoing EU membership; while
some form new conglomerates with their neighbours to strengthen cross-border
cooperation, as can be seen in the EUREGIOs, or split up into smaller units to
reinforce local economies and culture.
Issues of territory and borders thus remain politically salient – as do questions
of identity and ‘belonging’: Among citizens, there seems to be a steadily growing
emotionality not only when it comes to the ‘homeland’ and its (imagined or desired)
borders at state level, but likewise – and sometimes even more importantly – with
regard to regional ‘belonging’. In line with this, many of the contributions to this
edited anthology deal with aspects of regional identity – either by explicitly making
it the focus of inquiry or by acknowledging its importance as a contextual variable
in political processes. According to this approach, the role of regional identity must
not be neglected when analysing the role of regions in EU multilevel governance.
Regions and their role in EU multilevel governance have been subject to inten-
se research in recent years, resulting in a vast body of literature, particularly in
the field of political science. This is not least due to the changes that came into
force with the Treaty of Lisbon, which rearranged the way regions participate in
the EU’s political system (e.g., Abels/Eppler 2015; Bursens/Högenauer 2017; CoR
2013; Högenauer/Abels 2017; Tatham 2015). Scholars have, for instance, dealt with
regional activity in connection with the Early Warning System (EWS) (Borońska-
Hryniewiecka 2015; 2017; Fromage 2016; 2017) and the Regional Authority Index
(Hooghe et al. 2016) has become an important source for comparing the influence
that regional channels have on the multilevel system both in Europe and worldwi-
de.
This anthology takes a closer look at European regions by providing a multifa-
ceted picture of their innovative abilities as well as the potential perils of ‘regional
closure’.The various chapters range across questions of regional identification and
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feelings of belonging; institutional, political and legal structures that enhance or li-
mit regional political endeavours; and questions of cross-border cooperation.Most
of the contributions examine examples from various regions throughout Europe
and focus on similarities and differences among them. Others take a horizontal
perspective by focusing on regional political representation within EU multilevel
governance or on EU programmes for regional economic development.
While the dream of a ‘Europe of the regions’ had clearly lost some of its appeal,
the new millennium has so far witnessed a growth in relevance of the regional le-
vel – both as a layer of citizens’ identity and as an increasingly important political
player in EU multilevel governance. This is the underlying notion linking the va-
rious chapters in the four sections of this volume, as will be outlined briefly in the
remainder of this introduction.
1. Regional Identity – A Citizens’ Perspective
While political scientists have recently been busy studying the role of regions in the
context of EU multilevel governance, other disciplines in the social sciences seem
to be lagging behind.While geographers’ interest in spatial orders and their conse-
quences for political, economic and social systems has generated a body of relevant
work in the field of regional studies, sociologists have long neglected the role of re-
gions in processes of collective identification.2 There are still relatively few studies
that focus on regional identity as a main dependent or independent variable in so-
ciological analysis. This is rather astonishing, given the vast body of literature on
collective identities that exists in the field of political sociology. Meanwhile, howe-
ver, survey questions on collective identities have been improved, moving, first,
from the classic ‘Moreno question’3 to more sophisticated measures and, second,
recognizing the importance of ‘multiple identities’. The latter is of particular im-
portance in contexts of multilevel governance. On the one hand, the very notion
of collective identity – including regional identity – is always Janus-faced, since it
guarantees cohesion within social groups not least by defining ‘external’ bounda-
ries in order to form clear-cut identities (Tajfel 1982). At the same time, concepts
of nested and multiple identities (Medrano/Guitérrez 2001) highlight the potential
synchronicity of various collective identities, thus integrating regional identities in
a larger framework of social/territorial identities.
Several contributions in this volume focus on the tension between openness
and closure that is immanent to collective identities. Are empirically observed re-
2 Exceptions being the addition of ‘identification with the region’ as a default category in item
batteries and the addition of NUTS regions as standard classifications inmultilevel analyses.
3 ‘What is your national identity?’
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gional identities more integrative or more exclusionary in nature? To what extent
are sentiments of regional belonging not only exploited by populist movements,
but also used by mainstream political actors? And how do regional identities tie in
with a European identity that is becoming increasingly important, at least among
younger and better educated cohorts within society?Whilemultiple identities seem
to be on the rise and are increasingly recognized in scholarly literature, it might
be misleading to directly infer a pro-European stance – the existence of multiple
identities perhaps only points us to the fact that the act of placement per se has
become of high importance to some individuals.
The first section of this volume is dedicated to the fundamental question of
regional identity. As such, it also sets the scene for many of the contributions in
the following sections, given the high salience of questions related to collective
identity in the context of both regional and European politics.
Elisabeth Donat gives an example of a very strong regional identity, in the case
of Tyrol, with reference to survey data on regional identity. Following the classical
approach of attitude theory in applying a tripartite definition of regional identity,
she argues that ‘Identity’ is more than just ‘identification’. Alongside the cognitive
component of classification, the affective and the connotative components of re-
gional identity are equally important, since they serve as sources of key political
attitudes and behaviour.
In her chapter, Katrin Praprotnik focuses on the relationship between various
identities. Surveys have long tended to operationalize collective identities as mu-
tually exclusive. Praprotnik addresses an important research gap by dealing with
the relationship between regional and European identity. Using Austrian data from
the European Value Study, she demonstrates that support for the EU is nearly equal
among those who consider themselves solely ‘Europeans’ and the mixed group of
‘regional Europeans’. Her analysis also demonstrates once again the importance of
education for such attitude patterns.
Camille Dobler draws a dense picture of the multiplexity of collective identities
by using the example of the Strasbourg border region. Her qualitative interviews
illustrate the coexistence of various identities but also reveal that European iden-
tity is not a particularly significant referent for her interview partners. European
identity seems to be more functionally than emotionally integrated in people’s sto-
ries at the border; it mainly comes to respondent’s minds when addressing cross-
border activities such as working or education. Her chapter again illustrates the
importance of boundaries as a social fact and not merely a geographical matter
(Simmel 1903).
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2. Regions in a Turbulent EU – Political and Legal Manifestations
While the first section of this volume focusses on regional identities at the indivi-
dual level of citizens, the contributions in this section analyse their manifestation
at the level of the polity and in the dynamics of party politics.
A strong regionalism or even regional nationalism as promoted by various po-
litical actors across European regions – rooted in or making use of a pronounced
regional identity – always carries the risk of encouraging separatist tendencies. Yet
at the same time, advocates of secession sometimes argue that if their region were
to become politically independent, it should remain a member of the EU – this is
the case in both Scotland and Catalonia. At first glance, this could be interpreted
as a sign of genuine support for European integration or a generally pro-European
stance. In fact, however, such positioning may simply be instrumental, as the Eu-
ropean level together and the notion of a ‘Europe of the regions’ are seen as means
of fostering the desire for political autonomy and independence.Meanwhile, Brexit
has also finally brought the issue of ‘recovering’ political autonomy to the level of
the European Union. The fact that the arguments used by Brexiteers and Scottish
separatists in their respective referendums were quite similar (see Rahmatian in
this volume) tells its own tale.
While separatism is clearly the most extreme political manifestation of regio-
nalism, it is by no means the only one. Federalist arrangements often prove very
effective in balancing regional interests and identities within a polity, even in the
case of strong regional parties. This is for instance the case in Bavaria (cf. Sturm
2019 and in this volume). Whether and to what extent regionalism manifests in
claims for separatism may be influenced by a number of factors, including spe-
cific historical events, constitutional arrangements and economic developments.
The key significance of shifts in the dynamics of party politics, however, should
not be disregarded in this respect: Cleavage theory (Lipset/Rokkan 1967) has alrea-
dy taught us that the existence of social grievances and the formation of a shared
collective identity do not necessarily translate into collective political action (cf.
Bartolini/Mair 1990). The latter requires organization, i.e. ‘someone who can ta-
ke advantage of political opportunities, develop organizations of some kind, and
interpret grievances and mobilize consensus around them’ (Tarrow 1992: 177).
The contributions in this section look at legal and political manifestations of
regionalism in several EU member states. Though the empirical contexts and ana-
lytical settings are diverse, the issue of regional identity appears as an important
point of reference in each of the three chapters.
Karl Kössler’s contribution deals with manifestations of regional identity at the
level of policy and the political system. Taking examples from regions within and
beyond current EU territory, Kössler explores how references to regional identities
are reflected in constitutional documents and welfare-state policies. When rooted
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in self-perceptions of regional distinctiveness and identity, he argues, such refe-
rences are to be understood as ‘successful’ instances of regions claiming (more) self-
government. At the same time, however, they may also affect processes of identity
formation at the regional level itself.
The next chapter touches upon the most far-reaching demands for political au-
tonomy, i.e. separatist movements. Andreas Rahmatian discusses calls for Scottish
independence in the United Kingdom and challenges the very notion of the concept
of ‘civic nationalism’ as employed by the Scottish National Party. The chapter goes
on to identify a number of ironic parallels between the referendums for Scottish
independence and Brexit, respectively. Rahmatian further argues that both Brexit
and the UK government’s stance during the lengthy process of negotiations with
the EU can only be understood by taking into account what he calls Britain’s le-
gal feudalism, which still serves as the framework for a state without a written
constitution.
Roland Sturm takes a closer look at Bavaria, a special case in German politics
compared to the other Länder.The population of Bavaria is characterized by a par-
ticularly strong regional identity. This is clearly reflected in the political behaviour
of its main governing party, the CSU, which is often said to desire more autonomy
for Bavaria or a greater decentralization of state powers in Germany. This, howe-
ver, is not the case, as aptly demonstrated by Sturm. Rather, the CSU’s anti-Berlin
politics are to be understood mainly as a symbolic gesture and a matter of stra-
tegy. Hence, despite heavily relying on regional allegiance in its communications,
the CSU clearly sees Bavaria’s place as within Germany and the EU.
3. Intended and Unintended Consequences of EU Programmes
for Regional Development
European regions held out great hopes for the EU, not only with regard to their
desire for increased political influence. Economically disadvantaged regions also
expected to catch up rapidly with stronger regions in terms of economic and social
development. Such expectations seemed eminently reasonable, given that the EU
treaties explicitly set out the goal of strengthening the EU’s economic, social and
(since the Treaty of Lisbon) territorial cohesion. Many of these hopes, however,
have not been fulfilled. First, despite the strengthening of the role of regions in
the EU governance system as a result of treaty change, regions have not become
participants in the EU legislative process as a ‘third level’ alongside the Council and
the European Parliament. Second, EU cohesion policy programmes by and large
seem to show heterogeneous effects (Bachtrögler/Oberhofer 2018).
Against this background, the emergence of a new regional Euroscepticism and
even calls for independence cannot be precluded, at least in some European regi-
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ons and both among citizens as well as regional political actors. Conversely, the
(perceived) effectiveness of EU cohesion policy in a given region seems to have at
least the potential to reduce anti-EU voting (cf. ibid.).
EU regional investment programmes increasingly require cross-border coope-
ration between regions and member states. This has resulted in a number of suc-
cessful projects fostering cross-border infrastructure, culture or educational links.
Such cooperation points to an encouraging future for European regions as they
manoeuvre beyond the ‘national containers’ of member states that have undoub-
tedly blocked many decisions at the EU level in recent years. Regional cross-border
cooperation also contains promise in the form of the emergence of multiple collec-
tive identities across state borders. This is not limited to privileged social groups
that regularly travel across the continent and benefit most from European integra-
tion. As things stand, however, this is of course all still up in the air.
The contributions in this section look at EU regional investment programmes
from a range of angles, either as the dependent or the main independent variable.
They focus on European identity, the question of policy shifts as a result of the
global financial crisis, and cross-border cooperation, respectively.
Fabian Landes’ contribution presents his research on the effects of territorial
investment on European identity. By means of a multilevel analysis, Landes tests
the assumption that attachment to the EU is a consequence, at least in part, of
economic-utilitarian considerations on the part of citizens. The effects of such in-
vestment can be demonstrated formixed identities (at once national and European)
and vary among countries but surprisingly not within them, pointing to the fact
that the ‘national container’ is still the dominant category in politics.
Moritz Neujeffski examines whether regional investment programmes in the
EU have undergone a shift in their rationale from redistribution to competitiveness
following the global financial crisis. He analyses major reforms within the Eu-
ropean Structural and Investment Funds prior to and after the crisis and compares
them to the Investment Plan for Europe, a.k.a. the ‘Juncker Plan’. Employing the
theory of ‘discourse coalitions’, he identifies a continuous strengthening ofmarket-
based instruments and the endorsement of more competitiveness already prior to
the crisis, pushed by a stable coalition of a handful of member states.
Cross-border cooperation between regions in Europe are at the core of Urszula
Roman-Kamphaus’ contribution. Comparing the Polish-German and Polish-Slovak
border regions, she highlights the importance of cultural factors for understan-
ding differences in the effectiveness of EU-funded cross-border cooperation.While
pre-existing networks and cultural similarities promote successful implementation
across the Polish-Slovak border, Roman-Kamphaus argues that policy innovation
is higher in the Polish-German case precisely because of the lack of such resources.
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4. Still Dreaming of a ‘Europe of the Regions’? On the Interplay of
Regions in the EU
The concept of a ‘Europe of the regions’ has at times been popular in both Eu-
ropean politics and the scholarly literature, particularly during the 1980s. It has
been accompanied by various attempts to strengthen the role of regions within
the EU’s multilevel governance framework. While the role of regions has indeed
been strengthened via EU treaty reforms – beginning with the establishment of
the European Committee of the Regions in the Maastricht Treaty – regional poli-
tical actors have since suffered a degree of disillusionment: EU member states still
have the major say at nearly all levels of the EU decision-making process today.
Nevertheless, there are gentle signs of a restructuring and re-empowering at the
regional level: the Committee of Regions is a vivid example of constructive coope-
ration among regions within the EU and is greatly valued by its members and part-
ners. Furthermore, several contributions to this volume also provide evidence of a
rise in regional identification together with identification as European, which sug-
gests a growing interest in European affairs among citizens with a strong regional
identity. Some authors even go further in perceiving momentum at the European
level towards again granting regions a major stake in the EU governance system:
Ulrike Guérot (2016), for example, argues in favour of restructuring the EU political
system as a European Republic. Gabriele Abels and Jan Battke (2019) also inquire
into the role of regions in EU governance following the failure of a ‘Europe of the
regions’ to emerge, concluding that what actually seems to be in the making no-
wadays is a ‘Europe with the regions’ (ibid.: 237).
The contributions in the final section of this volume look at the origins of and
the drift away from the dream of a ‘Europe of the regions’.
Justus Schönlau takes a closer look at the role of the European Committee of the
Regions (CoR) in reinforcing notions of multilevel governance in the EU. Though
its institutional role is limited to an advisory function by the EU treaties, Schönlau
shows how the CoR managed to expand its impact on EU policy making in various
ways while aggregating and balancing the multitude of views and experiences of
its heterogeneous member base. Taking the examples of CoR policy action in the
field of climate change and the very recent RegHub initiative, he argues that the
CoR has indeed become a significant agent in the institutionalization of multile-
vel governance, thus supporting not only the functioning but ultimately also the
legitimacy of the European integration project.
In her contribution, Claire Wallace analyses the end of the ‘European dream’,
which has led to a re-emergence of nationalism. For a long time it was hoped that
growing Europeanization would lead to growing cosmopolitanism, but, at least at
the beginning of the new millennium, these hopes had to be buried as nationalism
and populism grew throughout Europe. Wallace’s analysis of Eurobarometer data
20 Elisabeth Donat, Sarah Meyer
provides evidence that, alongside growing national identification, regional identi-
fication has also increased among citizens.Her text presents examples of this trend
in the cases of Latvia and Scotland and leads her to conclude that recent times have
seen a growth in ‘placism’– a tendency to identify with places in general.
Ulrike Guérot’s chapter contains a brief history of the concept of ‘Europe of
the regions’, in which she criticises the dominance of the member states at nearly
all levels of EU decision making. Guérot diagnoses a lack of republicanism in the
current political system of the EU and argues for both to be integrated in the near
future: republicanism and a federal structure that would give more power to the
regions. Her innovative approach is to call for a ‘European Republic’ that would
create a common umbrella under which European regions could peacefully coexist
and citizens’ rights would be managed under the principle of equality before the
law.
The field of Regional Studies is multifaceted, multidisciplinary and multilevel.
Given the ‘sui generis’ nature of the EU, it is not surprising that we can observe in-
creasing scholarly interest in the role of regions within the EU context. For regions
in Europe, numerous political, economic and societal challenges have come along
with the new millennium. The aim of this book is to contribute to the reflection
and study of the various regional responses to these challenges across Europe. By
collecting contributions from political science, sociology as well as legal studies,
this volume reflects the diversity in the field and takes account of the complexity
of European regions within a constantly changing environment.
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Regional Identity – a Citizens Perspective

Regional Identity between Inclusion and Exclusion
Elisabeth Donat
Do Regions Provide Cause for Optimism in a Turbulent Europe?
These days, waiting for decisions to be made at EU level requires patience. The EU
28 appear to have lost their fizz. Recently, both ‘internal’ matters, such as the ap-
pointment of a new European Commission, and ‘external’ questions, such as the
EU’s ongoing attempts to deal with what is often referred to as ‘the migrant crisis’,
havemade one thing very clear: At the level of itsmember states, the EU is divided –
into north and south, east and west, old and newmembers, and a United Kingdom
that, thanks to Brexit, is largely preoccupied for the time being. In many countries,
populist movements appear to be determining the direction of government policy;
political ideas incubated by these movements are being adopted –more or less wil-
lingly – by the political mainstream, thereby sowing the seeds of Euroscepticism
among broad swathes of voters. These developments, the political vacuum and the
powerlessness currently affecting many EU decision-making processes, have cau-
sed many to reconsider the concept of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ (Ruge 2004) for
new ideas and renewed hope. The concept of a ‘European Republic’ (Guérot 2016)
is not the only proposal that includes a greater role for Europe’s regions; an an-
thology recently published in German (Hilpold et al. 2016) explores strategies for
enhancing the regions’ influence in the European context. But why should we assu-
me that regions would be ‘more reasonable’, more amenable to uniting in a federal
Europe consisting of regions and would not act merely as smaller versions of to-
day’s nations, which would find it just as hard to achieve unity among their many
particular interests? The formation of regional identity strengthens and supports
a political community and is a key variable when considering the reorganisation
of regions and their competencies at the EU level. This chapter asks what regional
identity means and howmuch common interest a political community requires. At
the same time, it considers the balancing act that needs to be performed between
an inclusive and an exclusive (in the sense of exclusionary) regional identity.
Opinion polls periodically reveal that, in terms of territorial reference points,
regional identity is one of the most relevant sources of identification, immediate-
ly behind national identity, and well ahead of any European identity (Mühler/Opp
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2004, Haller 2009, European Commission/European Parliament 2017).1 Regional
identity shows incredible persistence: even though identities are becoming increa-
singly cosmopolitan, global, hybrid and multiple, regional identity is a consistent
key factor in the self-definition of most respondents (Pohl 2001). Interest in regio-
nal identity has also grown, not least as a result of the boom in social geography.
Conversely, the ‘spatial turn’ in the humanities and social sciences since the 1980s
has also seen the concept of space grow in prominence in analyses of social struc-
tures and social action (Schroer 2008). In the 1990s, extensive studies were carried
out of the importance of national identity and the distinction between nationalism
and patriotism (Fleiss et. al. 2009; Parker 2010; Blank/Schmidt 2003; Weiss/Rein-
precht 2004; Kosterman/Feshbach 1989). As the European Union underwent suc-
cessive major enlargements, research started to focus on questions of European
identity. Political scientists are particularly interested in the various levels of iden-
tity – regional, national, European and cosmopolitan – because a shared identity
is an important aspect of a political community (Herrmann/Brewer 2000; Peters
2005; Meyer 2009; Datler 2012; Galais/Serrano 2019). Nonetheless, little attention
has so far been paid to ‘regional identity’ in the political sciences, and though it is
one of the dimensions of ‘identity’ regularly included in major surveys of opinion,
it is rarely analysed in depth (see also the chapter by Praprotnik in this volume).
As a result, our knowledge of the substance and specific forms of manifes-
tation of regional identity is limited. In large international surveys of attitudes,
regional identity is most commonly dealt with using the concept of ‘attachment’
to the region, alongside questions on attachment to town or city, nation and the
EU/Europe. Yet this operationalisation covers only one aspect of regional identi-
ty, namely the degree of identification with the region. It does not explain what
substantive elements regional identity draws upon, whether there is an emotional
spectrum of ‘attachment’, and what forms of planned behaviour (Ajzen et al. 2005)
it can motivate. Unfortunately, opinion surveys and research often use the concept
of ‘identity’ hastily and in an unreflective way, a fact that has already been subject
to criticism (Brubaker/Cooper 2000). Even if ‘identity’ can shift in the course of life
and is influenced by socialisation processes (Erikson 1974), we can assume that it
is not renegotiated each day but is more or less habitually present (on the example
of national identity, Deschouwer et. al. 2015) and only becomes salient in a given
situation or context (Herrmann/Brewer 2000).
This chapter begins by summarising the findings of research carried out in the
social sciences on the measurement of national and European identity and uses
this to identify problems of the definition and measurement of regional identity.
1 Asked about attachment, 89 percent of respondents answered that they feel attached to their
city, town or village, 92 percent to their country, and only 54 percent to the European Union.
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Drawing on survey data from a study of regional identity in the Tyrol, it then con-
siders whether the distinction between a constructive identity and a chauvinistic
attitude should also be made at the regional level. Finally, it considers the implica-
tions for relations between regions in a federation of European regions.
Defining and Measuring Regional, National and European Identity
We use territorial designations quite naturally to describe all kinds of collective
identities: thus, we can speak of a local, regional, national and European identi-
ty, with reference in each case to a territory that we can easily envisage. As early
as 1903, Georg Simmel (Simmel 1903: 15) in his essay on the sociology of space
argued that ‘This is why consciousness of boundedness is not at its most precise
with so-called natural boundaries (mountains, rivers, oceans or deserts) but rather
with merely political boundaries which only place a geometrical line between two
neighbours.’ Simmel was one of the first to stress the social component of the con-
struction of space. Space is no longer a static given fact, but is defined, shaped and
transformed by social activity. Relations of objects in space, of people, the organi-
sation of space in general are expressions of existing power relations, because they
create hierarchies. By means of ‘Spacing’ (Löw 2000), the appropriation of space,
space is constructed in material and immaterial terms (via values, norms, rules).
It only becomes space in itself by means of (re)construction processes that take
the form of acts of synthesis. These acts of synthesis encompass the perception,
imagination and memory of spaces. In the temporal dimension, spatial relations
are reinforced by unchanging routines and (cognitive) reproduction and only called
into question when conflicts arise (Keating 2013). Precisely such conflict situations
and power struggles make us aware of how spaces are emotionally charged: spatial
identity is always also social identity. To speak of purely ‘territorial identity’ ap-
pears to be misleading: social relations are reflected in space and in this way give
space meaning. We are not dealing with mere ‘place-ism’ (i.e. a need for territo-
rial belonging, Lewis 2016; Evans 2012), but also and above all the social relations
associated with a given space.
To return to the questions we posed at the start, this raises the matter of whe-
ther regional identity can be ‘more constructive’ per se than national identity, and
whether, for example, regions would act ‘more reasonably’ in a European-level po-
litical entity than do nation states. If, however, it is not possible to speak of spatial
identity in itself, we can assume that regions are also deeply infused with social
identity and emotionalised and undertake the same processes of demarcation and
drawing of borders as nations. Since it has so far proved impossible, in the case of
nations, to empirically demonstrate the existence of a constructive, collective iden-
tity, a constitutional patriotism (Habermas 1993), a rational solidarity community,
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we may also assume that in the case of regions, attachment always goes hand in
hand with processes of demarcation and exclusion. In studies of national identity,
it has been observed that individuals who (are said to) embody a patriotic position
continually flirt with nationalist attitudes (Wagner et. al. 2012). In concrete terms,
this finds empirical expression in the difficulty of distinguishing a nationalist fac-
tor from a patriotic, civic ‘rational’ factor (Schatz et al. 1999): Both constructs (and
their measurement errors) exhibit such consistently high correlation that it is hard
to distinguish cleanly between them (Fleiss et. al. 2009; Parker 2010; Blank/Schmidt
2003; Weiss/Reinprecht 2004; Kosterman/Feshbach 1989). Nor do the two concepts
stand up well to testing via construct validation, since they show similar corre-
lations with external factors. It therefore cannot be said that they represent two
distinct attitude patterns.
At the regional level, Chacha (2012) attempts to distinguish between ‘inclusi-
ve’ and ‘exclusive’ attachment to region, where the former includes identification
with the nation alongside identification with the region, and where the analysis
also shows a small, positive correlation with European identity. By contrast, ex-
clusive regional identification demonstrates no correlation with European identi-
ty – though it is questionable, given the low coefficient, whether the distinction
between these two stances can be considered proven. Moreover, it may not be cor-
rect to assume that this correlation automatically indicates a pro-European stance:
Wallace (2020, in this volume) notes a general increase in the desire to identify
with a territory or group. Simultaneously identifying with region, nation and the
EU/Europe does not necessarily indicate a cosmopolitan attitude but may merely
reflect this general desire to identify with territories and/or groups. To explain this
situation requires a more precise determination of substance, emotional content,
and potential behavioural consequences, as undertaken, for instance, by Roudo-
mentof (2019) with reference to the ‘local’. When only a single indicator is applied
(the question of attachment), it remains unclear what this attachment consists of,
how it may be expressed in terms of emotions, and what kinds of action it might
precipitate.
When considering regional identity in a political context, it is particularly im-
portant to distinguish it from a ‘regionalism’ that might bring the agendas of the
group in question to the fore (potentially at the cost of others) (Pohl 2001: 12919):
‘The line between vague regional identity and active political regionalism is not
sharp and the motifs are mixed together.’ Models of ‘mixed’ and ‘nested’ identi-
ties assume that the coexistence of regional and European identity indicates an
inclusive and open attitude (Hermann/Brewer 2000; Galais/Serrano 2019; Medra-
no/Gutiérrez 2001). In light of research on secession and autonomy movements
within the EU, however, this extrapolation appears somewhat dangerous: whether
such professions of identity are in fact pro-European or merely pay lip service to
Europeanism as a means of resisting a restrictive nation state needs to be exami-
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ned in each individual case: ‘Through subsidiarity, regions have come to perceive
the EU “as an ally against the central state”.’ (Jolly 2007: 4)
Research at the level of European identity has also attempted to differentiate
between ‘cultural’ and ‘civic’ identity, though no tests on representative samples
have so far been carried out (Bruter 2003, 2004). Measuring the emotional com-
ponent of collective identity has proven particularly difficult. Duchesne (2008) and
Duchesne & Frognier (2008) have suggested that political identity is adequately
operationalised using the concept of ‘identification’; the concept of ‘citizenship’ has
been deployed as a means of explaining who respondents include within their own
group and who they exclude (Reeskens/Hooghe 2010): however, such analyses re-
main trapped at the level of ‘social categorisation’, i.e. the cognitive classification
of people into groups. Using this approach tends to mask the consequences of such
acts of categorisation: Attitudes always also include affective and connotative com-
ponents (Allport 1967; Herrmann/Brewer 2000; Kaina 2009). Precisely this positive,
emotional relation would be the basis for the legitimation for political action at the
regional, national or European level.
Collective identity is generated at the level of the individual (attitudes) and rein-
forced at the collective level via the social construction of cultural norms (narrati-
ves, discourses etc.) (Wiesner 2017). The cognitive components of a constructive
identification with region/nation/Europe appear to be relatively clear (at least in
theory): it involves a commitment to fundamental democratic values, civil rights,
the rule of law and recognition of the constitution (Habermas 1993; Laborde 2002).
However, here we are dealing with abstract, postmaterialist structures that many
respondents would likely have difficulty in identifying and categorising in an empi-
rical test. The definition of the affective components of such an attitude is unclear
(Deschouwer et. al. 2015; Fleiss et al. 2009): Is it a matter of ‘pride’ at certain con-
stitutional achievements that binds ‘patriots’ to a certain territory or group? Or
does a constructive regional identity consist of a combination of ‘love’ of a territory
together with certain values?
Nor is regional identity immune to preferential evaluation of one’s own group
and the deprecation of outside groups, in the appropriate context (Tajfel 1982).
‘Pride’ in one’s own region always includes an element of comparison: ‘proud’ in
contrast to whom or what? Even where ‘pride’ focuses ‘merely’ on democratic achie-
vements such as constitutionalism or the rule of law, it cannot avoid a degree of
idealisation. It is therefore not only worth varying the substantive features used
to measure collective identity but also, at the level of affect, to model the nuances
of feeling associated with attachment. Weiner’s (2004) attribution theory provides
a useful framework for analysing the various possible forms of emotional attach-
ment: ‘The most basic assumption of an attribution view of emotion is that fee-
lings are determined by thoughts, and specifically by beliefs about causality.’ (ibid.
355). Causal beliefs triggered by an event are distributed along the dimensions of
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causal locus (internal/external), causal stability (stable/unstable) and causal control
(controllable/uncontrollable). In accordance with the fundamental attribution er-
ror, people tend to attribute events, and particularly successes, to internal qualities
rather than situational circumstances. In the case of self-serving bias, for instan-
ce, we attribute our successes to our own aptitudes and efforts than to situational
factors. Attribution errors of this kind are also committed with regard to groups:
group-serving attributional bias describes this phenomenon in relation to the at-
tribution of successes to the internal qualities of the group to which one belongs. If
we arrange emotions along these dimensions, focusing in particular on those that
are attributed to internal causes, we generate the following classification (Table 1):
Table 1: Attribution, causal dimension, behaviour relations (Weiner 2004: 357 )
In the following analysis of emotional attachment to the region, the focus will
therefore lie on the emotions of pride, happiness, gratitude, and shame. As a com-
pletely neutral emotion, ‘indifference’ will also be included. It should be noted that
the emotion ‘pride’, in particular, is attributed to an internal cause in multiple in-
stances: once as a consequence of aptitude and again as a result of effort. By con-
trast, Weiner classifies happiness as a ‘relatively “thoughtless” emotion’ (ibid. 357),
as it arises independently of any specific cause. Weiner describes ‘gratitude’ as an
emotion that is capable of evoking pro-social behaviour, as it may arouse a desi-
re to ‘balance the scales of justice’. While, according to this schema, pride has no
effect on the motivational basis for further action, shame leads to withdrawal and
inhibits future action. The next section examines these relationships in terms of
causal attribution to one’s own group for data relating to regional identity in Tyrol.
Regional Identity between Inclusion and Exclusion 31
Survey Results: A Passion for Tyrol
In the following section, which considers the case of regional identity in Tyrol, we
consider what elements constitute this identity, what emotional nuances they con-
tain, and whether it is possible to distinguish between inclusive and exclusive (in
the sense of exclusionary) attachment.The data discussed here was gathered in 2011
by means of a representative random sample of 500 Tyrolean men and women.2
Prior to gathering this quantitative data, 29 narrative interviews were carried out
with Tyrolean residents, consisting of a biographical component and a problem-
centred component focusing on the respondents’ regional identity. The qualitative
interviews were carried out by trained personnel from Tyrol, i.e. by members of
the ‘in-group’, which proved highly conducive to an open atmosphere for the dis-
cussions.These interviews proved extremely helpful when it came to designing the
questionnaire, as they indicated just how very strongly Tyoleans identify with their
region. These ties are so strong that the attachment is even expressed in terms of
physical, corporeal images andmetaphors (the heart, the five senses, blood, genes).
Detailed descriptions of one’s own group with an emphasis on their authenticity
(authentic like the miners, authentic like Tyrolean sportsmen and women, authen-
tic and committed to solidarity like Tyrolean freedom fighters) contrast with vague
descriptions and evasive speculations about other groups. The interview material
also provided numerous metaphors for social inclusion and exclusion.
The strong emotional attachment to Tyrol is also evident in the quantitative da-
ta. 86 percent of respondents stated that they had deep roots in Tyrol and 87 percent
that they love the region. By contrast, only 27 percent answered that they only live
in Tyrol because of the high quality of life – a purely functional attachment thus ap-
pears to be rare.The data reveals – as do the qualitative interviews – generally very
strong attachment to the region on the part of its inhabitants. In accordance with
the considerations of the previous section, emotional attachment to the region has
been broken down as the result of various styles of attribution in a more detailed
manner than is usually the case in studies of this kind. Respondents were asked to
choose between five emotional states when considering their attachment to Tyrol.
Drawing on Weiner’s (2004) attribution theory, the survey covers a full spectrum
of emotions of attachment by distinguishing between pride, gratitude, happiness,
indifference, and shame. According to this theory, events associated with ‘pride’ are
interpreted as internal, controllable and stable results of sequences of occurrences
by those who experience them. By contrast, ‘gratitude’ is attributed to an external
cause – events and successes are caused by other people. ‘Happiness’ is a weak ex-
pression of a positive emotional state, in contrast to ‘indifference’, which describes
2 The survey was made possible thanks to the support of the Tyrolean Science Fund (Tiroler
Wissenschaftsfond).
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a neutral emotional state, and was present above all in the interviews with indivi-
duals who considered attribution on the basis of territories or groups to be of little
relevance in general. For reasons of balance, an explicitly negative emotion was also
included in the survey in the form of ‘shame’. To give an example: successes on the
part of one’s own group – even where one was perhaps not personally involved in
an immediate sense – could lead to an increase in self-worth by being experienced
in the form of pride, since ‘pride’ is attributed to internal, stable and controllable
causes. This leads to a boost in esteem for one’s own group – and simultaneously
for oneself (cf. Tajfel 1982).
Around a third of respondents stated that they were ‘proud’ when they thought
of Tyrol; 24 percent felt gratitude; 38.5 percent, happiness; and only 5.7 percent
expressed indifference. None of the respondents reported feeling shame in con-
nection with Tyrol (Figure 1). There were no differences in attribution by different
age groups or generations, though differences were apparent among respondents
with different levels of education and places of birth.
Figure 1 Attachment to Tyrol
The sociostructural characteristics ‘education’ and ‘place of birth’ have a clear
influence on emotional attachment to the region.The lower the level of school edu-
cation, the more likely the respondent is to report feeling the emotion of ‘pride’ in
connection with the region. By contrasts, respondents with higher levels of educa-
tional attainment have a more dispassionate stance towards the region (Figure 2)
and are more likely to express their emotional connection in terms of ‘indifference’
or ‘happiness’. Higher levels of education thus appear to lead to a ‘cooler’ relations-
hip to the region or indicate that such attributions are generally less significant for
these respondents.
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Figure 2: Educational Attainment and Regional Attachment3
Place of birth naturally plays a large role in determining attachment to the
region: respondents who were born in Tyrol were more likely to be proud of the
region, while those who moved there later in life were most likely to select the
comparatively neutral emotion of ‘happiness’ (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Place of Birth and Attachment to the Region
Following this overview of the data and discussion of how emotional attach-
ment varies according to sociostructural characteristics, we will now consider how
these emotions correlate with other attitude patterns. The focus here is on which
3 The Matura is the highest school leaving certificate in Austria, achieved after usually twelve
years of schooling.
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emotions, if any, can be linked with exclusionary activities or associated with chau-
vinism. In a logical regression, the influence of attitudes towards incomers and the
correlation with conservative attitudes were examined. Two indexes were construc-
ted: the first models the expectations made of new arrivals, the second consists of
conservative values (for the individual items in the indexes, see Table 3 in the ap-
pendix).When new residents arrive in Tyrol, they are expected to adapt.More than
80 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that new arrivals should not
be given preferential treatment (‘strongly agree’ and ‘generally agree’), and near-
ly as many respondents agreed that new residents should comply with prevailing
norms (‘strongly agree’ and ‘generally agree’). A greater variety of emotional respon-
ses were elicited on the question of whether newcomers to Tyrol should bring their
own culture and way of life with them: only around half of respondents agreed
(strongly) that they should. Respondents also demonstrated a very high level of
conservative values (cf. Appendix, Table 3). They were almost unanimous in consi-
dering ‘security and order’ and ‘conscientiousness’ to be important values.The value
‘being hardworking and ambitious’ also found the approval of a high proportion of
respondents –more than 80 percent considered this to be an important virtue (‘im-
portant and ‘very important’). Only with respect to the value ‘sense of tradition’ was
there a degree of variation in the answers given (cf. Table 3 in the Appendix). We
performed a multinomial regression to examine the influence of critical attitudes
towards new residents and conservative values on the various categories of emo-
tional attachment (Table 2). ‘Indifference’ was selected as the reference category.
For the model of the variable ‘pride’, both factors appeared to have a significant
influence. In the case of the other two models (‘gratitude’ and ‘happiness’), only
conservative values appeared significant. ‘Gratitude’ and ‘happiness’ thus appear to
have less of an exclusionary character than ‘pride’.












Critical attitude towards new residents 0.341 1.099
Conservatism 0.016 0.583
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It is worth examining the substance of ‘pride’ more closely in terms of these
results. There is a strong sense of pride in belonging, and this is clearly projected
towards the ‘outside’ (Figure 4). Nearly all the respondents stated that they were at
least partly proud that Tyrol is so popular among tourists. Almost two thirds were
of the opinion that people should use clear ‘markers’ to indicate their origins to the
outside world, and nearly half of respondents answered that it makes them proud
when politicians from Tyrol are included in the Austrian national government. On-
ce again, these distributions indicate a strong tendency towards differentiation in-
to ingroups and outgroups on the part of the respondents.
Figure 4: Pride (N= 500 )
If these items are combined to create a ‘pride scale’, a correlation with exclusio-
nary attitudes is again revealed. Pride shows a correlation of 0.327** with a critical
attitude towards new arrivals, indicating a significant (p=0.01) correlation between
pride in one’s region and a critical attitude towards incomers.
In summary we can conclude that regional attachment has several emotional
dimensions, which entail a variety of implications (for action). The dimension of
‘pride’ stands out in particular: drawing on Weiner’s (2004) attribution theory, it
can be argued that an attitude of pride makes one relatively receptive to the pro-
motion of chauvinistic attitudes and prejudices towards other groups.The data al-
so generally indicates a strong attachment to the region. Other analyses (cf. Donat
2020) show that regional pride is also closely associated with an uncritical stance
towards history and a sceptical attitude with regard to the modernisation of the
region. Conservative positions are also prominently represented throughout the
entire sample. The range of opinions revealed by this survey is relatively uniform,
which is why it is virtually impossible to apply clustering procedures, and multino-
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mial regression reveals low coefficients and generally weak correlation in a gene-
rally homogeneous set of opinions. The respondents reported an almost uniformly
high level of attachment to the region, as the qualitative interviews had already
shown. The survey reveals a region that is highly ‘self-assertive’ with high levels of
regional attachment in virtually every population group.
Social Closure in a Europe of the Regions
In the results presented here, Tyrol gives the impression of being a self-assertive re-
gion.This places high expectations on new arrivals seeking to join Tyrolean society.
Tyroleans express their identity to the outside world (with pride) and have a clear
understanding of what it means to belong. Their desire to uphold existing norms
is evident in their wish for Tyrol to remain as it is (cf. Donat 2020). How would a
region that is so self-assertive conduct itself in a ‘Europe of the regions’? Although
the results presented here certainly do not allow us to draw conclusions about how
a regional identity of this kind would influence behaviour in a union with other
(strong?) regional identities, nonetheless, they do outline a number of parameters
that the processes of demarcation and exclusion associated with a very strong re-
gional identity reveal. It is legitimate to ask how cooperation and the pursuit of a
united common interest can be achieved when several self-assured regions of this
kind come together. In view of the growing disparities among Europe’s regions,
the issue of the regional balance of power also arises – and the related matter of
who would call the tune. A self-assured region such as Tyrol is certain to see itself
as a key player, as the 2019 European Parliament election campaign demonstrated:
‘Europe Needs Tyrol’, but does Tyrol need Europe?
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Figure 5: The 2019 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in Tyrol
(Source: VP Tirol)
Keating (2013) takes the view that the wealthier regions in a European union
of regions would also agree to an expansion of resource redistribution among the
regions. But this has to be weighed against the existence at the present time of
many separatist movements, many prominent examples of which are economically
powerful and seek to disengage from national structures that bind them together
with economically weaker regions. It would therefore be hasty to make a blanket
judgement, and the situation calls for observation of individual cases and detailed
analysis of the components of regional identity that would provide further infor-
mation on processes of demarcation and exclusion.
Alongside the substantive features of regional identity, greater attention should
also be paid to emotional components, as they give a particularly useful insight into
the fine line that is crossed when collective identities drift into regionalism. Alt-
hough this research has outlined only some basic elements of one specific regional
identity, it is based on a comprehensive sample and extensive preparation in the
form of qualitative interviews. In this regard, it has an advantage over large, in-
ternational comparative surveys: For instance, the 2017 Eurobarometer sought the
opinions of only 86 individuals from Tyrol. This is why it is important that detailed
surveys of this kind are undertaken in the future.
In a world that is very much structured by the supposedly neutral meritocratic
ideal and the notion of singularity (Reckwitz 2017) as the path to social success, it
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makes sense to apply attribution theory as a model that can explain causal attri-
butions of success and failure. These attributions also apply to groups, particularly
when they allow us to raise our self-evaluations. The emotional spectrum of at-
tachment a region’s inhabitants have to the region is broad and does not always
follow functional and rational considerations. The political situation in Europe in
the early 21st century has again revealed the explosive power of such emotions.
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Regional Europeans
The Relationship between Social Identities and EU Support
in Austria
Katrin Praprotnik
1Politics in European countries is multi-level politics. Some decisions are made at
the regional level, others at the national level and more and more policies have
started to be negotiated at the European level. Whether each layer of the politi-
cal system is rooted in the heart of its citizens has been subject to scholarly at-
tention. A corresponding social identity is said to be an important prerequisite
of public support for a given political level. When it comes to public support for
the European Union, scholars have examined the potentially intervening effect of
a strong national identity (Carey 2002; Hooghe/Marks 2005, 2004; Kuhn/Stoeckel
2014). These studies revealed that as long as feelings of attachment are not ex-
clusive, a strong national identity does not necessarily preclude positive attitudes
towards the European Union. Identity studies that stress the fact that identities
are mutually inclusive further corroborated this finding (Marks 1997, 1999; Haesly
2001; Citrin/Sides 2004; Díes Medrano/Gutiérrez 2001).
Quite interestingly, however, these studies have largely neglected the relations-
hip between a regional and a European identity (but see Chacha 2012). We know
considerably less about people’s attachment towards their region and its effect on
their feelings towards the European Union.This comes as a surprise, since a regio-
nal identity is often equally as strong as a national identity and in some countries
even exceeds national attachment (European Commission 2019). Furthermore, the
European Union acknowledges the relevance of the regional level in its treaties
and political structure. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty anchored the principle of
subsidiarity and established the European Committee of the Regions in the EU’s
institutional framework.
1 This research has been conducted under the auspices of the Austrian Democracy Lab (ADL,
Danube University Krems and University of Graz). The ADL is part of the larger cluster demo-
cracy.research, a cooperationwith ForumMorgen. Please visit www.austriandemocracylab.at
for more information.
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Thus, the present paper aims to shed light on the relationship between a regio-
nal and a European identity and its effect on public opinion towards the EU. To be
more specific, my research question asks how a European identity that is coupled
with a regional identity affects EU support.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In the next section, I
will elaborate on the theoretical framework. Based on the relevant literature, I ex-
pect to see that a European identity has a positive effect on EU support and that a
coupled regional/European identity has an equally positive effect on EU support.
Following the theoretical section, I presentmy case selection and data.The analyses
will be based on the Austrian data of the European Values Study 2018 (Glavanovits
et al. 2019; Kritzinger et al. 2019). The fourth section is devoted to the empirical
analyses. The results show that a European identity favours EU support and that
an additional regional identity does not hinder a positive attitude towards the EU.
In the concluding section, I review this result against the background of current
identity literature and its relevance to the ongoing debate about the future of the
European Union.
Social Identities and Support for the European Union
Since the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and
throughout the history of the European Union, scholarly interest in the factors
underpinning public support for this unique political institution has been very
high. While earlier studies focused on utilitarian explanations (Eichenberg/Dal-
ton 1993; Gabel/Palmer 1995; Lubbers/Scheepers 2010; Hakhverdian et al. 2013;
Vasilopoulou/Talving 2018), more recent studies have considered the connections
between European and national social identities and attitudes towards European
integration (Carey/Lebo 2001; Carey 2002; Kuhn/Stoeckel 2014). This development
of the scholarly debate mirrors the development of the European Union. Since
economic effects prevailed at first, scholars tested whether people with a higher
socio-economic status who are able to profit from the unification process are
supportive of European integration. At least since the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992,
the EU represents more than a single market. Scholars then began to include the
concept of social identity and the effect of national and European identities in their
models. Most commonly, these items were measured as self-reported perceptions
of nationality, feelings of pride with respect to one’s own country or feelings of
attachment to different territorial levels. Both theories proved to be fruitful and
helped to paint a better picture of public support towards the European Union
(Hooghe/Marks 2004).
If we look at the studies explaining EU support based on European and national
identities, there are two lessons that can be learned. First, European identity is a
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strong predictor of EU support and second, social identities are mutually inclusive.
I start by elaborating on the first claim, which will lead me to my first hypothesis.
The identity approach began with an investigation of national identity on EU
support. The underlying rationale was that people grew up as nationals or, at least
in a context of a strong nation state. The European Union, due to an ongoing inte-
gration process, especially since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, was only present for
most people at a later point in time. In order to understand public opinion towards
the European Union, scholars saw it as important to understand the linkage bet-
ween these established national identities and the unification process. It is interes-
ting to note that the relevant studies focussed on a national identity that excluded
an additional European one.The scholars reported that feelings of exclusive natio-
nalism reduced support for the European Union (Carey 2002; Hooghe/Marks 2004,
2005; Luedtke 2005; but see Christin/Trechsel 2002). For example, Carey (2002, also
see Carey/Lebo 2001) who was the first to promote the identity approach, measu-
red national identity as a binary variable that distinguished between those who
feel only as a member of their nation and all others. He even multiplied this survey
item by the level of national pride. It does not come as a surprise that these strong
and proud nationalists are less supportive of the European integration process.
However, whether someone supports the European Union should depend not
only on national but also on European identity, i.e.whether someone feels an attach-
ment towards Europe. Some studies did in fact alreadymeasure European identity,
but the wording of the theoretical claims remained exclusively concerned with the
national level. For example, although Kuhn and Stoeckel (2014) were interested in
the effect of an exclusive national identity on EU support, they operationalised
their independent variable based on a survey item on EU citizenship. Those who
reported feeling ‘not really’ and ‘definitely not’ European citizens were classified as
exclusive nationalists.The results then showed that these exclusive nationalists we-
re less likely to support EU economic governance. If we stick to the original survey
item, then it is equally plausible to conclude that people who do not identity with
Europe are less likely to be in favour of the European Union.
Studies that measured citizens’ identification with Europe and linked it to sup-
port for the European Union unanimously highlight the positive effect of identifi-
cation on public opinion towards the EU. Carey (2002), for instance, ran a second
model in addition to the onementioned above and included an item on attachment
to Europe.This coefficient remained positive and significant even when controlling
for attachment towards other layers of the political system. The study by Hobolt
(2014) presents another convincing and more recent example. She linked attach-
ment towards Europe to public support for a deeper and wider European Union in
the future. Again, attachment to Europe explained positive attitudes towards both
versions of further integration.
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In line with this literature on European identity and EU support, I claim that
a strong European feeling should explain positive attitudes towards the European
Union. Hence, the first hypothesis reads as follows:
H1. Peoplewith a European identity aremore likely to support the EuropeanUnion
compared to people without a European identity.
The second lesson on social identities directly links to the previous discussion on
national and European identities. The presence of a European identity should not
only be relevant to understanding support for the EU, it is also plausible to expect a
European identity regardless of the existence of strong national identities. To date
we have ample empirical evidence that social identities are mutually inclusive. For
example, Marks (1997: 35) refers to ‘nested identities’, where ‘multiple, coexisting
identities with local, regional and supranational territorial communities [exist],
alongside an identity with the nation’. He supported his claim a few years later
with bivariate analyses that showed a positive relationship between national and
EU attachment. Similarly, using factor analysis, Haesly (2001) showed that while
British EU supporters would claim that their national identity is stronger than
their European identity, they nonetheless have a supranational identity, and both
of these feelings coexist within these people (in contrast to Eurosceptics who reject
having an EU identity). Regardless of the analytical approach and the countries un-
der scrutiny, the empirical studies on social identities conclude unanimously that
identity is a mutually inclusive concept (also see Citrin/Sides 2004; Díez Medra-
no/Gutiérrez 2001; Risse 2010).
While the combination of different identities and the effect of a combined
European and national identity on EU support are well established, much less is
known about the combination of European and regional feelings on the one hand,
and positive attitudes towards the EuropeanUnion, on the other. A study by Chacha
(2012: 222), however, reports that “[s]upport for European integration […] also hin-
ges on the level of inclusive regional attachment among EU citizens.”
Based on our knowledge of the effect of European and national identities on
EU support and Chacha’s (2012) research, I distinguish between regional Europeans
and Europeans. While the first group of people holds both a regional and a Euro-
pean identity, the second group are exclusively attached to Europe. If social iden-
tities are inclusive, and a European identity explains support of the EU integration
process, then positive EU attitudes should equally prevail in both groups.
H2. People with a European identity AND a regional identity (regional Europeans)
are equally likely to support the European Union as people with only a European
identity.
The following section presents the data used to test the hypotheses.
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Data: The European Values Study
In order to answer the research question and the hypotheses derived from it, I will
rely on the European Values Study (EVS).The EVS is a cross-national survey of hu-
man values in areas such as family, politics and society. Since 1981, the EVS has
conducted five waves of surveys in between 16 and 47 European countries/regions
each time. In the present chapter, I examine the relationship between regional/Eu-
ropean identity and EU support based on the Austrian data from the most recent
EVS, which was carried out in 2018 (Glavanovits et al. 2019; Kritzinger et al. 2019).2
The population consisted of people aged 18 or older who had their primary priva-
te residence in Austria. All interviews were face-to-face and conducted in spring
2018.
The survey provides adequate questions for both my dependent and indepen-
dent variables. Recall that the dependent variable should reflect people’s support
for the European Union. I use the following EVS question to operationalise EU
support:
Q38. Please look at this card and tellme, for each item listed, howmuch confidence
you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? – The
European Union
A simple tabulation provides an overview of the descriptive results of the EVS Aus-
tria with respect to this question.The Austrian figures show that 7 percent have a lot
of confidence in the European Union and 34 percent have quite a lot of confidence.
The remaining have not very much (38 percent) and no confidence at all (19 percent)
in the European Union (and 2 percent did not answer). These results are compara-
ble to other data sources such as the Eurobarometer study (with the proviso that
the questions are similar, but not identical). In the most recent Eurobarometer wa-
ve, Austrians were surveyed about their image of the European Union. Based on a
five-point scale, 8 percent reported a ‘very positive’, 32 percent a ‘fairly positive’, 37
percent a ‘neutral’, 18 percent a ‘fairly negative’ and 4 percent a ‘very negative’ image
(European Commission 2019).
In the multivariate models, I differentiate between people who have a ‘great
deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in the EU and all other respondents. This binary
construction of the variable helps to identify EU supporters and is a commonly
used approach in the literature (e.g. Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Vasilopoulou/Talving
2018).
2 This sample includes all the respondents from the EVS study in Austria plus an additional
sample on people with a migration background. In my multivariate analyses, I use the re-
commended data weights to guarantee representativeness.
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My main independent variables are European and regional identities. I opera-
tionalise these variables based on the question on attachment towards the different
geographical levels. Hence, in the following I will use the term identity and attach-
ment interchangeably. The corresponding survey item taken from the EVS reads:
Q45. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the
world. Using this card, would you tell me how close do you feel to…?
… your region [v164]
… Europe [v167]
In answering this question, people could choose between ‘very close’, ‘close’, ‘not
very close’ and ‘not close at all’. Again, descriptive statistics provide a first impres-
sion of the survey results (see Table 1). When the Austrian participants were asked
about their feelings of attachment towards Europe, 20 percent reported that they
are ‘very close’ and 46 percent that they are ‘close’. ‘Not very’ or ‘not at all close’ were
the responses of 27 percent and 6 percent, respectively.
Unsurprisingly, Austrians hold higher levels of attachment towards their region
than towards Europe. Almost all respondents feel ‘very’ (45 percent) or ‘fairly’ (43
percent) close to the regional level. Only a minority reported that they are ‘not very
close’ (10 percent) or ‘not close at all’ (1 percent).













Europe 20 46 27 6 1 0
Nation state 46 46 6 1 0 0
Region 45 43 10 1 0 0
City/Town 47 41 11 1 0 0
Notes: Figures do not add up to 100 due to rounding. Source : European Values Study 2018 –
Austria (Glavanovits et al. 2019; Kritzinger et al. 2019).
In order to compare these figures, Table 1 additionally includes the correspon-
ding answers to both the national and the local level. We see that these results are
quite similar to people’s attachment to their region and well above those of the
European level.
Again, I collapsed the relevant variables and generated the binary variables Eu-
ropean identity and Regional identity. These variables differentiate between attach-
ment (i.e. ‘very close’ and ‘close’) and a lack of attachment to each level (i.e. ‘not
very close’ and ‘not close at all’). Next, in order to test H2, I generated the variable
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Nested identities.This variable distinguishes people that are solely attached to the re-
gional level from people without any attachment to either level, from people with
European attachment only and from those who have both regional and European
attachment. If a European identity (and hence attachment) is compatible with a
regional identity then I would expect to see equal levels of EU support among Eu-
ropeans and regional Europeans.
My models will control for both the utilitarian (e.g. Gabel/Palmer 1995) and
the cue-taking explanations of EU support (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2002). In line with
previous literature, I use education to take the line of argumentation within the
utilitarian approach into account. The variable Education is incorporated as a cate-
gorical variable in the models. In line with the cue-taking approach, I include the
respondents’ political position measured by a Left/right self-placement on a scale that
ranges from zero (extreme left) to ten (extreme right). Finally, all models control
for Age and Gender as these two variables are commonly used control variables that
showed relevant effects in the past. Younger people are generally found to be sup-
portive of the European idea (Inglehart 1970, Lubbers/Scheepers 2010, Kuhn 2012,
but see Defelm/Pampel 1996 and Carey 2002 who found no age effect). The same
goes for male compared to female respondents (Inglehart 1970, Lubbers/Scheepers
2010, Defelm/Pampel 1996, Nelsen/Guth 2000, Carey 2002).
Explaining Support for the European Union in Austria
How does a European identity affect support for the European Union? How does
a European identity that is supplemented by a regional identity change EU attitu-
des? In order to provide an answer to these questions, I will first present binary
inspections of the variables and then multivariate models that test whether these
relationships hold under control of other relevant factors. I begin by comparing
support of the European Union among people who feel attached towards Europe
and others. The difference is quite remarkable. Among those who have a European
identity, 11 percent are strong supporters of the European Union and 40 percent are
supporters (38 percent have some support and 11 percent have no support). If we
look at the group without a European identity, we see that only 5 percent are strong
supporters of the European Union and 26 percent are supporters (44 percent with
some and 26 percent with no support). This is a difference of 20 percentage points
in EU support between people with and without a European identity and hence in
line with the expectation of H1. Table 2 inspects this relationship further and pres-
ents a bivariate tabulation of the newly generated variable Nested identities and EU
support. Recall that the variable Nested identities reflects a combination of the two
survey items on attachment towards Europe and the regional level. The first group
of people stated that they feel only attached to their region, the second group re-
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ported that they feel neither attached to Europe nor to their region, the third group
showed attachment towards Europe and finally, the fourth group revealed both at-
tachment to Europe and to the regional level. Again, we see that European identity
is closely linked to EU support. It is interesting to note that EU support is rather
similar among Europeans and regional Europeans. Both groups show high figures
of EU support. Among Europeans, 13 percent and 44 percent have a lot or quite a lot
of confidence in the European Union. Among regional Europeans, 10 percent and
40 percent have a lot or quite a lot of confidence in the European Union. This is in
line with H2, and the multivariate models will show whether there is no significant
difference in EU support among Europeans and regional Europeans.
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10 40 39 11
Source : European Values Study 2018 – Austria (Glavanovits et al. 2019; Kritzinger et al. 2019).
These multivariate models are binary logistic regression models. Recall that
the dependent variable differentiates between people who have confidence in the
European Union and all other respondents; i.e. EU supporters vs. EU critics.Model
I presents the multivariate test of H1. The first hypothesis expects that a European
identity will be shown to be positively linked with support for the European Union.
Model II presents the multivariate test of H2. The second hypothesis holds that
regional Europeans, i.e. people that identify with both the EU and their region, are
just as likely to support the European Union as Europeans, i.e. people that identify
only with the EU.
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European identity 3.791*** (7.54)
Regional identity 1.150 (0.65)
Nested Identities
Regional identity only 0.267*** (-3.92)
No identity 0.111*** (-5.23)







Reference category Reference category
Apprenticeship or
vocationalmiddle school




1.119 (0.45) 1.102 (0.38)
University degree 1.712* (1.95) 1.682* (1.87)
Left/right self-placement 0.843*** (-4.11) 0.843*** (-4.02)
Age 0.992* (-1.72) 0.992* (-1.81)
Female 0.895 (-0.77) 0.881 (-0.88)
Pseudo R2 0.106 0.110
N 1,685 1,683
Note: Dependent variable: EU supporters (0/1); Exponentiated coefficients; t-statistics in
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source : European Values Study 2018 – Aus-
tria (Glavanovits et al. 2019; Kritzinger et al. 2019).
Themultivariate tests confirm hypothesis 1.There is a positive relationship bet-
ween European identity and support for the European Union. The coefficient EU
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identity inModel I is greater than one and highly significant. If people identify with
the European Union, then they are more likely to support the EU as well. In order
to interpret the magnitude of the effect, I predict the probabilities of EU support.
If a person does identify with the European Union, then the probability that he or
she supports the EU is 0.53. This figure drops to 0.23 if identification with the EU
is absent. The predicted probabilities and their respective confidence intervals are
plotted in Graph 1.
Figure 1:. Predicted Probabilities of EU support: European Identity
Note: Predictions are based on Model I in Table 3.
Furthermore, there is no significant difference between people with only a Eu-
ropean identity and people with a European identity AND a regional identity. Both
Europeans and regional Europeans are supporters of the European Union. This is
in line with Hypothesis 2, which expected regional Europeans to be equally likely
to support the European Union compared to people with only a European identity.
In Model II, people with only a European attachment are taken as the reference ca-
tegory. Compared to this group, the coefficient Regional and European identities
is not significant, and hence I conclude that there is no statistical difference bet-
ween these groups. Note that both people who do not identify with either level or
who are only attached to their region are less likely to support the European Union
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compared to the reference category Europeans. These coefficients are significant
and smaller than one. Again, I will look at expected probabilities of EU support to
interpret the magnitude of the effects. Model II predicts Europeans to be suppor-
tive of the EU with a factor of 0.55 and regional Europeans by a factor of 0.52. In
comparison to these two types, people with no attachment reach a predicted pro-
bability of EU support of 0.12 and people with an attachment only to their region
of 0.24 (see Graph 2).
Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of EU support: Nested Identities
Note: Predictions are based on Model II in Table 3.
In terms of the control variables, the models yield results that are in line
with expectations and partly statistically significant. First, the significant coef-
ficient Education re-confirms the explanatory power of the utilitarian approach
(Gabel/Palmer 1995; as well as Lubbers/Scheepers 2010; Hakhverdian et al. 2013;
Vasilopoulou/Talving 2018, for more recent studies). If people hold a university
degree, then they are more favourable towards the European Union.
Second, the variable Left/right self-placement equally shows a relevant fin-
ding and corroborates the cue-taking approach. People that place themselves more
towards the right of the political spectrum aremore Eurosceptic compared to peop-
le that tend towards the left. In contrast to other recent studies (van Elsas/van der
Brug 2015; König et al. 2017), there is no U-shaped relationship between ideologi-
cal position and EU position. These authors have argued that both extremes of the
political spectrum tend to oppose the EU integration process, albeit for different
reasons. While left-wing parties fear a loss of their social security systems, right-
wing actors are afraid of jeopardising their own national sovereignty (also see van
Elsas et al. 2016; Lubbers/Scheepers 2010).This finding is not surprising for a coun-
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try like Austria, in view of the country’s party system.Themost left-wing party, the
Greens, is a pro-European party and its supporters share these positive attitudes
towards the EuropeanUnion.Themost right-wing party, the FreedomParty of Aus-
tria, is the only Eurosceptic party in the spectrum and its supporters agree with its
critical stance on integration.The lack of an extreme left wing party (at least in the
national parliament) and hence the absence of Eurosceptic left-wing cues explains
the linear relationship further. There is no evidence of support for European unifi-
cation by the political right due to their support of free trade policies, as found in
earlier studies such as Defelm and Pampel (1996).
With respect to Age, I find that younger people are more pro-European.This is
in line with some previous studies (Inglehart 1970; Lubbers/Scheepers 2001; Kuhn
2012). However, others have reported no effect (Defelm/Pampel 1996; Carey 2002).
Finally, the coefficient Female shows no statistically significant results in either
model. With respect to Female, I expected to see men as more favourable of the
EuropeanUnion than their female counterparts (Inglehart 1970; Lubbers/Scheepers
2010; Defelm/Pampel 1996; Nelsen/Guth 2000; Carey 2002). At least in the case of
Austria 2018, the models do not support this conclusion.
Regional Europeans in Austria: Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined the effect of identity on EU support among Austrian
residents in 2018.My focus was to look at EU identity together with regional identi-
ty. Although the number of studies acknowledging the identity component in their
explanations of public opinion towards the European Union has mushroomed in
recent decades (Carey 2002; Hooghe/Marks 2005, 2004; Kuhn/Stoeckel 2014), they
still largely overlooked the relevance of regional identity (but see Chacha 2012).
While we know that people may feel themselves to be Europeans and nationals of
their country at the same time, our knowledge of regional identities – i.e. whether
strong ties at this level are equally inclusive – is still limited.
Based on the relevant literature, my hypotheses expected to see a positive rela-
tionship between an EU identity and a pro-European attitude as well as an equal-
ly positive attitude among Europeans and regional Europeans. While Europeans
identify only with the European level, regional Europeans’ hearts beat for both the
EU and their region. The empirical analyses based on the Austrian data of the Eu-
ropean Values Study 2018 corroborated the hypotheses. In addition, they showed
that people with higher education aremore pro-European (in line with the utilitari-
an approach, e.g. Gabel/Palmer 1995) and that a more right-wing political position
favours Euroscepticism in Austria (in contrast to a U-shaped relationship in other
countries, but still in line with the cue-taking approach, e.g. Hooghe et al. 2002).
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These findings provide a positive outlook for future cooperation among the EU
member states. Especially since regional attachment tends to be strong, the finding
that a European and regional identity are inclusive is promising.
The present paper followed a classical approach to explain the role of identity
on EU support. Already researchers like Hooghe and Marks (2004), however, have
concluded that while the identity approach proves to be empirically powerful (may-
be even more than the utilitarian approach) its theoretical underpinnings still fall
short of the latter approach. Future research should tackle this issue in order to
strengthen the theoretical reasoning behind the identity hypothesis as well as the
operationalisation of the identity variables.
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Ambiguous Identities at the Rhine border
Failures and Successes of Europeanisation in a Pioneering
Laboratory of European Integration
Camille Dobler
Introduction
Autumn is certainly one of the best seasons to enjoy the picturesque streets of
Strasbourg. A fresh breeze blows around the millennial cathedral; geraniums are
still blossoming at the windows of the famous half-timbered houses, and tourists
become sparser, leaving café terraces to locals. In the autumn of 2018, in addi-
tion to posters announcing the traditional Christmas market to come, onlookers
may also notice two advertisement campaigns on giant electronic billboards. At bus
stops, a worrisome campaign from the municipality is inviting residents to ‘regis-
ter and vote, this time’, on 26 May. A large blue star garnished with 15 smaller gold
stars covers the face of American president Donald J. Trump. Nearby, at crossroads
and parking lots, a stately red poster from the regionalist party Unser Land is cal-
ling for the region to ‘break free’ from the new administrative division of regions,
and to take its fate into its own hands. A few hundred meters away, the Louise
Weiss building of the European Parliament emerges from behind trees and bell
towers. Such scenery might seem bizarre, yet, along the Rhine border, such things
are part of the ordinary landscape. On both riversides, antagonistic aspirations of
closure and openness towards national and supranational communities exist in a
state of cohabitation. In a local context marked by the 2008 economic crisis, ter-
ritorial restructuring and increasing engagement of regional political and societal
actors in transnational cooperation, it is assumed that identification with the EU
has evolved positively in recent years, together with a pro-regionalist feeling, to
the detriment of identification with national capitals. Part of a larger comparati-
ve research project, this chapter seeks to test this assumption empirically with a
focus on the French side of the river. The argument proceeds in four steps. The
first section conceptualises identities through citizens’ discourses and behaviours.
The second section sets the scene by reviewing the systemic integration of the bor-
derland where the research was carried out. The third describes and justifies the
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research design as well as the use of group interviews. The fourth section presents
qualitative findings. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the resilience of
boundaries in a turbulent EU.
Conceptualising Identity through Citizens’ Discourses
and Behaviour
Models of identity
In 2000, Martin Kohli saw in borderlands a promising battleground for the deve-
lopment of a European identity (Kohli 2000). In border areas, memories of past
struggles, historical traumas and socio-economic rifts between asymmetrical na-
tions (Wilson/Donnan, 1998) might lead to a hardening of national identities. Or
maybe daily interactions and fuzzy territorial attachments invite the inhabitants of
such areas to renegotiate their identities (Hierro/Gallego 2018). the characteristic
blurred heritage that arises from blended roots often results in strong territory-
based identities, and a complex emotional relationship with the nation state (Kea-
ting 1998; Medeiros et al. 2015).The different socio-political layers – local, regional,
national, European – make up unique and fluid constructions of multiples identi-
ties (Meinhof 2004). But how do these layers interrelate? A whole array of different
competing conceptual models exists. It is not in the scope of this chapter to review
them all, and I would like to elaborate on just three that are well-known in the field
of EU studies.
The first model derives from the literature on social identity, which has long
tended to see identities as incompatible.The exclusionary model conceives of iden-
tities as potentially destructive to one another. According to this view, national
identities would be threatened, from above, by the development of a European
feeling of belonging, or from below, by a strong regional identity, as in the case
of Basque nationalism (Carey 2002; McLaren 2006). If individuals remain free to
choose to which group they identify with, irreconcilable contradictions between
identities do not permit multiple political allegiances.
A second model, by contrast, suggests that individuals are capable of negotia-
ting between multiple identities, from the local up to the supranational, in con-
centric circles fashion: “people who identify strongly with local communities also
identify strongly with nations, and with Europe” (Herrmann/Brewer 2004: 12). In
the case of Spain for example, most Catalans and Basques see themselves as both
Catalans or Basques and Spaniards (Diez Medrano/Gutiérrez 2001). This ‘Russi-
an-doll’ model is based on theories of nested identity (Brewer 1993; Calhoun 1999),
according to which sub- and superordinate identities can cohabite, as both fulfil
different roles: of differentiation and inclusion, respectively.However, one problem
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with this model is that it fails to explain the ‘indeterminacy as to the relationship
between lower- and higher-order nested identities’ (Diez Medrano/Gutiérrez 2001:
759). How can we explain than in some regions with strong regionalist feelings,
the middle-layer of national identity is bypassed, as, in the case of Scotland, for
example (Grundy/Jamieson 2007)? Or that a new kind of regional Euroscepticism
is developing, as in Flanders?
A third alternative suggests that the multiple components making up an indi-
vidual’s identity cannot be separated into inferior or superior layers. They are not
nested or cross-cutting but rather highly entangled. This is known as the marble-
cake model (Risse 2003; Risse 2010). Its most important corollary is twofold: since
EU membership interacts with different national and local identity constructions,
then there are potentially as many ‘European identities’ as there are European re-
gions. And reciprocally, enmeshment with the supranational level implies a fluid
and continuous (re)construction of local and national identities, which might allow
contradictory positions within each component.
Identity through Discourses
If people ‘choose’ their identities rather than naturally possessing them, the ques-
tion arises of how they are constructed. Symbolic interaction is certainly the most
important perspective in sociology that provides theoretical underpinnings for the
understanding of identity construction. Its basic premise is that individuals attach
symbolic meaning to behaviours, objects, others and themselves and share those
meanings through interaction among each other (Mead 1934). In line with the inter-
actionist literature on identity, we assume that the key agent of these negotiations
of who people are, of who the ‘Other’ is, is language. In other words, individuals
produce identity through their talk. But the words we use do not only reflect the
beliefs of the given social context we develop in, they deconstruct and reshape our
social environment as well. Language plays a constitutive role in generating social
relations: “language provides – as a metaphor puts it – the grammar of social life”
(Eder 2007: 403)
The discursive construction of identity can explain the existence of contradic-
tory positions and attachments as conceptualised in the Russian-doll and marble-
cake models. This derives from the understanding of identity as a never-ending
process of self-identification and assignment of in-groups and out-groups. It is
near borders that on-going negotiations of boundaries between different ethnic
groups are at their most salient (Barth 1969).
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Negotiations and Inter-dependency at the Border
With 28 member countries in the European Union, 14,000 km of external land bor-
ders neighbouring 20 countries, and 26 countries within the Schengen area, bor-
derlands make up a substantial percentage of the European Union’s territory. One
EU citizen in three lives in these border areas, which are home to 36 trans-border
agglomerations and two million cross-border workers. The highly-integrated Rhi-
ne border between France and Germany is one of many examples. From a natural
boundary, the river was framed over centuries as a social boundary, strengthening
social orders on each side of the river and eventually crystallising into two natio-
nal borders. By crossing the river, local populations construct, de-construct and
re-construct those symbols of political identities (Simmel 1997). And the corollary
holds, too: as does any institution, borders in return change social contexts and
alter local populations’ perception of social boundaries. This ability of citizens to
participate in the (un)making of borders, through language but also through their
everyday actions, as ‘banal’ as they might seem, constitutes ‘borderwork’ (Rum-
ford 2009). Thus, in borderlands more than anywhere else, what local populations
say about themselves, their region and their nation-state, Europe, and the ‘Other’,
should be contrasted with what they do. Because the borderland is administratively
and logistically integrated, because it separates a region with high unemployment
from another with many work opportunities, borders are crossed and contacts oc-
cur. Can this prefigure a supranational identity? Cross-border mobility has been
shown to be positively correlated to the development of a post-national mindset
(Favell/Recchi 2009; Howard 2000; Sigalas 2010), and indeed, the ‘contact hypothe-
sis’ proposes that interpersonal relations are one of the most effective ways if not
themost effective way to overcome conflicts and negative stereotyping between two
social groups (Allport 1954). Yet, Gordon Allport also restricted such positive corre-
lation in terms of the qualitative nature of the contact, its context, as well as socio-
economic and cultural characteristics of the two social groups that meet. With the
French side of the Rhineland border changing nationality four times in 75 years
(between 1870 and 1945), few regions in Europe are as likely to develop the feeling
of supranational belonging as Martin Kohli called for in this case. Legal and admi-
nistrative support is another of the criteria needed for positive contact, according
to intergroup contact theory. As a matter of fact, it is in the Rhine Basin that local
cross-border cooperation was pioneered in the 1950s (Schelberg 2001).Transnatio-
nal political, economic and cultural structures have since been strengthened under
the stimulus of the European Union and the Council of Europe, to encourage the
border population to see beyond the ‘national container’ (Beck 2000)
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A European Microcosm in an Integrated Borderland
The last two decades have seen a ‘new regionalism’ emerging on the multi-level Eu-
ropean geopolitical and geo-economic scene, with regions gaining significant rele-
vance in the concrete work of shaping the EU itself (Paasi 2009). If Alsace does not
have secessionist desires that exist in Corsica or the Basque-country, it does have a
regionalist party, and it is not so uncommon to see discrete “Elsass Freie” graffiti and
stickers decorating street signs alongside the Rhine. Since the 2015 French territo-
rial reform erased Alsace from the map, those have flourished. As a gesture of ap-
peasement to hurt local pride, the Philippe government put on the table a legislative
proposal for the creation by 2021 of a Collectivité européenne d’Alsace [European com-
munity of Alsace] and the provision of specific competences, in particular a leading
role in transboundary cooperation within its geographical boundaries.1 The forth-
coming creation of this new administrative framework endorsing so adamantly a
supranational dimension is illustrative of the decisive role played by European re-
gions in giving flesh and bones to European integration.This regional gaze turned
towards the Rhine rather than Paris is nothing new. In 2010, after 50 years of trans-
national collaboration, the creation of the Metropolitan Trinational Region of the
Upper Rhine was legally enshrined,2 gathering the former region of Alsace together
with North and South Baden, South-East Palatinate and North-West Switzerland.3
The latest developments in the area also include the signing of the Aachen Trea-
ty between France and Germany in January 2019, which significantly increased the
competences of the Trinational Region’s four Eurodistricts. Amongst them, the Eu-
rodistrict of Strasbourg-Ortenau brings together in a ‘pilot European territory’ 61
French and 51 German municipalities, with 940,000 inhabitants, shaping a former
conflict-riven border into a ‘laboratory for European integration’ (Schultz 2002). In
this regard, the launch in 2017 of the binational tramway joining Strasbourg and
Kehl was emblematic of the systemic integration of the borderland; the last time a
tram had crossed the river being during the Second World War.
1 The legislative proposal for a Collectivité européenne d’Alsace was presented by the French go-
vernment on 27 February 2019 and adopted by the Senate at first reading, with modifica-
tions on 4 April 2019. Review of the proposal started on 24 June in the Assemblée nationale.
The proposed collectivité is set to couple the two departements of the former region of Alsace,
Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin, by 1 January 2021 in a unique administrative scheme with enhan-
ced prerogatives, in particular regarding road network and border management as well as
defence of bilingualism.
2 Région Métropolitaine Trinationale du Rhin Supérieur/ Trinationalen Metropolregion Oberrhein
3 An Upper Rhine Franco-Germano-Swiss Council made of 71 elected politicians is tasked to
represent the six million inhabitants of the borderland. This Council acts as the ‘Parliament’
of the Trinational Region.
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Yet, for the Eurométropole de Strasbourg, the binational tramway line is not on-
ly symbolic, but also instrumental in securing its title as a ‘European capital’, in
the controversies surrounding the seat of the European Parliament. Strasbourg is
home to three major European institutions: the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. It is also the home of
the European TV-channel ARTE, the European Pharmacopoeia, the European Om-
budsman, the Secretariat of the Assembly of European Regions and EUROCORPS.
At the heart of the city’s ‘European district’, the Lieu d’Europe [Place of Europe]
education centre aims at bringing European citizens closer to each other and to
European institutions.
Intense Europeanisation of the border seems to have had positive effects. Pre-
vious research conducted in this borderland has shown that Rhineland inhabitants
on both sides are more likely to support European integration than their compa-
triots (Schmidberger 1998). The resilience of Europhile feelings in the region to
political, social and economic changes remains, however, hypothetical. On the one
hand, the existing literature on the impact of major exogenous events such as eco-
nomic shocks, refugee crises or terrorism on secessionist aspirations converges
towards a positive correlation (Orzechowska-Waclawska 2017; Rico/Liñeira 2014).
On the other hand, empirical studies have long stressed that regional identity is an
important predicator for how likely citizens are to identify with the EU (van Span-
je/de Vreese 2011). Overall, there are compelling reasons to believe that European
identification in the region has varied. Building on a sample of 15 group discus-
sions with French families carried out in the Strasbourg area, this chapter offers
to make sense of the ‘identity mix’ of one of Europe’s most integrated borderland
areas.
Operationalising the Identity-Mix: Comparing Family Interviews
In light with the theoretical approach presented above, it was essential to get local
populations talking. Research in the fields of EU and border studies endorsing a
similar conceptualisation have produced valuable insights based on original eth-
nographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews (see, for examples relating to the
German-Polish border; Asher 2005; Meinhof/Galasiński 2010). In this chapter, we
are less interested in individual narratives than in understanding the negotiations
of meanings in the formation of collective cultural identities.4 Group interaction
4 By cultural identity, I refer in this chapter to what Michael Bruter defines as ‘a citizen’s sense
of belonging to a human community’ (Bruter 2013: 36) – as opposed to citizens’ identification
with a political system as an institution – with which they believe they share a certain he-
ritage, regardless of so-called objective reality. This can include any form of history but also
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is one way to gather such insights. Face-to-face interviews have been a success-
ful method of collecting not only personal narratives, but also patterns of common
sense and structural views. Here, however, we are also interested in the transmissi-
on of these views and potential contagion of affects between citizens. In contrast to
qualitative in-depth interviews, group interviews provide data on intra- and inter-
personal debates. They are also useful for contextually exploring ‘the gap between
what people say and what they do’ as when participants know each other, they can
contradict and correct each other (Conradson 2005: 131).
The 15 group interviews conducted in autumn 2018 each gathered families of
three to eight members belonging to two to three generations (parents and child-
ren, and grandparents where possible) for a total of 78 participants. Working with
families does not guarantee diverse political ideologies within one group to the
same extent at artificial sampling. However, low polarisation of opinions is mi-
tigated by mutual trust between participants and generational differences within
each group. Conflicting political opinions, particularly regarding European inte-
gration, were freely expressed and clearly evident. As numerous research projects
have shown, citizens’ attitudes towards European integration are divided along so-
cial lines (Hobolt 2016; Kuhn 2015; van Spanje/de Vreese 2011), as well as national
ones (Diez Medrano 2003; Herrmann et al. 2004). Since the research only focused
on France, sampling of participants had to reflect the ethnic diversity of a historical
country of immigration. Families were therefore recruited to enable comparison of
discussions in these two dimensions: along social lines and according to nationali-
ty.Three categories of five families each – to ensure diversity of political ideologies
in the sample – were constituted accordingly: the first group consisted of working-
class families, the second of upper-middle class families, both holding only French
nationality, and the final category of middle-class families holding multiple natio-
nalities (French nationality and an additional EU/non-EU nationality). Recruitment
was initially undertaken using a snowballing technique and later by direct solicita-
tion as based on theoretical sampling, made easier thanks to the help of respected
individuals from local associative outreach programmes. The theme of the discus-
sion was kept deliberately vague so as to limit selection bias, and participants were
offered a voucher for their participation in the study (cf. appendix 1).
Standardisation of the discussion was supported by the development of a uni-
que interview scenario. All discussions were moderated by the researcher herself
moral or religious traditions, as well as values, philosophical and political norms. A cultural
identity is therefore a social identity and can encompass a territorial one. Cultural identi-
ties can also turn into political identities ‘when governments become parties to them’ (Tilly
2003: 609). Here, we are considering a ‘we-feeling’ loosely defined, a sense of commonality
expressed by participants.
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and lasted ca. two hours.Theywere organised around four openly formulated ques-
tions only, one using vignettes, a second asking for active participation through
free pictorial expression. This helped to make sure that participants enjoyed en-
ough freedom to take the discussion in the directions that are most relevant to
them, and to limit research biases. The four questions touched upon different as-
pects of European integration in the Strasbourg area: regionalism, the border and
the figure of the ‘Other’, EU institutional design and policies, the ‘crisis’ of Eu-
ropean integration, and the meaning of European identity (cf. appendix 2). Each
room layout was unique, as the discussions were held in the comfort of each fami-
ly’s living room, but family members were invited to form a semi-circle, with the
researcher sitting within this circle, as opposed to chairing from the centre.
Balancing Blurred Allegiances
In the remaining parts of this chapter, I present some of the preliminary results
obtained fromfield research conducted betweenOctober andDecember 2018 in the
Strasbourg agglomeration. I draw on extracts from five of the 15 group discussions;
all 15 were used for the analysis, and those five extracts were chosen because they
are illustrative of patterns that emerged in the overall sample.5 In the transcriptions
below, all names have been changed; // refers to cut-off speech, … to brief pauses
and (…) to longer ones. Italics indicate that words have been left in their original
language.
Choosing the ‘Other’: an Uneasy Task
In constructing cohesive social identities for themselves, individuals rely on oppo-
sition to an ‘Other’, using mechanisms such as stereotyping and flattened catego-
risations to build social boundaries. Negative stereotyping in particular plays an
important role in self-identification, and typical topics for such process include fe-
ar as well as dislike. If fear did not appear as a recurrent theme in the discussions
– at least in reference to neighbouring French and German communities – dislike
and disapproval of behaviours – and occasionally the more extreme form, disgust
– were central to all 15 discussions. What appeared as the most intriguing pattern,
however, was the absence of a clear ‘Other’ between and within the 15 families. Half
of the negative strategies of out-grouping relied on regional differentiation, while
5 Qualitative data are difficult to generalize, as samples cannot perfectly match the socio-de-
mographic characteristics of the population. Results should be treatedwith care and extracts
presented in this chapter were chosen because they were illustrative of clearest patterns in
our sample.
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the other half relied on nationalist discourse. The extract below is derived from
a discussion between a family of four, two parents, Véronique and François, with
their daughters, Lucie and Julie. Julie left Strasbourg for the neighbouring former
region of Lorraine to attend university. The conversation had shifted from their
cross-border habits to their support for the French team during the 2018 Football
World Cup, when Véronique said that the family also decorated their house with
the European flag. She then went on to talk about self-identification.
Extract 1: Middle-Class French Family
Véronique: “Me, I feel closer to Germans.
Julie: Well, for us (looking at her sister) it is a bit different since we live… in fact,
no, I do not feel close to Lorrains at all.
(the entire family laugh)
Lucie: No, me I would still say Lorrains. We are closer to Lorrains in mentality. We
still have a common history against the… well, between quotationmarks, the Ger-
mans  //
Véronique: Yes, but if you forget //
François (talking to Veronique): Yes, yes, yes, but yes, she is right //
Véronique: No, for me, we have to forget this side of history. For me, regarding the
question, I believe that, looking at how we are, regarding work habits, regarding
work expectations, well, evenme, I would feel closer. Howmany times did I say, as
a joke, ‘Well, I think Alsace would be better off as a, how to say this, as a German
region or département!’ I find us to be closer.
Julie: I would also say Germans rather than Lorrains. Meeting Lorrains every day,
I do not share at all the same way of thinking, the same mentality, not the same
way…even the way of talking. There are too many things that are changing. The
way of driving... Well, too much stuff.
Lucie: Now that I am thinking about it, when I was in Lorraine, I met more with
people from Alsace than with Lorrains… because it is true that I take it badly, I get
quite offendedwhen a friend, who is not Alsacienne at all, she came to Strasbourg
for her studies, and she toldme ‘No but you, you are résidus d’Allemands [residues
of Germans]’. And it is true that, for me, this is the kind of thoughts that are offen-
sive. No, we are not Germans, we remain French. Then yes, there is a proximity
with Germany, you cannot deny that, but I do not like it when people call us and
say ‘No but you are quasi-Germans.”
In this family, reference to national frames were not obvious, and the choice ap-
peared to be rather between the two neighbouring regions, Lorraine and Baden-
Württemberg, as later in the conversation, the distinction was made by mother
and daughter between Germany and the Länder.The negative stereotyping of Lor-
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rains as a general category by Julie takes the form of typically vague disapproval of
their behaviour: their way of talking and driving. Among each generation, the out-
group strategies differ. Lucie’ initial uneasiness at labelling Germans as ‘Others’
disappears at the memory of an encounter. When she recalls her experience of
being out-grouped herself by a friend, only then does she invoke the French na-
tional frame, in a typical example of looking-class self (Cooley 1902). Despite clear
contradictions, she later expressed strong identification with her region, and then
to the supranational, bypassing national identification.
How powerful social interactions are in building the regional self with both
French and German nationals alike was palpable in all families, even in those who
share a second extra-European nationality. In the case of middle-class French fa-
milies, this was further strengthened by family memory of war(s). The abstract
below comes from a discussion between a family of eight, bringing together three
generations: grandparents (Joseph andMadeleine), parents (Christian and Françoi-
se), uncle and aunt (Patrick andMarie) and two teenage boys (Jean andThomas). In
this extract, negative stereotyping targets Germany, while the French, as a general
category, are kept at a good distance.
Extract 2: Middle-Class French Family
Marie: “Me, I think it is because of school that I do not like Germany. All we were
seeing, it was factory workers, unemployment, pollution…it was just that…all the
Erzählungen in German, it was that, so then, I had a vision of Germany, an Eastern
country, the horror you know? It was a bit like…the bottom of Eastern Germany,
you know… (she laughs)
Patrick: Yes. An industrial country.
Jean:Well, I think for me it is different because I speak as good German as French,
almost…well… I speak goodGerman so I feel just as good in France and inGermany.
It is as easy to order at a table in France or there. And, actually, I even go more of-
ten than you to Germany, I think. Me and Anna, we go to Germany //
Thomas: every two days.
Joseph: It is maybemean what I am going to say, or idiotic, but if I do not go there,
it is out of respect for my parents. And if I do not go there, I didmymilitary service
in Ackern, nearby.
Jean: Yes?
Joseph: Back then, when you were taking a walk with the French uniform, you
should have seen the face that old Germans were making!
Françoise: Ah yes, that….
Joseph: Ah yes, you got that right! In France, à l’intérieur, we were called ‘boches’
and then in Germany, we were called ‘sales Français’ [French scums]!
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Jean: Yes, but all this is over now papi! Me, I feel closer to Germans than to ceux
de l’intérieur [those from the inside], clearly; I feel better in Berlin than in Paris.
(Joseph laughs)
Madeleine: Me, I feel better with les gens de l’intérieur [the people from the in-
side].
Christian: With my dad, it is not worth discussing, I mean, they are the casques à
pointes [spiked helmets]. For us it is funny, because me, personally, I rarely go in
Germany. But we put the two of them in bilingual schools and for them, Germany,
it is just a continuity of France //
Françoise: Me, I find that Germans are still closer to us than les Français de l’in-
térieur, still. Culturally, we need to say what needs to be said //
Patrick: Ah! that is funny, that you say we! Because, you, you are a rapatriée [repa-
triated] anyway!”
In this second abstract, negative constructions are labelled in terms of regional
distinctions: generalisation and stereotyping of Germans and Germany, and di-
stancing work from the French national frame by the systematic grammatical use
of “gens de l’intérieur” to refer to French nationals, and the word “rapatriée” to refer to
Françoise, who was not born in Alsace. Here, the strong vocabulary used, far from
being merely anecdotal, materialises a frontier between the former Alsace region
and the rest of France, perceived as such even by those who feel close to France. Ge-
nerational patterns are made visible through the contrasting interpretations made
by Joseph and his grandson concerning the family memory. In-grouping strategies
do not follow a clear pattern; with the exception of the grandparents, who express
strong regionalist sentiments, the two adult couples and two teenagers disagree in
their primary political allegiance. Jean was one of the rare participants in our sam-
ple to express a European identity ‘first’, which he defined as a “manière de vivre”
[way of living] rather than a feeling.
Europe between Daily Border-Crossing Habits and Great Unknown
It was no surprise that all families were involved in borderwork. But surprisingly,
it was among those who did not speak German, namely working class and French
families with an immigration background, that borderwork was the most intense.
Typical border-crossing activities did not only included occasional hikes or weekly
grocery shopping, but daily ice-creams and walks in Kehl, as well as regular af-
ternoons at German swimming-pools. The third extract is taken from a discussion
amongst Franco-Turkish local residents. It is exemplary of the appropriation of the
border by the local population, but also of the reminiscence of the frontier as an
axis of socio-economic inequality in the narratives of the local population.
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Extract 3: working-class Franco-Turkish family
Ela: “We go to do grocery-shopping, to eat ice-cream //
Melis: We are just nearby.
Feride: Yes, this is really nice.
Azra: And even more now, with the tram that goes directly //
Feride: and the gardens to take a walk in the summer.
Melis: Yes, we do not have that chez nous [at home].
Feride: In fact, we have a link with Germany, that is the thing that is good. Just the
bridge, it binds us…
Feride: and financially, we notice the difference when we shop.
Melis: Oh yes, when it comes to prices…it seems to me it is easier there…there is
like a sort of facility…
Halim: Me, I have the feeling that, when you cross the border, it is a bit more de-
veloped…the buildings…I like the nature there…it looks clean…We go there with
mum, we eat ice-cream. It is nice.
Azra: and with my friend, we go there, to the swimming pool and to do shopping.
We could stay here, but it is more (…)
Melis: The mentality of Germans is different than chez nous, too. For people who
wear the veil, we are not looked down upon, but in France, we feel it //
Azra: At the swimming pool, we all go there because we have the right to enter
dressed.
Halim: There are more freedom there. And fewer unemployed…”
Calls are growing for the reconceptualisation of European identity as a way of do-
ing, rather than being (Favell, 2005). Enjoying EU citizenship, crossing borders to
go shopping or take a quick swim, not noticing EU logos on tramways on the way:
those are signs of a banal Europeanism (Cram, 2001). But if it is clear in our sam-
ple that the presence of institutions and opportunities offered by infrastructures
have enhanced European behaviours, is it enough to spur emotional identification
beyond borders? The abstract below derives from a conversation between six fa-
mily members. Emilie, the oldest daughter, expresses discomfort at the confusion
between the Rhine border and Europe.
Extract 4: Upper-Middle Class French Family
Emilie: “But really, this is not Europe, this is Germany…
Théo: Yes, it is mostly Germany.
Emilie: how to say this…Alsaciens, they are going to speak about Europe, but they
are just talking about Germany in reality. Because, I remember, when Iwas singing
at the conservatory, we participated in a concert for the new countries joining the
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European Union //
Christine (the mother): Ah yes, I remember!
Emilie: Yes. And that…that was a powerful moment, but still…for…. well, it is not
that we do not hear about it, but just that, for Alsatians, in Strasbourg, Europe, it
is just about going on foot or with the tram to Germany. Voilà. That is also a bit (…)
Louis (the father): It is true that we are a little bit //
Théo: No, but it is true, I also find that, when there are cultural projects, which
are a bit bigger, it is often France, Germany, Switzerland, but well, you never hear
about France Norway or even France Spain.
Mathilde: Yes…but then first, the fact that France and Germany are the countries
that are a bit…. the authors?
Louis: The founders.
Emilie:Well, but…. what are we, how are we, us, close to Europe, what do we know
about it, at the end…except, concretely, our relationships with our close neigh-
bours…”
(silence, then laughs)
The Europeanisation of the border and her family’s many border-crossing habits
are undermined by Emilie’s unease and feeling of discomfort in the face of her own
lack of knowledge about the EU. For many respondents in the sample, intense bor-
derwork and banal Europeanism did not automatically equal closeness to Europe,
illustrating the clash between concrete and abstracts experience of Europe. Their
active European citizenship is balanced by apparent indifference to European inte-
gration, and tomy surprise, their full awareness of this contradiction.This resulted
for many participants in unease regarding their own lack of strong emotional at-
tachment to Europe as a polity. A more direct question about the meaning of a
European identity at the end of the discussion was an opportunity for participants
to try to ‘make sense’ of it. The last extract below brings together three sisters and
one of their daughters at the kitchen table.
Extract 5: Working-Class French Family
Christine: “We still feel European, right?
(silence)
Nathalie: …But you, what are you?
Catherine: Well, French first of all…I mean (…)
Nathalie: Memy region…At the beginning, I amAlsacienne. I would putmy region
first, that yes! I am Alsacienne, then French, and European after.
Catherine: Ah yes! You see, me, European, I would not have thought about it. I
would have put Alsacienne and French.
Christine: Me I would almost put France and then Alsace…
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Nathalie: Ah yes? …and you (she turns towards her daughter) whatwould you have
put first? French or Alsacienne?
Rose: Bah Alsacienne.
Christine: Well, it is not that obvious.
Rose: No, for me, it is logical.




As illustrated in this extract, in-group constructions are multi-layered and variable
between members of a single family. From the three models of identity presented
previously, we can exclude the exclusionary model. Although identification to the
region was strong, it should not be confused with regional closure (with the excep-
tion of Joseph). For most participants, identification with the region and the nation
state follows the strategies of differentiation and inclusion of the nested identity
model: French in Germany and Alsacienne in France. Yet, it is when looking at the
salience of attitudes that the ambiguity – and not simply hybridity – surrounding
multiple political identities more clearly emerges. While hybridity refers to a logi-
cally composed coherent identity-mix made of different realities, ambiguity as a
concept better stresses the context-dependent character of attitudes on identities
(Bachleitner et al. 2010). In particular, in our border context, a European attitude
only emerges when provoked, either by the moderator or by a provocative family
member, despite regular border crossing, so much so that European identity does
not appear as a particularly significant referent. Contrary to other regions such as
Scotland where a regionalist attitude spurs pro-European feelings, it does not seem
to be the case here, despite the immediate proximity of European institutions.
Discussion
To some extent, cross-border regions mirror the working of the EU itself. They
share with the EU a complex multi-level governance involving European institu-
tions, nation states, regional authorities, as well as a strong civil society made of
non-governmental agencies and citizens’ initiatives. The cross-border context has
created the potential for peaceful negotiations of social identities between ethnic
groups, despite linguistic and cultural differences. I have justified the focus on the
Strasbourg agglomeration for the opportunity to study (a) hybrid identities in a
pioneering borderland of cross-border cooperation, and (b) a symbolic border of
European integration and the seat of several European institutions. In the conclu-
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ding remarks of this chapter, I would like to go back and sketch two thoughts on
the future of regional boundaries in Europe.
Ambiguous Identities, Faded Borders?
People construct their political identities in relation to a range of political and cul-
tural factors, as well as out of their own experiences. In borderlands, those factors
vary and clash as the rhythm of everyday life is determined by encounters and bor-
der-crossings, but also by difficult memories and stereotypical beliefs. In-group
and out-group constructions are continuously re-negotiated. As exemplified above,
this happens within families, but more disturbingly, cutting across generational
patterns (thus in contradiction to Hipfl et al. 2003; Meinhof 2004). Out-grouping
strategies from younger participants with only French nationality were barelymore
likely than their parents’ to be based on supranational and national identification.
Strong regional identification was expressed by a majority of participants, distinct
from but not in opposition to both France and Germany, as results show that the
frontier subsists in border narratives as an axis of contemporary socio-economic
inequality. Interestingly, it is only when confronted with the geographical determi-
nism of the border with Germany that the national referent is then reinvoked and
gains in legitimacy, with participants leaning towards a concentric circles identity-
mix.
Laboratories of European Social Integration
In this multi-layered construction, ‘Europe’ is not a self-chosen category of identi-
fication, which contrasts with the intense usage inhabitants of Strasbourg make of
their European citizenship. In the scenario for our discussion, families were invited
to order pictures of the city’s iconic landmarks from those they were most attached
to those they were least attached to. Interestingly enough, the two pictures illus-
trating European institutions were, in a majority of cases, placed last. When asked
if this was deliberate, to my surprise, many shared that they had already visited the
European Parliament: for Europe Day on 9 May, celebrating the anniversary of the
1950 Schuman Declaration, on school trips, or because they used to work as clea-
ning staff, delivering newspapers, or in the catering service of the European Par-
liament. “Euro-indifference” alone then fails to explain the detachment that many
participants have shown. Despite intensive integration of the borderland and the
presence of European institutions, and in full awareness of the resulting political
and socio-economic they enjoy, local populations expressed strong mixed feelings
towards European integration as a whole.While it is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter to explore the various aspects of Euroscepticism and what is ‘going on’ behind
apparent indifference towards European integration, it appears clearly that bor-
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derlands are not only valuable research field to enhance our understanding of the
European project in terms of systemic integration, they also offer a unique basis
to grasp European unification from below.
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Appendix 1 – Advertisement for Participants
  Figure 1: Example of advertisement for participants: Strasbourg 
Source: own figure
Appendix 2 – Family Discussion Schedule
Presentation of the session (researcher) & introduction roundtable∼ 10min
I am giving each of you a few stickers, and I would like to ask you to think about
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what summarizes best the region you live in. It can be anything, one thing, several
things, you can draw something or write a word. Think a little moment and then
I would like you to show your stickers to the others, and to explain to us what you
meant and why you picked this.∼ 20min 
I am now shuffling your stickers with 7 pictures. I would like you to, together as
a group, rank them from what is the most important to you personally (what you
are the most attached to), to what is the least important. You can add or remove
stickers.
 
7 photographs include (without legends): European Parliament Louise Weiss building,
Council of Europe with European Court of Human Rights, Europe bridge with binational
tram over the Rhine, Two riversides Garden, Rhine Palace in the Neudorf district, Stras-
bourg cathedral, Petite France neighbourhood with Vauban barrage∼ 15min
Now, I would like you to draw something on the stickers: a smiley face! I would like
you to think about your current state of mind about the European Union. How do
you feel about the European Union right now (if you feel anything at all)? What
is the first smiley (or smileys) that come to you mind? I leave you to think for a
few seconds. Then please show it one by one to each other and express what you
meant and why you chose this smiley face.∼ 20min
Would you have drawn the same smiley a few years ago? How so?∼ 15min
Would you have drawn the same smiley if I had asked you about France right
now, and not the EU?∼ 15min
Lately, we often talk about crisis when we talk about Europe. For you what crisis
does this refer to? Why do you think about this? Is there anything you want to say
about it?∼ 20min
I have a final question. What does it mean to be European?∼ 15min
END – Open floor for remarks & free discussion∼ 30min

II.
Regions in a Turbulent EU –
Political and Legal Manifestations

Regional Identities in Europe
Their Manifestations in Constitution- and Policy-Making
Karl Kössler
Introduction
For a certain period of time, starting in the early 1980s, the notion of a ‘Europe
of the regions’ (Keating 2008: 630) generated a lot of support and even enthusi-
asm, as it became a political slogan used by ardent promotors of regionalism and,
for a while, also the European Commission. Around the turn of the millennium,
however, the idea of regions as a genuine ‘third level of government’ within the
EU suffered a setback for several reasons, among them the acknowledgement that
realising this idea is bedevilled by the enormous diversity of European regions in
terms of both legal status and political influence (Weatherill 2005: 15). This chapter
is decidedly not about the EU-focused ‘Europe of the regions’ in the above sense.
Instead, it explores European regional identities in broader terms and asks how
such identities may manifest themselves, especially in case of regions demanding
greater autonomy in both constitution- and policy-making. Section 2 provides a
working definition of ‘region’ and how it relates to autonomy claims and processes
of identity formation. Section 3 then explores how the constitutional entrenchment
of regional identities interacts with these processes and how such identities may
be reflected in policy-making. Section 4 concludes.
European Regions, Autonomy and Regional Identity
The ‘Region’ as a Contested Term: A Working Definition
As we shall see in this section, the term ‘region’ has rapidly gained importance
in recent decades in politics, academia and in the arenas of both international and
constitutional law. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that understandings of
this term have proliferated. In such a context, it is evident that a working definition
is needed of what this chapter takes ‘region’ to mean.
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First, the focus is exclusively on regions in a legal-political sense.However, as the
etymological origin in the Latin word regiomerely refers to a boundary line, and to
the territory between boundaries, the distinctiveness of this territorymaymanifest
itself in a range of quite different ways (Gamper 2004: 3). Depending on the criteria
used to set one area apart from others, we may distinguish, for example, historical,
cultural and economic regions, which can make it appear that talk of legal-political
regions is nothing more than the bias of lawyers and political scientists. There ap-
pears to be an emerging consensus, however, that regions should be considered as
social constructions rather than natural entities in any case, irrespective of which
criteria are used (Keating 1997: 390).
Secondly, we need to narrow the focus within the wider category of legal-politi-
cal regions. What this chapter looks at are subnational regions defined as ‘an inter-
mediate territorial level, between the state and the locality’ (Keating 1998: 9). This
definition does not require, of course, that such intermediate entities are explicitly
and literally called regions in constitutional texts, as was the case arguably for the
first time with the regiones mentioned in Art. 8 of the 1931 Spanish Constitution
as autonomous components of the Estado Integral. Subnational regions according
to this interpretation can be called provinces, cantons, etc. However, the regions
addressed in this chapter are certainly not those above the state, i.e. entities bound
together by political, economic or military cooperation between states. Until the
1960s, this was arguably the only understanding of ‘region’ that had common cur-
rency, and it is still reflected in terms such as ‘macro geo-economic regions’ (Ortino
2005: 282) or APEC or ASEAN.While recent decades have witnessed the beginning
of a shift towards a more open conception of regions that also includes subna-
tional entities (Keating 1998: 9), Europe has in the meantime seen the emergence
of new understandings of legal-political regions. A case in point are cross-border
regions, which have been established through sustained bilateral or multilateral
cooperation across international boundaries. These regions, often deliberately ter-
med ‘Euroregions’, which typically follow a functional rationale and/or symbolic
rationale of (re-)connecting territories that share some common historical or eth-
no-cultural identity but are separated by international boundaries, are inherently
political in nature. But cross-border regions also have a legal dimension, for in-
stance, under EU law as a consequence of the 2006 EU Regulation on a European
Grouping of Territorial Cooperation,1 in the national law of numerous countries in
post-communist Central and Eastern Europe and, importantly in the age of Bre-
xit, under Strand 2 of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. ‘Macro-regions’ within the EU
are an even newer form of legal-political region, albeit one with far weaker legal
institutionalisation. With a focus mainly on the economy, they have resulted from
1 See Regulation (EC) No. 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council (2006) of 5
July 2006 on a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation, OJ L210/19, 31 July 2006.
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the EU’s adoption of macro-regional strategies since 2009 (European Commission
2014).This final kind of region is based on certain common interests and challenges
and is itself merely a relatively loose ‘network, a modus operandi or, rather, a form
of joint action’ involving actors from various levels of government levels, not least
the subnational regions that this chapter focuses on (Committee of the Regions
2012).
Dynamics of Autonomy and Dynamic Autonomy
As far as the establishment and extension of regional autonomy is concerned, one
may distinguish between two basic dynamics that I have explained in more detail
elsewhere (Palermo/Kössler 2017: 22–25): a top-down approach of granting limi-
ted autonomy primarily for the delivery of regional development policies, as in
several European countries such as France during the early post-war period, and
bottom-up dynamicswith regions themselves claiming distinctiveness and arguing
on this basis for some autonomous status. The latter dynamics grew strongly in
prominence from the 1970s onwards with the advent of what has been aptly cal-
led (Western) Europe’s ‘regional revolution’ (Hopkins 2002: 39). Notable reforms or
reform attempts during this decade that involved bottom-up dynamics included
the start of a process in Belgium that has so far seen six consecutive state reforms
(1970–2011); the adoption in Spain in 1978 of the constitutional framework for the
establishment of autonomous communities; and, in the United Kingdom, the (at
least attempted) devolution projects for Scotland and Wales (Mény 1982).2 As this
chapter aims to explore the manifestations of regional identities in constitution-
and policy-making, it concentrates on cases of autonomy that are characterised by
bottom-up dynamics. In other words, it concerns identity-related claims for (more)
self-government.
Such demands then typically reflect a dynamic understanding of regional au-
tonomy according to which self-government is a process rather than an outcome.
This point relates to a classic controversy on the nature of federalism – a pheno-
menon that is, despite different views on the exact relationship, closely linked with
regional autonomy (Palermo/Kössler 2017: 13–61). After a long period during which
KennethWheare’s vision of federalism as something inherently static (Wheare 1947:
11) had prevailed, this was challenged in the 1960s, particularly by Carl Friedrich’s
arguments that federalism should be seen as a dynamic process of federalising
2 Both projects eventually failed after post-legislative referendums in 1979. In Wales, only
20.3% voted for devolution, while 51.6% did so in Scotland. But as the latter figure repre-
sented merely 32.9% of the registered Scottish electorate, the required threshold of 40%
was not reached.
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rather than the final outcome of this process. In short, Friedrich pioneered an un-
derstanding of federalism as process (Friedrich 1962: 528). For him, federalism was
not a ‘a fixed and unalterable plan’ or ‘a static pattern, as a fixed and precise term
of division of powers between central and component authorities’ (Burgess 2006:
35).The downside of such an approach is of course the uncertainty about when this
federalisation process started and where it will end. This point can be illustrated
by the way labels of autonomy have been used in the South Tyrolean political dis-
course over the last three decades. Once the implementation of the reform package
agreed upon in 1969 was completed in 1992, a new vision was needed.This was first
labelled ‘dynamic autonomy’, implying bilateral negotiations for additional com-
petences, and then, after 2011, ‘full autonomy’. The latter was vaguely defined in
a position paper produced by the ruling party, the South Tyrolean People’s Par-
ty, as reducing national government powers to only a few matters and achieving
comprehensive financial authority. Yet, similar to the above-mentioned process of
Belgian state reforms, this process remains open-ended and its outcome unclear.
What ‘full’ means in terms of the scope of autonomy of course lies very much in
the eye of the beholder.
Regional Identity
Historically speaking, regional identities have often been regarded with a certain
disrespect, not least among liberal political theorists.The following quotation from
John Stuart Mill testifies to this: ‘Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial
for a Breton or a Basque of French Navarre to be a member of the French natio-
nality than to sulk on his own rock, the half-savage relic of past times. The same
remark applies to the Welshman and the Scottish Highlander.’ (Mill 1861: 293) The
underlying assumption of such disparaging remarks is the belief of traditional li-
beralism that a nation state built on a monolithic national identity is a necessary
prerequisite for democracy. In order to put this monolithic idea of both the nati-
on and the state into practice, the liberal-democratic nation state in this tradition
pursues a project of producing ex post the uniform national identity, for instance
‘Frenchmen’ and ‘Italians’,3 that its theory of democracy actually presupposes. Even
though this school of thought has been challenged since its heyday in the 19th cen-
tury by several movements, especially since the 1990s by the ‘liberal nationalism’ of
Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, it continues to exert influence (Norman 2006:
1–3). This is epitomised by the widespread portrayal of national identity formation
as something normal and neutral, when it is in actual fact based on a liberal myth
3 Regarding France, see Weber (1977). For Italian identity, see Massimo D’Azeglio’s often-cited
bon mot: “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians”, quoted in Hobsbawm (1992:
44).
Regional Identities in Europe 87
of neutrality (Kymlicka 2002: 343–347) and on the ‘identity fiction’ that construc-
ts such identities from the dominant collective identity ‘based on power relations
and/or themagic of the greater number’ (Marko/Constantin 2019: 130).This context
is relevant for regional identities in two important ways.
First, the construction of a uniform national identity by ‘extending’ the domi-
nant collective identity makes it (almost) inconceivable for members of the domi-
nant group that identities other than this fused nationalised one may exist. For
instance, ‘English Canadians outside Québec largely think of themselves as Cana-
dians-who-happen-to-speak-English, rather than as a distinct national group wi-
thin Canada’ (Miller 2001: 314). And this inability to imagine multiple identities for
oneself often entails that regional identities, let alone claims for regional autonomy
that are based on such identities, are considered to be something inherently sus-
picious. Even if national identities tend to dominate in many countries, multiple
group attachments at different levels are of course possible and it is increasingly
recognised, for instance, ‘that European identity can be seen as complementing
rather than replacing or conflicting with national and regional identities’ (Men-
dez/Bachtler 2017: 7). Secondly, and something that is often forgotten by move-
ments of regional identity formation, the ‘identity fiction’ of inflating the domi-
nant identity and simultaneously suppressing others is likewise a problem at the
regional level. If autonomy is understood as a tool to empower – whether exclusi-
vely or at least largely – the dominant group at the regional level and to reinforce
its identity as that of the region as a whole, this replicates the dynamics of 19th-
century identity formation in the nation state only on a smaller scale, that is in a
‘nation-region’ (Kössler 2018). The schizophrenic attitude of reinforcing a suppo-
sedly uniform regional identity vis-à-vis the national identity and simultaneously
downplaying other identities within the region is just as problematic for a vibrant
democracy as exclusive identity formation at the national level. At both levels, the-
se processes must demonstrate some degree of pluralism and openness, as they
otherwise go against democracy’s core idea of multiple claims to representation,
i.e. against a notion of a (national or regional) political community ‘whose iden-
tity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will remain forever latent’
(Lefort 1988: 304).
Regional Identities in Constitution- and Policy-Making
Constitutional Entrenchment of Regional Identity
A constitution is ‘less something we have than something we are’ (Pitkin 1987: 167)
because it is shaped to a significant extent by a distinctive history before the actual
process of constitution-making and always inextricably linked with questions of
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identity. In countries characterised by the presence of both national and regional
identities, the constitutive function of a constitution at the national and (where
existent) the regional level, i.e. to forge a political community, is equally important
as its regulatory function regarding the exercise of public power.
While numerous issues of constitutional design are relevant and indeed fier-
cely contested where competing identities exist, with territorial demarcation and
power-sharing arrangements being only some examples (Kössler 2016), this chap-
ter focuses on the image of the above-mentioned political community, as reflec-
ted in constitutional preambles or other programmatic provisions. Importantly,
comparative evidence demonstrates that there is an emerging trend for preambles
to be granted greater binding force, either independently, as sources of rights, in
connection with other constitutional provisions or as guidelines for constitutional
interpretation (Orgad 2010; 715–718). In this context of increasing relevance, it is
all the more important to recognise that, rather than static images, preambles are
better understood as only setting the initial topography upon which the image of
the political community is shaped (Jacobsohn 2010: 12).This is because the distance
between the preamble and the people for whom it purports to speak always inevi-
tably tends to grow over time (Tushnet 2010: 671). For instance, the preamble of the
1937 Irish Constitution famously still invokes ‘the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom
is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States
must be referred’, which creates a pronounced dissonance with the reality of an
increasingly secular country.
Statements of identity in preambles and other programmatic provisions of na-
tional constitutions have been increasingly complemented, during the post-Cold
War period, by equivalents at the subnational level. In fact, the processes of sha-
ping the image of the political community at both levels are closely interconnec-
ted, sometimes contradictory, and therefore need to be explored in an integrated
manner through a multilevel perspective. Regional identities interact with these
processes in two ways. First, they often define the creation of a certain image of
the political community. Secondly, a constitutional imagination of an identity that
had not previously existed may in turn have repercussions on identity formation.
As for the first scenario, pre-existing regional identities were constitutionally
entrenched and thus rigidified, for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A good
example is the former Article 1 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republika Srpska,
which reflected a monistic conception of the identity of this constituent unit in a
way that favoured ethnic Serbs over regional minorities.This programmatic article
at the very beginning of a constitution adopted on the eve of the BosnianWar (1992-
95) defined the Republika Srpska as ‘a State of the Serb people and of all its citizens’.
Importantly, that statement did not only reflect a certain exclusive conception of
identity, privileging one ethnic group, it also had far-reaching institutional reper-
cussions, as it formed the rationale and justification for eschewing power-sharing
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and entrenching instead highlymajoritarian decision-making of the legislative and
executive branches of government to the benefit of the Serb majority population.
Part of Article 1, the wording ‘a State of the Serb people and’, was in 2000 even-
tually declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court because it violated the
constitutional principle of ‘collective equality’ of Bosnia’s three constituent peoples
(Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats).4 But other legal battles concerning the constitutio-
nalisation of (an exclusive) regional identity have followed. Cases in point are the
renaming of municipalities by adding the prefix ‘Serbian’5 or, very recently, the
upholding of a National Day of the Republika Srpska considered discriminatory
against non-Serbs.6
In the second scenario mentioned above, the constitutionalisation of a certain
image of regional identity, which had not existed before, in turn influences identity
formation. A case in point in this regard is Article 2 of the 1978 Spanish Constitu-
tion, a programmatic and ambiguous provision characterised as ‘a veritable syn-
thesis of all the contradictions looming during the constitution-making process’
and an ‘authentic point of encounter between different conceptions of the Spa-
nish nation’.7This provision balances ‘the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation,
the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards’ with the ‘right to self-go-
vernment of the nationalities and regions’, thus laying the constitutional basis for
what then became known as the state of autonomies (Estado de las autonomías) and
for the creation of regional identities alongside pre-existing ones such as Catalan
and Basque identities. The establishment of the Autonomous Communities (1979-
1983) created political spaces for regional parties, which were either newly founded
or consolidated under these conditions and proved instrumental in the produc-
tion and reproduction of regional identities in Spain (Martínez-Herrera 2002). Of
course, the regional governments used their new powers in areas such as culture or
language to different extents and with varying degrees of success to shape distinc-
tive regional identities. Yet, it can be said that on the whole ‘[i]rrespective of their
relative artificiality or historical depth, all of the autonomous communities embar-
ked on a process of boundary building, which included the invention of symbols
as well as the rediscovery and rewriting of regional cultures’ (Convers 2000: 130).
This process of regional identity-formation eventually again found constitutional
expression. Between 2006 and 2011,many Autonomous Communities adopted new
statutes, which, despite their subordination to the national constitution, are clas-
4 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000), Partial Decision U5/98 III of 1 July
2000.
5 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004), Partial Decision U 44/01 of 27 Febru-
ary 2004.
6 Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015), U3/13 of 26 November 2015.
7 Jordi Solé i Tura, one of the framers of the constitution, quoted in Conversi (2000: 126).
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sified as constitutional documents in a material sense.8 These included numerous
references to historical kingdoms and traditions, to ‘indigenous languages’ of the
region or flags, monuments and anthems (Delledonne/Martinico 2012). However,
in its seminal ruling of 2010, the Constitutional Court famously placed certain li-
mits to identity affirmation in the case of the Catalan statute. The judges held that
the national symbols and historical rights mentioned in this statute must be read
as referring to the (Catalan) nationality as part of the indivisible Spanish nation and
that Catalonia may be a national reality ‘in an ideological, historical or cultural
sense’ but, unlike Spain, not in legal-constitutional terms.9
Regional Identity and Policy-Making
Processes of regional identity formation are reflected in policy-making in a num-
ber of areas. But they are arguably intertwined with social welfare policies in a par-
ticularly strong way. Apart from redistribution and political legitimation, a third
key function of such policies is the creation and/or consolidation of identity(ies)
(Palermo/Kössler 2017: 347). While historically ‘the welfare state served to “crystal-
lize” the nation-state’ (Moreno/McEwen 2005: 2) by engendering a feeling of nati-
onhood, competing regional identity formation has led a number of subnational
governments to engage in social welfare. Irrespective of the government level that
pursues policies in this area, there is a dialectic relationship between welfare-state
policies, on the one hand, and identity and solidarity, on the other: ‘Not only does
a sense of common identity help sustain the values of mutual help, but the welfare
state itself helps foster national [or regional] identity and unity.’ (Keating 2001: 40)
Scotland, Flanders and the Basque Country are good examples of the interplay
between regional identities and social welfare policies. In the third case, the regio-
nal government introduced a minimum income scheme as part of its 1988 Plan to
Fight Poverty. This was a pioneering initiative in Spain and mainly inspired by the
French Revenu minimum d’insertion (Moreno/Arriba 1999). This programme was the
fruit of a marriage between identity politics and social policy, as embodied by the
coalition government of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and Basque Socialist
Party (PSE). With the minimum income, the coalition deliberately and decidedly
aimed at strengthening social identity and cohesion within the Autonomous Com-
munity.
In Belgium, the economic rise of Flanders (and parallel demise of Wallonia), as
ports, service and foreign investments gradually became more important than the
coal and steel industry, was soon accompanied by calls for decentralisation of func-
tions including social policy. After this process began with the first state reform of
8 Spanish Constitutional Court (2010a), STC 31/2010 FJ 3.
9 Spanish Constitutional Court (2010b), STC 31/2010 FJ 12.
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1970, ‘autonomous’ Flemish social welfare policies came to the forefront of the poli-
tical agenda andwere eventually enabled by another state reform in 1980.While the
national government remained responsible for the most important social insuran-
ce schemes (e.g. old-age pensions and unemployment insurance), ‘social assistance’
to individuals was to some extent decentralised (Cantillon 2006). This enabled the
Flemish Community, for instance, to complement in 1999 the national programme
providing assistance for elderly people with the Flemish Care Insurance, which the
Court of Arbitration upheld as constitutional.10 After the decentralisation of family
allowances with yet another state reform in 2011, further transfers of powers regar-
ding social security schemes remain at the heart of efforts to strengthen Flemish
identity today – for some, this has been so much at the expense of Belgian identi-
ty that these transfers are seen as a key step in gaining independence. That is why
further decentralisation of social welfare is looked at in the rest of the country with
utmost concern (Swenden 2013: 370).
The link between the assertion of a distinct regional identity and striving for
social welfare policies ‘of one’s own’ is particularly evident in the case of Scotland.
It is important to note that the creation of the UK welfare state occurred in a post-
World War II context in which it was supposed to serve as a powerful new mani-
festation of common British nationhood, replacing the then-declining Empire in
this function (Williams 1989: 162). It was therefore natural that relevant institutions
were (re)named the Ministry of National Insurance or the National Health Service.
It was only in the 1960s, when the UK-wide welfare state started to lose its unifying
force, that this provided a fertile ground for Scottish parties to pursue an agenda
of welfare nationalism. This agenda saw Scotland and not the UK as the primary
locus of solidarity. Moreover, the portrayal of Scotland as more socially minded,
particularly in comparison to England, became a hallmark of identity formation
and underpinned both the thrust in the 1990s for devolution (of certain social wel-
fare policies) and opposition in the 2000s to the privatisation and marketisation of
public services (Keating 2012: 221). More than in the Basque Country and Flanders,
however, Scottish welfare nationalism has been balanced since the start of devo-
lution in 1998 by a strong counter-current of welfare unionism, which emphasises
the need for a common policy framework to equity and a broadly common social
citizenship across the UK (Hazell/O’Leary 1999: 43).
Conclusions
‘It is fair to claim that no clear account of the concept of autonomy is available.’
(Wiberg 1998: 43) This often-quoted statement refers to territorial autonomy of re-
10 Belgian Court of Arbitration (2001), Judgment No. 33/2001.
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gions and not to non-territorial autonomy of groups, which is on the whole a much
less powerful instrument (Kössler 2010: 265–272). But in addition to ‘autonomy’
the term ‘region’ also lends itself to a myriad of different understandings. While
there is indeed a proliferation of such conceptions, this contribution has focused
exclusively on the subnational region and how identities of such regions in Europe
are related to constitution- and policy-making.
Regional identity formation is linked with both these dimensions of autonomy
in a dialectic relationship. While such identities inspire constitution- and policy-
making, these political processes in turn aim at and often succeed in reinforcing re-
gional identities. A certain image of the regional political community, in the above
example of the Republika Srpska an exclusive one, not only found its expression
in constitutional preambles and other programmatic provisions, it also influenced
the subsequent processes of identity formation and provoked resistance from non-
Serbs who successfully challenged several constitutional provisions in court. This
case illustrates a critical issue for the development of collective identities, espe-
cially in the context of power-sharing arrangements for divided societies, which
has recently attracted increasing attention, i.e. the systematic exclusion of smal-
ler groups, often referred to as ‘others’ (Agarin et al. 2018). What has been termed
the exclusion-amid-inclusion (EAI) dilemma effectively includes the main groups
involved in the previous (but often only frozen) conflict, but at the same time exclu-
des certain ‘others’. Going far beyond institutional exclusion, this also has reper-
cussions on perceptions of collective identities. In Spain, the recognition in Article
2 of the Constitution of both a national identity and regional identities, as well
as the opportunity for the Autonomous Communities to legally define the latter
in their statutes, enabled the reinforcement and sometimes even the initiation of
processes of regional identity formation. These processes culminated in the 2000s
with several Autonomous Communities revising their statutes. Similar to the Bos-
nian case, however, the court interpreted and reinforced the national Constitution,
especially in the case of Catalonia, as a clear limit. It thus demonstrated the in-
terconnectedness of identity formation in constitutional terms at the national and
subnational levels of government.
Not unlike constitution-making, policy-making is also linked with regional
identities formation in a dialectic relationship in several areas. This seems to hold
true in particular for social welfare policies, which are facilitated by the solidarity
bonus generated through a common identity while fostering such an identity at
the same time. Yet looked at in detail, this relationship works differently from case
to case and has different underlying rationales in each instance. In Flanders, the
early but still ongoing calls for the decentralisation of more andmore social welfare
policies appear to have been inspired in part by a more general desire to ‘downsize’
the repertoire of powers of the national government. In other words, they seem
to some extent instrumental, which is exactly what makes them suspicious to
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opponents of decentralisation. In comparison, in the case of Scotland, claims for
‘ownership’ of social welfare policies are arguably far more intimately linked to a
continuous narrative on egalitarianism as part of a Scottish (and particularly not
English) identity. But even in this case, welfare nationalism, a political force at
least since the 1960s, has been faced with a deliberate counter-reaction towards
welfare unionism. This once again demonstrates the limits that regional identity
formation is typically confronted with, be they legal or political in nature.
While the focus of this paper has been decidedly on regional identities, many
of the considerations above regarding the links between constitution- and policy-
making, on the one hand, and the formation of collective identities, on the other,
are reminiscent of the cumbersome process of developing a European identity. A
case in point is the treatment of identity in the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
which is central to the EU’s constitutional law. Both the preamble and Article 1 of
the TEU refer repeatedly the ‘peoples of Europe’ in the plural, even if reference is
made to an ‘ever closer union’ between them. But on the other hand, Article 9 of the
TEU regulates common EU citizenship (in addition to member state citizenship),
which was agreed upon in Maastricht in 1992 precisely with a view to the creati-
on of a European political community with a distinctive identity (Kostakopoulou
2007). Moreover, the new Article 2 introduced with the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, aims
to establish a community based on shared European values as elements of a com-
mon identity. However, the real existence of this community and the enforcement
of these values through the procedures of Article 7 have become, in relation to the
governments of Hungary and Poland, fiercely debated issues (Halmai 2019). These
instances of constitution-making are aimed, as are several other fields of EU po-
licy-making (Prutsch 2017: 18–23), at strengthening a common European identity
that can eventually complement national, regional and local identities. At the sa-
me, of course, it needs to be taken into account that ‘increasing re-nationalisation
tendencies and growing alienation from the “European project”’ (Prutsch, 2017: 39)
mean this endeavour is now a far greater challenge than it was a few years ago.
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The European Union has recently had to face increased assertions of national iden-
tity and regional autonomy in several member states. The ‘identitarian’ far right is
on the rise in a number of countries and is strongly opposed to the idea of the Eu-
ropean Union.1 Growing authoritarian nationalism also pretends to be an answer
to global capitalism (Bloom 2016: 50–51). Furthermore, certain regions within EU
member states, such as Scotland or Catalonia, are also demanding greater autono-
my ever more loudly. It is noticeable that, although both movements (i.e. identita-
rian politics associated with nation states, and movements for greater autonomy
within a state) derive from the same root – nationalism (see Gellner 1998: 3–4, 61)
– they can be (but are not always) quite different in their position towards the Eu-
ropean Union and in their stance to immigration politics. In Scotland, for example,
a rise in nationalism and calls for Scottish independence from the UK (effectively:
from England) since the 1960s is evident in the fact that the Scottish National Party
(SNP) has held power in the regional (devolved) government of Scotland since 2007.
And yet, at least the present leadership of the SNP proclaims to have a rather so-
cial-democratic political position2 and is opposed to a far-right anti-immigration
1 This is, however, not really a new development in the EU, see Schlesinger (1994: 325) for a
description of this phenomenon about 25 years ago.
2 See, for instance, the speech by the then newly elected SNP leader Nicola Stur-
geon on 15 November 2014: ‘But in the SNP, the people of Scotland will always
know they have a party of true social democracy.’ Cited in Sparrow (2014), ‘SNP
conference – Nicola Sturgeon’s speech: Politics Live blog’, The Guardian, 15 Novem-
ber 2014: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2014/nov/15/snp-conference-nico-
la-sturgeons-speech-politics-live-blog (accessed 8 March 2019). Historically, the SNP was a
conservative party, and from 1934, when it was founded, and at least until 1937 some of its
founders, for example Andrew Dewar Gibb, flirted with fascism, albeit rather coyly. See, e.g.,
Hanham (1969: 163–166).
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agenda.3 It also declares its adherence to a concept of ‘civic nationalism’ (Kiely et
al. 2005: 150). Whatever that may be, it is ostensibly a rejection of a nineteenth and
twentieth century-style traditional ethnic and homogeneous mono-cultural natio-
nalism (Gellner 1998: 2–3, 72–73). Such ‘traditional’ nationalism sees itself as uni-
versal, which is incorrect as such, because cultural diversity where nationalism did
not play a significant role has inevitably also existed. Furthermore, nationalisms
in different nations are necessarily confrontational and in a state of rivalry (Gell-
ner 1998: 6–8, 95). By contrast, the SNP leadership is supportive of membership of
the European Union and the EU’s anti-nationalist values. It reflects the mood of
the Scottish people in this regard: in the EU referendum on 23 June 2016, Scotland
voted in all its constituencies and with 62% overall for remaining in the European
Union (overall turnout in Scotland: 67.2%).4
The following is a perhaps idiosyncratic discussion by a European about Scot-
land’s drive for – and largely already achieved – autonomy within the UK, with an
emphasis on the legal perspective. As it concerns the UK, the discussion cannot
be divided from ‘Brexit’, the UK’s impending departure from the EU. This chapter
concerns the development of autonomy within a country that positioned itself out-
side Europe as a cultural space, and that would not have changed, even if the legal
withdrawal from the EU according to Art. 50 TEU had not gone ahead or had been
delayed further.
Autonomies Inside and Outside the European Union:
The English-Scottish United Kingdom and Brexit
In England, the majority of the English people do not consider themselves part of
‘Europe’. British, especially English, people refer to themselves as ‘British’ in con-
trast to, and not as a subset of, an identity as ‘European’. Furthermore, and possibly
in reaction to mounting Scottish nationalism in the context of the 2014 indepen-
dence referendum,many would also stress that they are ‘English’. For them ‘Europe’
is ‘the Continent’. The outcome of the EU referendum was therefore no great sur-
prise; in fact, it was fairly astonishing that the result in favour of Brexit in England
was rather weak (53.4%),5 given the populist anti-immigration and xenophobic agi-
tation, fuelled by the British tabloid press, which characterised the EU referendum
campaign.
3 See, for instance, Carrell &Watt (2013), ‘Nigel Farage andAlex Salmond clash over protesters’,
The Guardian, 17 May 2013.
4 BBC News: ‘EU Referendum Results’: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/
results (accessed 8 March 2019).
5 See e.g. BBC website: ‘EU Referendum Results’:
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The Scots generally feel, and usually are, more ‘European’, but are part of a uni-
on with a country that, by contrast, has a non-European orientation. Whether the
kingdoms of England and Scotland will remain united, especially in the aftermath
of a potentially disastrous ‘no-deal Brexit’, remains to be seen.Many Scots are sym-
pathisers or supporters of a separatist nationalist movement that seeks Scottish
independence but (generally, though not always) sees the future of an independent
Scotland in the EU, that is, in a political and economic union of nation states that is
designed to overcome nationalism.Thus, the Scottish nationalists largely adhere to
a non-nationalist EU. In contrast, other, more traditional right-wing nationalists,
such as in France, Germany, Austria or Italy share a similar level of disdain for the
EU, but it is precisely this commonality of political perspective that prevents them
from cooperating. The idea of ‘nationalists of the world, unite!’ is a contradiction
in terms.This shows two important aspects of nationalism: national identity is not
‘natural’, but constructed and invented at will, and nationalism involves irreconcil-
able paradoxes.
The paradoxes of nationalism are also evident in the Brexit debate. Brexit is
indeed a peculiarly British, or rather English, problem and is really a matter for
the British, with their pathological obsessions with Europe, to sort out.6 Self-con-
tradictory views are quite common. Even ‘remainers’, that is, those who oppose
Brexit, are not free from nationalistic contradictions. The remainer position com-
bines a nationalistic attitude that emphasises autonomy and uniqueness with a
pro-European position.This is true in both England and Scotland individually, and
in the UK as a whole. One can draw certain conclusions about developments insi-
de the EU from the experiences around autonomy in a country that will soon be
outside the EU.
Unacknowledged Federalism Without a Written Constitution
Are Scottish devolution and the Scottish independencemovement really models for
the idea of autonomous regions in Europe? This question can be answered imme-
diately with a resounding ‘no’. The principal reason is that Scottish devolution is
based on a unique constitutional framework that could not, and should not, be fol-
lowed anywhere else. Any modern federal system with relatively autonomous regi-
ons, states, Länder or cantons requires a written constitution that sets out the com-
petences of the federation vis-à-vis the separate federal states. Federalism can have
a democratising effect by preventing excessive centralisation of political power, but
this can only operate properly where there is a constitutional system that distribu-
tes powers and has a judicial review system, either through a specialised constitu-
6 Fintan O’Toole, ‘The paranoid fantasy behind Brexit’, The Guardian, 16 November 2018.
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tional court or (particularly in common law systems) through the ordinary courts
assuming the role of a constitutional court.
Britain has no written constitution; that is undisputed. However, what may be
controversial is my own interpretation after having lived and worked as a lawyer
(mostly as an academic) in both England and mainly Scotland for some twenty
years: the United Kingdom has no constitution at all as a modern political and
legal system would understand it. What Britain has, is a feudal constitution in
the spirit of an ancien régime, as in France before the French Revolution of 1789
and before the US Constitution (1787, in force since 1789). The term ‘ancien régime’
is characteristically not used by British political scientists, lawyers or historians,
because there has been no revolutionary rupture, for England since the Glorious
Revolution of 1688-89, and, for Scotland, since the Act of Union of 1707, which
formed the Kingdom of Great Britain. The current British system is thus ‘ancien’ in
substance, at least from a continental European viewpoint (Rahmatian 2018: 620).
The feudal system is part of everyday life in the UK, although ordinary peop-
le will often not be aware of it. Every instance of land ownership in England and
Wales is technically a feudal tenure in law, whereby the Crown, at the apex of the
feudal pyramid, is the only owner of the land, while the user and perceived owner
of the individual plot of land or house is actually a vassal or feudal tenant (nowa-
days usually a tenant-in-chief with no intermediate superiors). Every conveyance
of immoveable property in England and Wales today is officially a substitution of
vassals – the seller is substituted by the buyer according to the Statute Quia Emp-
tores of 1290, which is still in force. Scotland only abolished this system of feudal
landholding in 2004. This legal, not only sociological, feudalism is ultimately still
the framework of a state that does not have a written constitution (Rahmatian 2018:
620–621 on the legal technicalities): the feudal pyramid, based on landholding and
property – mirrored in the ubiquitous and unabated power of the English class
system today – is the skeleton of the structure of the British ‘state’. It is also cha-
racteristic that the term British ‘state’ is unfamiliar (Loughlin 1999: 35); in Britain
one refers rather to the ‘Crown’ or ‘Government’ or ‘Parliament’, as the case may be.
Naturally the constitutional and administrative structure of the British ‘state’ also
rests on the feudal system; it could not rest (in law) on a founding constitution,
because there is none. The legislative, executive and judicial powers were and are
rooted in the feudal structure. The Crown and the British Parliament in particu-
lar, including the highest court of the land until 2009, were historically, and still
are, creatures of feudalism. The court of final appeal was formerly the House of
Lords (technically ‘The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords’), whereby the
judges or Law Lords were also members of the House of Lords, the Upper House
of Parliament. In 2009, a separate Supreme Court was established, which finally
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achieved proper separation of powers.7 This features a characteristic of (otherwise
historical) feudal systems: the fusion of private law (land ownership) and public law
(state institutions), which political theorists of the early modern period so carefully
sought to distinguish by conferring sovereignty on the state, the prince, and later
the people (public law), and by conferring property on the individual (private law).8
I said before that ‘naturally’ the British constitutional and administrative sys-
tem rests on the feudal system, but there is almost no reflection on that fact among
British public lawyers, and I cannot see much difference between English and Scot-
tish lawyers in this regard. What I have presented is certainly a heretical account
of British constitutional law. Legal historians would probably be more forgiving
and would remember the statement of the distinguished legal historian Frederic
Maitland that ‘our whole constitutional law seems at times to be but an appendix to
the law of real property’ (Maitland 1909: 538).9 But it would probably not be accep-
ted by traditional British constitutional lawyers. Nevertheless, my understanding
has been proven in the course of the Brexit negotiations.
The British system of an unwritten feudal constitution can be interpreted in
such as a way as if Britain had a modern democratic constitutional system. In this
way, the old feudal ancien régime framework is laced with constitutional conventions
that emulate a modern constitutional system of the type that emerged following
the French Revolution, and as is found in every other EU member state, and as is
the tacit assumption underlying the legal and constitutional framework of the EU
itself. Recently, British politicians of both principal political parties, have, however,
chosen to depart from that method of emulation and pursue a different path. This
may be a specific form of English democracy, or it may turn out not to be even
that. The feudal constitution itself has (again, naturally) no democratic safeguards
enshrined within it (Rahmatian 2018: 624–626). Since the imitation of modern Eu-
ropean constitutional democracies is no longer sought, British membership of the
EU is incompatible also for this reason, and, for that reason alone, the Brexit nego-
tiations were largely negotiations for their own sake.10
Developments in the Brexit process in early 2019 are but a symptom of this con-
ceptual gap. The former British Prime Minister Theresa May could apparently not
understand why EU leaders did not agree to a reopening of the negotiations of the
withdrawal agreement,11 after it had been voted down spectacularly in the British
7 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s. 23, and SI 2009/1604: Supreme Court of the United King-
dom: The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (Commencement No. 11) Order 2009, sch. 2.
8 Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, book 26, chapter 15 (1995 : 876).
9 ‘Real property’ is the legal term in England for land, immoveable property, which is feudal.
10 I have always made that point in Rahmatian (2017): ‘Brexit: Verhandeln um des Verhandelns
Willen?’ Der Standard (Austria), 24 August 2017.
11 Peter Foster, ‘Theresa May leaves diplomats in “disbelief” after presenting EU leaders with
unchanged Brexit demands’, The Telegraph, 18 January 2019.
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Parliament by 230 votes on 15 January 2019,12 the worst defeat for any British go-
vernment in at least 100 years, and then voted down again twice and decisively on
12 and 29March 2019.The then PrimeMinister’s stance was the result of a notion of
British exceptionalism combined with a complete misunderstanding of the princi-
ples of the EU that are based not on some feudal structure with ever-changing
constitutional conventions but on a modern constitutional statutory framework
which the constitutions of the member states in aggregate and the EU Treaty itself
provide. The new UK Prime Minister since 24 July 2019, Boris Johnson, seems to
carry this misunderstanding to a new extreme.
However, despite the string of reputation-harming performances in the course
of the Brexit debacle, most British politicians still fantasise about the UK being the
oldest and best functioning democracy in Europe, with the best legal system in the
form of the Common Law. It would not cross their minds that the EU, although it
limited British parliamentary sovereignty, acted as a kind of framework that helped
the ancient British feudal constitutional system emulate amodern democratic state
and ensured that the British constitution continued to be interpreted in the light
of a modern liberal and pluralist parliamentary democracy (Rahmatian 2018: 626).
Where does that leave Scotland? Actually, nowhere, but that is partly also self-
inflicted. As explained earlier, the British constitutional system is, in essence, still a
feudal system. Such a system does not contain any concept of federalism, but provi-
des effectively a centralist state structure. Although Jean Bodin13 and later Thomas
Hobbes14 developed the modern idea of sovereignty as a clear departure from the
late medieval feudal system,15 they took over the inherent centralism in the feudal
system in which any political and legal relation – including the personal element of
feudalism, the homagium, as well as the proprietary element, the beneficum (Gans-
hof 1964: 72, 75, 106) – ultimately focused on a single vanishing point, the king.This
was the case under the French feudal system (and France would became the classic
example of a centralist state) and the English system, which imported essentially
the (Norman) French feudal system, albeit in a more tightened way (Stenton 1979:
60-61, 64–65). It was only Johannes Althusius (1614) who proposed, against Bodin,
the idea of federalism (Althusius 1965: 99). In modern British political and constitu-
tional theory, Althusius is entirely unknown, and Bodin fares little better. Whether
greater familiarity with these thinkers wouldmake any change is doubtful, because
the concept of federalism, considered rather as an American or German idea, is in
any case still unpopular in the UK. Furthermore, for UK politicians and much of
12 For a breakdown of results according to political parties and constituencies, see e.g. Antonio
Voce and Seán Clarke, ‘How did my MP vote on May’s Brexit deal?’, The Guardian, 15 January
2018.
13 Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, book 1, chapter 8 (1955: 25–36).
14 Hobbes, Leviathan, chapters 18, 22, 26 (1985: 228-239, 274-288, 312–314).
15 Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, book 1, chapter 9 (1955: 37–38).
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the English people, the idea of a ‘federal Europe’ or an ‘ever-closer’ European Union
is almost horrific (Schlesinger 1994: 319) – something that contributed to the Brexit
result.
Nonetheless, in 1999 the Scotland Act 1998 established the Scottish Parliament.16
This Act introduced to the UK what is usually called ‘asymmetrical devolution’, and
could more prosaically be termed ‘unrecognised limping federalism’.17 It is limping
because there is no equivalent English Parliament; the British Parliament in West-
minster covers English affairs, and there is little indication of a political will to
change that. It is unrecognised because, rather than laying out a federal structu-
re in a written constitution, these arrangements were rather grafted ad hoc on-
to the centralist unwritten constitution of the whole of the UK. The Scotland Act
1998 that devolved certain powers to Scotland, a federalisation in all but name, is,
however, still an Act of the UK Parliament. According to classical British constitu-
tional doctrine (the theory of parliamentary sovereignty), Parliament cannot bind
subsequent Parliaments, which can thus amend or abolish any Act, including the
Scotland Act, at will at any time and thereby eliminate the Scottish Parliament and
end Scottish devolution.There are no higher-ranking constitutional norms. Recent
legislation has nevertheless emphasised that, in this particular case, such a move
would not be possible,18 and the key constitutional decision of the Supreme Court
in Miller confirmed that in 2017.19 However, though that may be the law, politics
may take a different view. The Scotland Act and Scottish devolution are based on
a self-imposed limitation of parliamentary sovereignty by the Westminster Parlia-
ment in London.This self-limitation is the same legal construct that made Britain’s
EU membership and acceptance of supranational EU law possible, and exactly this
is in the course of being dissolved. The cited case of R. (Miller) incidentally stres-
ses the foundational centralism of the UK: it makes clear that neither the Scottish
Parliament, nor the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies have a legal veto on the
UK’s withdrawal from the EU.20 Whatever Scottish nationalists may want to belie-
ve, ultimately Scottish devolution can only exist as long as it secures the grace of
the British Parliament in London. This is different from a proper written federal
constitution, which all Parliaments, national and regional, would be subjected to.
Many Scots may cherish their devolution, but what Scotland has done with its
devolved status has so far been unimpressive. The legislative competence of the
16 Scotland Act 1998, s. 1.
17 Scottish nationalists often see devolution as a defective compromise, see e.g. Maxwell (2013:
38–39).
18 Scotland Act 1998, s. 63A.
19 R. (on the application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017]
HRLR 2, para. 149.
20 R. (on the application of Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017]
HRLR 2, para. 150.
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Scottish Parliament is actually rather wide,21 but a look at the titles of the fifte-
en Acts of the Scottish Parliament passed in 2018 may give an idea of the pro-
blems that seem primarily to concern the Scottish legislature: they do not strike
one as having a particularly nation-building quality, but are typical of a regional
assembly.22 It is true that the Scottish Parliament has no competence to legislate
on Brexit-related matters,23 but it is astonishing that the SNP, which has formed
the Scottish Government since 2007 and has Scottish independence as its declared
political aim, has so far not made any serious attempts at preparing for a possible
independent Scotland outside the existing legislative constraints.That could inclu-
de establishing independent informal foreign relations with smaller EU member
states (and learning foreign policy from them), or developing greater economic au-
tonomy, for example, by encouraging IT and other high-skills service industries to
settle in Scotland, and so forth. An unsympathetic analysis may regard the idea of
Scottish independence as a case of romantic political irrationalism or a strategic
political dream, and it is not clear whether it is intended that the dream should
ever genuinely be fulfilled. Scotland undoubtedly has a separate national identity,
expressed by – or made up by – a range of cultural features: education, language
(Scots and Gaelic), a different legal system partially based on the historical conti-
nental European ius commune deriving from Roman Law (White et al. 2013: 21), a
cultural outlook generallymore directed to Europe, but at the same time influenced
21 Scotland Act 1998, ss. 29-30, and on retained EU law after Brexit, see s. 30A.
22 Prescription (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 15), Historical Sexual Offences (Pardons and Disre-
gards) (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 14), Housing (Amendment) (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 13), Is-
lands (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 12), Land and Buildings Transaction Tax (Relief from Additio-
nal Amount) (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 11), Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group Proceedings)
(Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 10), Social Security (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 9), Forestry and Land
Management (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 8), Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening
Communications (Repeal) (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 7), Budget (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 6), Do-
mestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 5), Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland)
Act 2018 (asp 4), Wild Animals in Travelling Circuses (Scotland) Act 2018 (asp 3 ), Writers to
the SignetDependants’ Annuity FundAmendment (Scotland) 2018 (asp 2), EdinburghBakers’
Widows’ Fund Act 2018 (asp 1).
23 See the Supreme Court Decision The UK Withdrawal From The European Union (Legal Con-
tinuity) (Scotland) Bill - A Reference by the Attorney General and the Advocate General for
Scotland (Scotland), [2018] UKSC 64, para. 52: ‘… An enactment of the Scottish Parliament
which prevented … subordinate legislation from having legal effect, unless the Scottish Mi-
nisters gave their consent, would render the effect of lawsmade by the UK Parliament condi-
tional on the consent of the Scottish Ministers. It would therefore limit the power of the UK
Parliament to make laws for Scotland … The imposition of such a condition on the UK Parlia-
ment’s law-making power would be inconsistent with the continued recognition, by section
28(7) of the Scotland Act, of its unqualified legislative power.’ This subordinate legislation
would particularly be legislation following the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.
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by Presbyterianism as a distinctive variant of Protestantism.24 However, it appears
that blaming the central government in London and insisting on autonomy when it
suits the Scots is politically easier25 than a well-planned, reasonable (and perhaps
non-nationalistic) and systematic preparation for full political independence. That
may even apply after Brexit: Scottish allegiance to the UK may prevail over allegi-
ance to the EU.
Parallels between the 2014 Scottish Independence Debate and the UK
Brexit Debate of 2016
The 2014 Scottish independence referendum also revealed a contradictory attitude.
It was never quite clear whether the governing SNPwas doingmore than indulging
in a romantic fantasy. The main disturbing feature of this referendum campaign
was not so much the possibility of independence of Scotland from the UK, but ra-
ther the complete and naïve unpreparedness of the Scottish Government for this
step, shrouded in self-centred nationalistic rhetoric.26 First, and, for a lawyer, fun-
damentally important, there was neither a draft constitution for the envisaged new
independent state nor even any advanced preparations (Rahmatian 2018: 630).27 It
was claimed that nothing would change much for Scotland after independence,
especially not as far as the economy is concerned.28 It was said that after indepen-
dence, Scotland would retain the (English) pound as its currency.29 Scotland, being
in the EU via the UK, would remain in the EU as an independent country as well.
The last claim should be remembered by Scots who now (rightly) accuse the UK
Government of incompetence in legal matters during the Brexit negotiations. The
position of the Scottish SNP Government about EU membership of Scotland after
24 On the tense relationship between the Presbyterian communities and the Roman Catholi-
cism of the Irish immigrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see, e.g. Han-
ham (1969: 19–20).
25 In the words of one Scottish Nationalist: ‘Scotland’s subordinate political status’ frustrates
‘Scottish initiative’ in relation to its own welfare and economic policy, see Maxwell (2013: 55).
When this was published, the Scottish Parliament had existed for over twelve years.
26 Rahmatian (2014) ‘Schottland: Das hässliche Gesicht des Nationalismus’, Die Zeit Online, 16
September 2014.
27 It is telling that nobody, apart frommyself, raised this point as an essential issue,which shows
that Scots lawyers are also totally socialised in the deficient concept of the unwritten consti-
tution of the UK.
28 Salmond (2014): ‘St. George’s Day Speech: Full Text’, New Statesman, 23 April 2014.
29 For example, S. Carrel, ‘It’s Scotland’s pound and we’re keeping it, says Alex Salmond: First
minister indicates independent Scotland would use sterling even if formal sterling zone was
rejected by UK government’, The Guardian, 7 August 2014. On the – rather grotesque – effec-
ts of such a decision (if approved by England, which seemed very unlikely), see Rahmatian
(2012: 337).
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independence was not only unquestionably wrong under international law and the
rules on state secession (Crawford 2007: 383; Rahmatian 2012: 336), the EU itself
also pointed out several times that this view is incorrect, and an independent Scot-
land would have to reapply for EU membership.30 The Scottish SNP Government,
now very EU-friendly, then rejected out of hand statements made by the EU that
other member states could block Scotland’s accession to the EU.31 Since there are
many conspicuous parallels between the lofty and disingenuous declarations ma-
de during the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 and in the Brexit process
from 2016 onwards, one can conjecture that the current pandemonium around Bre-
xit gives a good indication as to how the Scottish independence process would have
been if the referendum result in 2014 had been in favour of independence (Rahma-
tian 2018: 633). However, maybe the Scottish Government did not quite want to win
it anyway, just as the proponents of Brexit within the ruling Conservative Party in
the UK did not quite want to win the Brexit referendum, either, but only sought
political gain in a personal gamble.32
In Brexit Britain, Scotland is now probably one of the calmer parts of the coun-
try, but that should not make one forget the period of the run-up to the Scottish in-
dependence referendum.There was a highly nationalistic atmosphere at that time,
no trace of the purported civic nationalism. Furthermore, an inclusive identity-
creating nationalism is in any case a contradiction in terms: the making of identity
(expressed in an independent Scottish state) always involves inclusion and exclu-
sion, a distinction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ (Schlesinger 1994: 321). Accordingly, the
whole country was rather engulfed in the usual traditional, hostile and toxic na-
tionalism, and a few elements showed obvious parallels to fascism,33 though the
Scottish Government did not associate itself with these dark forces. This nationa-
lism was then primarily directed at the English – for no justifiable reason – but,
if the referendum result had been in favour of independence, it could have turned
30 For example, European Parliament, Parliamentary Questions, Subject: Status of the
United Kingdom if Scotland leaves, 29 October 2012, available at: http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=P-2012-009862&language=EN (accessed 8
March 2019). See also: Letter of the then EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso to Lord Tu-
gendhat, House of Lords, 10 December 2012.
31 Jim Pickard and Mure Dickie, ‘EU Commission president says Scotland membership not au-
tomatic’, Financial Times, 16 February 2014.
32 Hinsliff, (2016): ‘A pyrrhic victory? Boris Johnsonwakes up to the costs of Brexit’, The Guardian,
24 June 2016.
33 On historical interchanges between Scottish Nationalists and the Nazis in the 1930s and 40s,
see Bowd (2013: 138–181). However, even during that time, only a small number of Scots as-
sociated themselves with fascism. An outline of the current weird curiosities of Scottish Na-
tionalism is contained in Bowd (2013: 265–267).
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quickly against Europeans and other perceived non-Scottish elements as well.34
This demonstrates again that kindred nationalists – here English and Scottish na-
tionalists – may merge in a nuclear fusion, with the emission of deadly energy as
a result, but are unable to work together constructively.
Against the Mainstream of the EU Integration Agenda: Regionalisation
as a Non-Nationalistic Approach
Scottish devolution in the UK, which has now left the EU, is not a convincingmodel
for the development of autonomous regions within the EU, but perhaps rather an
example of how not to do it. A negative example of this kind can also give guidance
points. Furthermore, the Brexit process has unintentionally strengthened the po-
sition of the EU as the better political and economic entity for Europe in principle:
not even the most brilliantly devised EU-advertising campaign could have made a
better case for the EU than has the chaotic British Brexit disaster. The most pallid
and uncreative EU-apparatchik in Brussels need only point to the UK after Brexit
as a possible alternative to the EU and will have won the argument at once. In this
regard, Europeans can be grateful to the British.
However, if the EU wants to survive in the coming decades, it cannot rely on
an unexpected boost accidentally provided by the inabilities of a parting member.
Rather it is necessary for the EU to adopt a more flexible approach to the process
of political and economic integration. Sometimes further integration is expedient,
sometimes not, and even a certain reversal must be possible if necessary. The con-
stitutional body of the EU must allow these adaptabilities. In the same way as the
ribs must be flexible to allow the body to breathe in and out, otherwise it cannot
live, the constitutional and political framework of the EU must allow the EU to
breathe as an entity, otherwise it cannot live. Nobody wants to destroy the ribcage,
but a static ribcage is a statue, not a living being. A sclerotic EU is a dying EU, a
danger that we face now.
For that reason, legal and economic integration in the EUmust happen in pha-
ses that are, at least in principle, partly reversible.This is a good basis for increased
regionalisation in Europe, and that, in turn, allows for a better recognition of auto-
nomous regions within the EU. Pressure for further legal and economic integration
still underpins the official agenda of the EU administration, but this could actually
34 An insight is provided by the views of Jews in Scotland at the time: ‘For now they [the Scottish
nationalists] are restricting themselves to propaganda and signposts in Gaelic that no one
really needs. But as a Jew who has relatively short roots in Scotland, and with friends and
family in England and Israel, as much as I feel Scottish on the outside, I fear that one day
people will start asking: “How Scottish are you?”’, quoted in Pfeffer (2012): ‘Jews on Scottish
independence: More faintheart than Braveheart’, Haarez, 26 October 2012.
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lead to the destruction of the fundamental European idea: the prevention of war
between France and Germany and between EUmember states generally.This is the
essence of the EU, and the four freedoms are supposed to contribute to the reali-
sation of this ideal (an aspect that is rarely understood in the UK, hence the Brexit
calamity). The more one pursues legal and economic integration and unification
across Europe, the more one impedes and endangers the fabric and framework of
a union of European states. Further legal unification prompts a tendency of the
EU member states to move away from one another. Further (imposed) unity cau-
ses further diversity, and, at the same time, a certain level of diversity effects and
strengthens unity. This process appears somewhat dialectical, but is actually an
ultimately unresolvable paradox, a phenomenon that I have called the ‘Herderian
paradox’, after Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). It applies in relation to alrea-
dy harmonised areas of the law in the EU, such as copyright, and to areas where
there is more national diversity, as in the case of European private law (Rahmatian
2016: 919–920) or regulatory rules for the economy.The unity through, and within,
diversity is then indeed what Herder saw as the overarching humanist culture that
unites mankind, not only in Europe. Unity is actually created and made possible
through diversity. Herder does not advocate a value relativism, but a co-existence
of different values in different cultures (Berlin 1991: 84).
For Herder, there a distinctive ‘national character’ (‘Nationalcharakter’) of peop-
les (Herder Ideen, II, 9, iv, 1989: 369–370), which he explained in his philosophy of
history, particularly in his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (‘Ide-
as on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind’) (1784–1791) (see also Rahmatian
2016: 915-917). Herder’s ‘national character’ is the outcome of a mystical combina-
tion of history and tradition, education and civilisation, but also of nature and
climate.35 However, despite the dissimilarity of peoples in their seemingly irrecon-
cilable plurality there is still a ‘general spirit of Europe’ (‘Allgemeingeist Europas’),
which will gradually extinguish the national characters (Herder Ideen, IV, 16, vi,
1989: 705–706). Herder even once uses the term ‘European Republic’ (Europäische
Republik) (Herder Ideen, IV, 16, 1989: 678). But, contrary to Herder’s view, a ‘national
character’ does not derive from nature, culture and tradition, language, education
and art. National character is rather deliberately created, a social construct of po-
litics, economics and the media, and frequently consciously fabricated for political
ends. It is also often given some irrational mystical spiritual force, which allows it
to avoid rational critique.
Humans create the various national characters by behaving as if they were real.
In this way the national character can become an important political factor. Britain
is a case in point: it is, also culturally, not really a part of Europe, because it chooses
not to be, particularly England. However, that may change, and it has indeed been
35 Herder Ideen, II, 7, iii (1989: 268–270); II, 7, v (1989: 280–281); II, 8 (1989: 298–299).
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different in the past. A ‘national character’, as with individual identities, ought not
to be a concept that is fixed and imposed from above (‘them’ and ‘us’ as a self-
definition against ‘them’); for example, a Jewmay not be concerned much about his
or her Jewishness, but the anti-Semites will be, and that forces him or her into a
certain role. The identity of people and peoples should rather be an ever-changing
performative act of the self and can therefore only work in democratic systems
which allow free discourse and exchange in a stable political space as a prerequisite.
This is an aspect of the Herderian paradox of the European ‘unity in diversity’ of
different nations with their different ‘characters’. The nations may seek to define
and reassess their (imagined and created) identities as they see fit in an ongoing
debate.
This concept can also be a model for the regionalisation of Europe in the Eu-
ropean Union in a way that does not depend on ethnicities and languages; it is
therefore not nationalism in the traditional sense of the past two centuries. Under
such a design, nation states would provide the constitutional and legal framework
of the regions, particularly in relation to constitutional and social security rights,
which would also have to be transportable across the EU. The idea of autonomous
regions as a separate concept would gradually dissolve in an all-encompassing re-
gionalisation of Europe.
Nationalists in autonomous regions in Scotland and Catalonia, for example,
unconsciously apply this idea already. When nationalist movements appear more
EU-friendly than the central states in which they are situated, they invoke the EU
(when it suits them) as a political counterbalance to the central government to pre-
serve or even extend their autonomy. In this way they appeal to the idea of a Europe
of the regions. However, their position also contains the seeds of demise of a Eu-
rope of the regions, because that idea is in contrast to their nationalist endeavours
to create traditional independent nation states. If such endeavours are successful,
and the new state subsequently becomes a newmember of the EU, it may well turn
into a quite EU-critical member, because the EU will then be seen as interfering in
the new nation state. It should not be forgotten that the principal objective of se-
paratists and nationalists is obtaining unfettered power over the region they claim
independence for. This could be seen in the Scottish independence referendum in
2014: the SNP planned to keep the British monarchy for an independent Scotland
(Scottish Government 2013: 21, 45, 340), had no constitution in place for the pos-
sible new state, and all political parties in the Scottish Parliament except the SNP
and the small Scottish Green Party were against independence. (How could a con-
stitutional convention be formed for passing a Scottish constitution under these
circumstances?) The result could have been a one-party state in form of an abso-
lute monarchy, at least for an interim period. Political theorists should know that
any assumptions about an innate benevolence in human nature are entirely out
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of place in politics, hence the absolute requirement for checks and balances in a
constitutional system.
At the moment, the EU-friendliness of the Scottish nationalists is also a vehicle
for distinguishing the Scots from the English (Ichijo 2004: 86). A central problem
when nationalists are confronted with defining their nationalism in positive terms
is: What does characterise Scottishness? The nationalists’ positive attitude towards
the EU is also a strategic tool for achieving Scottish independence, since separating
from the UK but staying in, or rapidly joining, the EU is seen as a means of ob-
taining great political change, but risking little economic disruption (Ichijo 2004:
91-92). The experience of the position of the EU during the Scottish independence
referendum in 2014 should have prompted Scottish nationalists to abandon this
fantasy: in relation to existing members the EU may tend towards a diminution of
the importance of the nation state, but in relation to aspiring members, it applies
faithfully the classical rules of international law on the definition and secession of
states, and on membership of international organisations.
Conclusion
It has been shown that the discourse in the Scottish independence referendum in
2014 shared many elements of irrationality with the Brexit referendum two years
later. Both are symptoms of generally irrational, populist and romantic nationa-
lisms, whether against the central state or the EU, but in each case in relation
to something bigger against whom the little plucky underdog tries to assert his
self-determination, without a clear notion as to what actually should be determi-
ned. A consensus can quickly be found in the form of hatred towards refugees,
xenophobia and racism, which then become the wretched areas of agreement. In
this context, a particular national character is also often established or unearthed.
While this national character does not have the sublime cultural features Herder
wanted to see, politics would be ill-advised to deny the existence of such national
characters, which are there because too many people(s) believe they exist. Natio-
nalism nevertheless remains an objectionable and dangerously destructive force.
It does not become better if it is renamed ‘civic nationalism’ or ‘patriotism’, and
Arthur Schopenhauer’s snarky comments about nationalism (Nationalstolz) (Scho-
penhauer, 1976: 66)36 are as valid today as they were in the nineteenth century. (One
should also remember François Mitterrand’s words in 1995: ‘Le nationalisme, c’est la
36 And also his important observation: ‘Incidentally, individuality prevails by far over nationa-
lity, and with a given person the former deserves a thousand times more consideration than
the latter.’
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guerre!’)37 However, nationalism will not disappear if it is suppressed or disavowed
in the constitutional framework of the EU and its policies on integration.
At the same time, cultural differences should not be deformed or destroyed by
way of centralisation and unification. The major political challenge of the twenty-
first century will be the reconciliation of cultural differences in a greater unity (and
not only confined to Europe), based onmutual respect and appreciation.This para-
dox cannot, and should not, be resolved, but it may subdue nationalist forces. The
idea of a European unity of cultures in their diversity did not emerge only with
early German Romanticism. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, the greatest writer of the
late German Enlightenment, demonstrated it in a beautiful way in his play Minna
von Barnhelm (Act 4, Scene 2, Lessing 1853: 221):
‘Riccaut de laMarlinière: […] –Mademoiselle parle français? Mais sans doute; telle
que je la vois! – La demande était bien impolie; vous me pardonnerez, Mademoi-
selle. –Das Fräulein (Minna von Barnhelm): Mein Herr –Riccaut: Nit? Sie sprek nit
Französisch, Ihro Gnad? - Das Fräulein: Mein Herr, in Frankreich würde ich es zu
sprechen suchen. Aber warum hier? Ich höre ja, daß Sie mich verstehen, mein
Herr. Und ich, mein Herr, werde Sie gewiß auch verstehen; sprechen Sie, wie es
Ihnen beliebt.’
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True Bavarians
The Volatile Identity Politics of Born Regionalists
Roland Sturm
Introduction
Bavaria is a special case in German politics.The state has developed a strong regio-
nal identity. And this regional identity finds its political expression not only within
the state of Bavaria, but also at the federal level. It would not be surprising if there
was a strong political movement for Bavarian autonomy or independence. But the
opposite is the case. Bavaria sees itself as a paragon of cultural, educational and
economic success in a federal Germany. Bavaria lives the paradox of efficient re-
gional identity politics in a non-secessionist environment. The EU is part of this
environment and above all a forum for pursuing Bavarian economic preferences.
Contrary to the misunderstanding in the English language literature (Hepburn
2008; Hepburn 2010: 540; Padgett/Burkett 1986: 114), the present chapter argues
that the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) cannot be identified as ‘separa-
tist’ or ‘autonomist’. Rather, the CSU is a party with a regional base but national
ambitions. This forces the party to give priority to the preferences of the Bavarian
voter. Otherwise, the party would have no chance to win landslide election victo-
ries that are necessary to pass the national five-percent hurdle for elections to the
German parliament.
The CSU has an agreement with its Conservative sister party, the Christlich
Demokratische Union (CDU), that the latter does not contest general elections in
Bavaria, leaving the field clear in favour of the CSU. After an election, the CDU and
the CSU always join forces in one parliamentary party in the federal parliament.
The CSU’s absolute priority of winning regional elections and the Bavarian seats in
a general election can lead to conflicts between the political preferences of Bavaria
and Conservatives1 at the national level. At first glance, this may look like a struggle
1 Although Germany does not, as has been noted, have a single ‘Conservative’ party, the ex-
pression the Conservatives (‘die Konservativen’) is common as a shorthand for the federal
CDU/CSU ‘double party’, which is, in most cases, considered a single force on the German po-
litical stage. Hence I will use the capitalised ‘Conservatives’ to refer to this political grouping.
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for autonomy. It is, however, only part of the strategic necessity to put Bavaria
first in order to stay involved in national politics. The CSU has to balance regional
and national interests, and it has tried several models to organize this interest
intermediation. It is beyond doubt, however, that among the strategies chosen, we
do not find Bavarian autonomy being given priority over national integration.
There is a widespread myth that what the CSU wants is more autonomy for
Bavaria or a greater decentralization of state powers in Germany (Hepburn/Hough
2011: 79). This misunderstanding is nurtured by the party itself and its self-styled
role as a champion of federalism. The CSU is, indeed, a separate political entity,
but the party’s purpose is to perform a role in national and European politics. To
secure this role, it uses its regional base. Here it needs to be successful. No matter
what the CSU’s allies in her conservative sister party want, the CSU will always
have only one priority: an absolute majority of seats in the Bavarian parliament.
This makes the CSU an awkward partner for Conservatives in the rest of Germany,
at least as long as the Bavarian electorate has preferences that differ from those of
Germany as a whole. Symbolic gestures directed against ‘Berlin politics’ may help
to close the regional ranks, but should not be misunderstood as an expression of
autonomist ambitions. The overarching aim of the CSU is not to strengthen the
separate political existence of a Bavarian polity. On the contrary, over the years
German federalism has becomemore centralized and unitary in character with the
help and support of the Bavarian government (Sturm 2013a; Sturm 2015).
This chapter is structured as follows: The next section deals with the strategic
choices the CSU has to make to balance its two hats as regional and national party
without losing its grip on its Bavarian identity. This is followed by a discussion
of what the core of Bavarian identity is. And finally, I ask whether Bavarian self-
confidence is enough to even allow elements of a regional foreign policy.
The dominant role of the CSU as a multi-level party
The CSU has governed Bavaria for more than 50 years. Over this time, it had an
absolute majority of seats in the regional parliament from 1946 to 1950, from 1962
to 2008 and from 2013 to 2018. Exceptions to single-party rule made possible by the
parliamentary strength of the CSU were periods when the CSU needed coalition
partners to stay in power and to support a CSU head of government. Only for a
short period in the post-war years, from 1954 until 1958, was the CSU in opposition.
The CSU’s long period of undisputed rule in Bavaria made it possible for the party
to merge – at least in the eyes of many observers inside and outside Bavaria –
Bavarian politics with the party political image of the CSU. Success of the CSU
in federal elections and European elections were also essential for the strength of
the German Conservatives outside Bavaria. The CSU is therefore bound to have a
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tactical relationship to party political identity-building.This is evident in the range
of positions the party has recently taken on Europe: from the strongly EU-critical
position taken in the 2014 election campaign for the European parliament to fend
off competitors on the right (Sturm 2018) to the pro-European turn of 2019, when
the CSU hoped to make a CSU EU parliamentarian and chairman of the European
People’s Party, Manfred Weber, the next President of the EU Commission.
The volatility of CSU identity politics has its counterpoint in the stability of its
commitment to Bavaria.The key question for the CSU is how to organizemaximum
political success in Bavaria. One precondition is that it has no conservative rival in
Bavaria. As noted above, from the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, the
CDU and the CSU have agreed not to compete in Bavarian or federal elections.
Though under the leadership of Franz Josef Strauss, a CSU politician with national
popularity, there were initiatives from outside Bavaria for an all-German CSU, the
party leadership hesitated to support this idea. German unification appeared to
pose a problem for the CSU, because on paper, the increase in the electorate meant
it could become more difficult to pass the five-per cent hurdle for membership in
the German parliament at federal elections. The party leadership toyed with the
idea of an East German partner, dubbed the DSU. The fear that the CDU would
retaliate with a Bavarian branch stopped further efforts. Parties to the right of
the CDU have also posed a threat to the dominance of the CSU: the Republikaner
in the 1980s and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) today. As in the past, the
CSU is now reacting to the challenge from the right by offering voters a manifesto
that includes the major demands of such right-wing challenger parties. This may
estrange the party from the CDU, as, for example, in recent years on the question
of the maximum number of migrants Germany should welcome. However, more
importantly for the party, such a strategy helped to solidify the CSU’s approval
rates. Today the Greens have become the main challenger to CSU dominance in
Bavaria. The ‘greening’ of CSU policies is again following the pattern of stealing
your opponent’s clothes without consulting the CDU.
The second problem for the party is to find an optimal solution for the manage-
ment of the party in the capital and in Bavaria. The key here is the best possible
allocation of power centres at German and Bavarian level (Kießling 2004; Sturm
2013b). The party has to make two strategic decisions. One is whether the party
chairman (no woman has yet held the position) should accept a ministerial post in
Berlin (or previously in Bonn) or should the party chairman sit in Munich. A se-
cond decision to be made is whether the chairman of the party and the head of the
Bavarian government (Ministerpräsident) should be the same person or different
people should hold these two jobs. If the Bavarian Ministerpräsident is simultane-
ously party chairman, the CSU’s man or woman in the capital heads the influential
CSU Landesgruppe (the group of Bavarian MPs within the joint Conservatives par-
liamentary party).The Landesgruppe has a right to veto decisions of the CDU/CSU
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parliamentary party in the national parliament.The fact that strategic decisions at
the federal level are so central to the party’s strategic options demonstrates again
that the CSU is not a party with an exclusive regional and autonomist focus. Its
fabric always combines the national and the regional outlook. Given the choices
detailed above, this leaves us with the options listed in table 1.
Table 1: The strategic choices for the CSU in combining Bavarian and national politics
Options Power centres Examples
1: The federal option:
party led from a po-
sition in the national
government
Split power centres: party
chairman in federal capital
(cabinet)/










option: party led from
Bavaria
Regional power centres: party
chairman in Munich/ CSU
head of Bavarian government
1946–1949 Josef
Müller/Hans Ehard;
2008 Erwin Huber/ Günter
Beckstein;
3: The unified Bavar-
ian option: party led
by one person in
Bavaria
Regional power centre:
one person in Munich is both









Source: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (1995) and my own data.
What is the best strategy for a regional party with national ambitions? Histo-
ry does not tell us. The CSU has tried all three options. Much of the effects of the
option chosen depended on personalities, and all three options have advantages
and disadvantages. It is, however, obvious that none of these options led to de-
mands for greater autonomy for Bavaria.The challenge for the CSU remained how
to continue to be an influential force in national politics while remaining authen-
tically Bavarian and able to win absolute majorities in Bavarian elections. Option 1
seems to offer the most far-reaching degree of nationalization for a regional party.
With the party heavyweights Franz-Josef Strauss (defence minister in the cabinet
of Konrad Adenauer and finance minister in the cabinet of Kurt-Georg Kiesinger)
and Theo Waigel (finance minister in the cabinet of Helmut Kohl) the CSU gained
national prominence. This model could only work, however, with a father figure
as the head of the regional government in Bavaria. An uncontroversial CSU poli-
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tician as Bavarian Ministerpräsident, someone more interested in regional affairs
than in the challenges of party politics and with an ability to act as a unifying force
within Bavaria while avoiding conflict was able to rely on tradition and historical
identities to legitimize CSU dominance in Bavaria. By contrast, the party chair-
man in the capital represented the party’s policies and was willing to take a stand
on policy matters. Only the combination of both characters guaranteed electoral
success in Bavarian elections. During Alfons Goppel’s time in office as Bavarian
Ministerpräsident his regional popularity successfully mobilized support for the
CSU even though the party chairman was restricted by cabinet discipline when he
sought confrontation with the Bonn government. This successful model did not
work well when Theo Waigel was chairman of the party. His first partner as Mi-
nisterpräsident in Bavaria, Max Streibl, did not succeed in developing a fatherly
image as office holder. He eventually lost office because of a corruption scandal.
His successor, Edmund Stoiber, tried to consolidate the CSU in Bavaria by provo-
king conflicts with the party chairman, among other things. AsMinister of Finance,
Theo Waigel was responsible for the introduction of the Euro. (He even invented
its name.) As the Euro was unpopular in Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber attacked the in-
troduction of the Euro and wantedTheoWaigel to resign from the party chair.This
conflict illuminates the blame game that is possible if the jobs of party chairman
and Ministerpräsident remain separated. The CSU can simultaneously be involved
in national government decisions and opposed to these decisions.This blame game
can, of course, also be played when options two or three are chosen.
Option 2 is the least attractive for the CSU, because it has no institutionalized
role in national politics and is weakened by competing power centres. The party
chairman can take part in coalition meetings in the capital if the Conservatives are
part of the national government. But he lacks any kind of national electoral appeal
that could be added to the influence on voters that comes from the Ministerpräsi-
dent.
Option 3, however, empowers the party leader, who is at the same time head
of government in Munich. In this role, he can play the game of outsider to the
national government and government critic in the name of Bavaria, and, at the
same time, if the CSU is in the national coalition, he can intervene in national
politics. Strong Ministerpräsidenten present their Bavaria as an example of good
government for the whole of Germany. Two of them, Franz Josef Strauss in 1980 and
Edmund Stoiber in 2002 even became the Conservative parties’ candidate for the
office of Federal Chancellor. Again, personalitymatters.No-one expects the present
holder of the office of Ministerpräsident in Bavaria, Markus Söder, to take on a role
of comparable significance. His wish to combine the offices of party chairman and
Ministerpräsident shows, however, his strategic preferences.
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The roots of Bavarian identity politics
Whereasmost of the German states (Länder) were reshaped after the SecondWorld
War, Bavaria retained its traditional boundaries. Though it is internally divided by
regional dialects and historic allegiances, a pan-Bavarian identity developed. At its
core are above all certain symbols, traditions and customs, which outsiders, too,
see as ‘typically’ Bavarian. This is a feature of a relatively passive regional culture
that generally does not carry a political message, such as the option of separatism
(Sturm 2016). Opinion polls show that non-political items are of central importance
for Bavarian identity. The most commonly mentioned include: regional costumes
and traditional dresses (traditional Bavarian dress such as the Dirndl and Leder-
hosen), beer and other traditions, followed by Oktoberfest, and the mountains (the
Alps), lakes and forests. Of lesser importance, but still worth mentioning, are re-
gional food and the Bayern Munich football club (Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung 2009: 59).
Tom Mannewitz’s (2015: 351) comparative empirical research on regional cul-
tures in Germany characterizes Bavaria as libertarian-constitutional. This is the
framework in which the dominant cultural identity develops. Mannewitz finds
that, for Bavarians, freedom is more important than equality. Social, political and
economic competition is supported by 91 percent of the population. Only ten per-
cent of Bavarians give priority to solidarity over competition. There is little or no
support for socialist ideas, the welfare state is less popular than in other German
Länder. Self-reliance is viewed more positively than a paternalistic state. The pu-
blic role of the church still enjoys the respect of a much larger segment of regional
society than elsewhere in Germany. Support for the constitution, legal procedures
and the Federal Constitutional Court are also above average.
The Bavarian cultural identity embedded in this libertarian-constitutional po-
litical culture strengthens a feeling of social and cultural identity that is stronger
than the proximity felt to Germany or Europe (see table 2). Research has shown
(Sturm et al. 2010) that regional identities are based on the circumstances of day-
to-day life and face-to-face communication. In Bavaria the difference between ‘us’
and ‘them’ originates from assumed emotional proximity, not, however, from po-
litical conflict. A dialect, for example, can draw emotional boundaries, yet in the
Bavarian context it cannot be used as justification for separatism. Though cultural
identity can justify regional self-confidence especially when – as is the case in Ba-
varia – this can be connected with regional economic success, this self-confidence
is reined in by the constraints of Germany’s system of interlocking federalism.
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Table 2: Regional allegiance in Bavaria (in %)






63 26 7 3 1
Region 59 29 8 3 1
Bavaria 51 37 8 2 2
Germany 40 45 13 2 0
Europe 17 43 28 10 2
Source: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (2009): Heimatgefühl und Leben in Bayern. Generationen-
spezifische und regionale Unterschiede von Einstellungen zu Politik und Heimat, München:
Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung: 33.
Federalism is less popular in Bavaria than one might expect. German interlo-
cking federalism has managed to transform a system of shared rule and self-rule
into a vehicle of constant bargaining behind the scenes. Bavarian citizens tend to
see their regional government as an actor which rarely speaks for territorial inte-
rests. Unitary federalism implies that most important pieces of legislation origina-
te at the national level. It is generally regional governments and, only occasionally
regional parliaments that react to national government initiatives. Regional go-
vernments are better placed to register resistance if necessary, because they are
represented in the quasi-second chamber of Germany’s parliament, the Bundes-
rat,which has a role in national legislation. Empirical research has shown, however,
that political conflict in the Bundesrat is rare, even though parties play a major ro-
le in its decision-making process. The Bundesrat is part of the German consensus
culture, which easily overcomes party political competition (Finke et al. 2019). Still,
on rare occasions territorial and/or financial interests lead to a confrontation with
the federal government in the Bundesrat. At least symbolically, and certainly in its
political communications, a Bavarian government is bound to defend a ‘Bavaria
first’ logic. In the national context, this is not without problems, because the other
Länder may see Bavaria as a wealthy and powerful neighbour with an inclination
to dominate.
The International Dimension
The CSU’s party political ‘Bavaria first’ logic finds its expression in the arena of
foreign policy, too. Germany’s cooperative federalism allows the Länder to pursue
their own independent foreign policies. In the past, state governments havemainly
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concentrated on efforts to promote regional industries abroad. They see themsel-
ves as ambassadors for regional investment, supporting foreign direct investment
in their states. In recent years, the Bavarian government has given its parallel for-
eign policy an explicitly political dimension. In its effort to increase party political
support in Bavaria, the CSU has taken foreign policy initiatives that are in conflict
with German foreign policy or at least tend to clash with the official position of the
German government. For example, there are strong voices in the CSU’s leadership
that advocate a better relationship with Russia, not least for economic reasons.The
then Bavarian PrimeMinister Horst Seehofer, accompanied by the former Bavarian
Prime Minister, Edmund Stoiber, visited Vladimir Putin several times. He suppor-
ted the end of sanctions against Russia.2The Bavarian government shares a critical
attitude towards Angela Merkel’s refugee policies with Victor Orbán of Hungary.
The Bavarian government has established a close relationship with the Visegrád
countries and tends to play down democratic deficits in Poland and Hungary. In
Bavaria, this disagreement with Berlin over foreign policy is not seen as a problem.
It may not be a decisive vote-winning device to insist on these priorities visa-à-vis
national politics, but it has the double advantage of securing regional interests
(economic ones, and the interest of keeping refugees out) and of demonstrating
to the Bavarian voter that the CSU defends Bavarian interests even if this means
(low-level) conflict with the national government.
In this respect, the CSU is not immune to regional ‘closure’. When this hap-
pens, it is usually the result of past experiences. Bavaria had hoped to become part
of an institution with veto power within the EU. The Committee of the Regions
(CoR) not only lacks this power, it became also increasingly self-centred. Succes-
sive Bavarian governments thus considered participation ineffective. As a result,
Bavarian governments, though interested in multi-level politics, decided to do it
‘their way’ (Bocklet 2017). This, however, did not entail a turn towards Euroscep-
ticism. It was more an effort to make the best out of a range of limited options.
On the one hand, this meant Bavaria would use all points of access to influence
European politics: the federal government, regional cooperation and lobbyism in
Brussels. On the other hand, efforts were made to open up European channels for
the regional parliament and to give regional parliamentary majorities the means






Identity politics have a long tradition in Bavaria. For the governing CSU, they are
a tool to secure power on the national and regional stages. Office-seeking and, as
a precondition, vote-seeking, is more important than policy details. The CSU has
always been flexible when it came to policy preferences. Policy choices obeyed the
logic of power politics. A conflict with the national government and even with the
Conservatives in power in the capital was (and is) quite frequent. However, conflict
was not used to mobilise support for separatism. Bavaria is not a German Scotland
or Catalonia.The CSU sees itself as a national party with regional roots but also has
the ambition to play a role in the context of the German national government. The
relationship to multi-level governance, including federalism, is tactical within the
limits that interlocking federalism draws. True Bavarians never forget where they
come from. They like their regional culture and traditions, but see their future in
Germany and in the EU. For the CSU, the respect for cultural difference is, above
all, ameans to guarantee survival in national politics.The Bavarian cultural identity
does not need protection; what is far more dangerous for the CSU is that Bavarian
economic success, which attracts not only Germans from other regions but all the
forces of globalization and migration, makes it harder for the party to claim that
the CSU is the only party able to effectively represent Bavarian interests.
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Can Money Buy Love?
The Impact of EU Cohesion Policy on European Identity
Fabian Landes
Introduction
The ambitious overall goal of the cohesion policy of the European Union (EU), often
referred to as the regional policies of the EU, is to harmonise living standards in all
European regions and to reduce economic, social and environmental inequalities
(c.f. Maastricht TEU 1992: Title XIV, Article 130a). To fulfil these ambitions, the EU
devotes almost one third of its entire budget to fostering regional development
and creating economic and social cohesion between European regions (European
Commission 2019). This represents a massive financial redistribution mechanism.
Both academics and policy makers have tended to focus on the impact and ef-
fects of cohesion policy investments, and studies have overwhelmingly focused on
assessing the economic impact of the money that the EU has invested in Europe’s
regions. It is only in recent years that scholars have become interested in the ques-
tion of whether cohesion policy also influences citizens’ views on the European
Union itself. This chapter investigates one of the effects of European program-
mes on regional development while also reducing the research gap by studying the
interconnection of European identity and cohesion policy investments. The main
theoretical argument of the analysis is that European identity formation in part fol-
lows rational economic-utilitarian considerations. When the European Union and
its policies produce tangible added value for their citizens, it is more likely that
they will start to identify as citizens of the Union. To account for the wide variety
of regional circumstances in Europe, a second hypothesis assumes that this effect
varies among European regions.
To test these two hypotheses, I developed a large data set that combines indica-
tors of citizens’ level of European identity fromEurobarometer Data with economic
indicators of the EU’s spending activities in the regions and of regional economic
activity. The scope of the analysis stretches over the period from 2000 to 2014, and
the data is analysed using a multi-level regression model.
The analysis presents evidence of a positive correlation between the level of
cohesion policy investments in the region and the share of citizens reporting iden-
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tification with both their nation state and the European Union. Likewise, themodel
shows a negative correlation between levels of EU investment and the share of ci-
tizens that identify solely with their country. This effect does not vary much within
countries, but does so between countries, suggesting that national contexts play an
important role and that economic considerations in EU identity formation are mo-
re important in some countries than in others.
The next section briefly introduces the literature on EU cohesion policy evalua-
tion. I then discuss some theoretical aspects of EU identity and cohesion policy.
A short introduction to the quantitative research design of the study is followed
by a presentation of results, which are further discussed in light of the theoretical
considerations.The last section of this chapter contains some concluding remarks.
Evaluating EU Cohesion Policy
In this chapter, cohesion policy refers to money allocated under the European Re-
gional Development Fund (EFRE), the European Social Fund (ESF) or the Cohesion
Fund (CF). The effects of these EU cohesion policy activities have been subject to
substantial study. The literature can generally be divided into two categories: stu-
dies of regional context and the effect of various local government and economic
structures on cohesion policy spending, and literature seeking to assess the net
impact of money invested in European regions (Crescenzi/Giua 2017). Despite gro-
wing interest on the part of academics, no consensus has been reached on whe-
ther cohesion policy spending contributes to the economic and social cohesion of
European regions (Bachtler et al. 2016). While some studies have shown that it in-
creased territorial cohesion (Fiaschi et al. 2018; Rosik et al. 2017; Pontarollo 2017),
others have stressed that, in specific contexts, cohesion policy might have no, or
even negative effects on territorial cohesion (Bachtrögler et al. 2019; Kroll 2017;
Medve-Bálint 2017). Only recently have studies added the dimension of European
identity to cohesion policy evaluations (Aiello et al. 2018; Borz et al. 2018; Pegan et
al. 2018), which is surprising considering that strengthening European solidarity
is one of the main rationales behind the idea of a Europe-wide investment policy
(European Commission 2019).The next section introduces the concept of European
identity and discusses some arguments that have been made in the literature on
the relationship between cohesion policy and European identity.
Cohesion Policy and European Identity
Social or collective identities refer to the phenomenon of an individual feeling soli-
darity with or belonging to a group and being able to identify certain common traits
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that are of defining nature for that group (Brubaker/Cooper 2000). These com-
mon traits can have either civic or cultural/ethnic characteristics (Reeskens/Hoo-
ghe 2010). In the case of European identity, most scholars have argued that ci-
vic traits (e.g. common values or shared historical experience) are most important
(Smith 1992; Agirdag et al. 2016; Bail 2008),while ethnic and cultural traits (e.g. eth-
nicity, religion) play only a minor role in defining the group of ‘Europeans’ (Bruter
2003).
Concerning territorial identities, two main ideas that describe the relations-
hip of different territorial entities as sources of identity have been put forward.
The nested model describes the relationship of national and European identity as re-
sembling concentric circles. It assumes that people have strong and narrow regio-
nal and national identities, on top of which is added the layer of European identity
(Herrmann/Brewer 2004). The so-called ‘marble-cake’ model assumes that national
and European identity cannot be separated from each other but are an integral
element of each other (Medrano/Gutiérrez 2001).
While the existing literature has uncovered a wide range of factors that influ-
ence individual and collective levels of European identity, the role of cohesion policy
in the formation of European identity has only recently gained attention (Capello
2018; Chacha 2013; Chalmers/Dellmuth 2015; Medeiros 2017; Mendez/Bachtler 2017;
Osterloh 2011; Pegan et al. 2018; Verhaegen et al. 2014).The discussion is structured
around three principle arguments: the awareness argument, the regional argument
and the economic-utilitarian argument.
The awareness argument considers the awareness of cohesion policy as a tran-
sition factor for a positive effect on European identity. Therefore, cohesion policy
can only have an impact on European identity if people are aware of the existence
and effects of such policy mechanisms (Borz et al. 2018; Mendez/Bachtler 2017).
The perception of cohesion policy outcomes is thus more important than their ac-
tual effects. One criticism of the awareness argument is provided by Inglehart’s
(1970) model of cognitive mobilisation: awareness of EU policy and European iden-
tity cannot be considered to be independent from each other, as higher European
identity is also likely to raise the awareness of EU policies (ibid.). There is thus a
danger of circularity.
The regional argument highlights the importance of regional context for streng-
thening European identity though cohesion policies. When citizens have strong
regional attachments, they perceive policies that empower local or regional autho-
rities as something very positive. Inhabitants of regions with a strong longing for
regional autonomy are particular likely to perceive the EU as an institution that
provides regional authorities with the means to pursue their own policies (Cha-
cha 2013 ; Capello 2018). The effect of cohesion policy on EU identity depends on
regional identity structures and local institutional capacities.
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Economic-utilitarian approaches to European identity describe the identity pro-
cess as a calculation of the costs and benefits of EU membership and an evaluation
of the performance of the EU (Eichenberg/Dalton 1993). The economic situation of
individuals should thus be an important factor in explaining their European iden-
tity (Clements 2011). In this view, a positive European identity is therefore rather
a function of economic advantages that the individual had in the past or imagines
experiencing in the future. As such, cohesion policy can be considered as one factor
in these cost-benefit calculations. People who live in regions with high levels of co-
hesion policy spending tend to consider the EU as a source of identity because the
EU contributes to their everyday wellbeing (Osterloh 2011; Verhaegen et al. 2014).
The (admittedly very bold) aim of this study is to investigate the success of
cohesion policy in contributing to increasing European identity. In doing so, this
study will follow the economic-utilitarian argument, as developed by Osterloh (2011)
and Verhaegen et al. (2014). This study’s ambition to produce comparable results
among all European regions makes the regional argument problematic as a the-
oretical foundation. That argument’s highlighting of the importance of regional
context makes it difficult to use as a framework for a comparative research ques-
tion. The awareness argument, on the other hand, seeks to explain how citizens
perceive regional investments by the EU, and not how those investments influence
their identification with the EU. Therefore, the next section will develop a quanti-
tative research design in order to test the following hypotheses, which postulate an
economic-utilitarian approach:
H1: Cohesion policy spending has a positive impact on regional collective identi-
fication with the EU.
Since it seems oversimplified to assume a general effect for all regions, a second
hypothesis takes into account the great heterogeneity of European regions and ac-
knowledges regional differences:
H2: The effect of cohesion policy on European identity varies among regions.
Research Design
To test the hypotheses, I developed a large data set with European identity as the
dependent variable and two independent variables: the amount of cohesion policy
spending and regional gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The level of ana-
lysis is level 2 of the nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques (NUTS2), a set of
regional entities that was standardised by the EuropeanCommission for the purpo-
se of survey statistics and policy planning. Inconsistent regional units among the
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various data sources and changes over time required deviation from the NUTS2
level in some circumstances and aggregation of some of the data.
European identity was measured using the so-called ‘Moreno question’ from
Eurobarometer (EB) surveys.The question asks the respondents for their feeling of
belonging to their nation state in comparison to the EU.1
Using the Moreno question, and Eurobarometer data generally, is problema-
tic. Many scholars have criticised the validity of this specific survey item (Bruter
2008; Mendez/Bachtler 2017), accused the European Commission of political bias
in collecting the data (Nissen 2014), and called into question the use of quantitative
surveys for oversimplification (Armbruster et al. 2003; Maier/Rittberger, 2008).
Even though the literature is divided on the application of theMoreno question,
it was still used in a variety of recent studies on European identity (Fligstein et al.
2012; Mendez/Bachtler 2017; Roose 2013). Considering the broad comparability of
EB data (Hobolt/Vries 2016), it seems justifiable to use this item in the following
analysis. Since the level of analysis is the region, the variable was aggregated into
three dependent variables:
1. Share of respondents with national identity only
2. Share of respondents with a mixed identity (both national and European)
3. Share of respondents with European identity only
Thefirst independent variable is the level of cohesion policy spending.TheCommis-
sion provides extensive data on modelled annual expenditure for regional cohesion
policy. This model is based on simulations of expenditure patterns in the member
states and regions, and seems to be more accurate than just considering monetary
transfers from the Commission to the member states (Lo Piano et al. 2017). As the
control variable, the regional gross domestic product per capita is included in the
data set, to control for differences in purchasing power and thus differing impacts
of the same amount of money across European regions.
Since the effect can be expected to be very gradual, each variable was recorded
yearly for the period 2000–2014. This timeframe marks some important develop-
ments of EU cohesion policy, such as the RIS3 reforms and the eastern enlargement
of the EU, and thus seems appropriate for the analysis. However, restrictions in da-
ta availability also influenced this decision.
The data is analysed using a multi-level regression model. Normal multiple re-
gression models cannot account for hierarchical data structures, but the present
hierarchical data require a more sophisticated analysis. The models include three
levels:
1 Original wording of the question: ‘In the near future, do you see yourself as…? 1NATIONALITY only
2 NATIONALITY and European 3 European and NATIONALITY 4 European only 5 Don’t know’
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• Single observation in one region
• Regions (consists of 14 years per region)
• Countries (consists of 196 regions in total)
The outputs of the analysis allow for an interpretation of both fixed effects at the
general level and random effects at the lower two levels.Thosemodels are also called
random slope-random intercept models. This enables comparison of the variabi-
lity of regression slopes between regions within countries and between countries,
thus allowing assessment of whether the effect of cohesion policy spending varies
between regions or between countries. At the same time, it will make it possible to
compare regions and countries in terms of the size and direction of the effect, so
that the role of regions and countries in the effect of cohesion policy on identity
can be explored.2
As there are three dependent variables, I discuss three statistical models in the
next chapter.
Empirical Findings
Theempirical findings consist of two parts: the fixed-effects and random-effects re-
gression parameters. A multilevel random slope-random intercept model provides
a single regression line for the whole model (fixed effects) and different regressi-
on lines for each country and region (random effects). Thus, for all three models,
both dimensions have to be considered. For the fixed effects, the outputs are si-
milar to conventional regression outputs. The random effects are more difficult to
interpret, since there are different slopes and intercepts both for all countries and
for all regions. The first step in interpreting this large number of parameters is to
regard the distribution of both intercepts and slopes, which follows below.
2 For a more elaborate discussion of multi-level regression model analysis, see Steenbergen &
Jones (2002) or Luke (2004)
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Table 1: fixed effects regression parameters
Model (I)*** (II)*** (III)**
national mixed European
Expenditure/cap in
EUR -0.00009** 0.00014*** -0.00003**
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00001)
GDP/cap in -0.0035*** 0.0034*** 0.00001
1 000 EUR (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.00001)
_cons 0.523*** 0.421*** 0.0259***
(0.0203) (0.019) (0.005)
N 1963 1963 1961
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1 reports the fixed-effects parameters for the three models for each of
the three dependent variables. The first observation is that the three models and
cohesion policy expenditure fulfil the significance criteria; regional GDP is also
significant except for model III. The second important insight is that, in general,
cohesion policy spending has a stronger effect on identity formation than GDP, as
indicated by higher constants.3 Although it is difficult and unrealistic to interpret
the coefficients literally, their comparison allows for such an observation.
Furthermore, models I and II provide evidence for accepting the first hypo-
thesis. These models predict that increasing cohesion policy spending per capita
will negatively influence the share of citizens that have only national identity and
positively influence the share of citizens that have mixed EU/national identity.
Model III contradicts this conclusion, as it predicts a negative impact of cohe-
sion policy expenditure on those with only European identity. There are however
some problems with model III in general. The dependent variable has very homo-
geneous and very small values, all of which are not optimal preconditions for a
multiple regression analysis. The share of citizens that have only European identi-
ty is very small in all countries and shows almost no variance over time. Together
with the relatively low level of significance, this provides an argument for not con-
sidering the model as a whole.
3 Note that the scale of the variable expenditure per capita is 1 EUR/capita. Introducing the
variable with the more convenient scale of 1 000 EUR/capita would have exceeded the com-
puting efficiency of the software due to the very small numbers involved.
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The distribution of the random parameters is indicated in graph 1 for model I
and in graph 2 for model II.This gives an insight into how the effect varies between
countries and regions. For both models, the negative relationship between slopes
and intercepts suggests a sort of saturation point. Once the share of citizens with
only national ormixed identity reaches a certain point, cohesion policy expenditure
or GDP has no further impact in reducing or increasing that share, respectively.
This is not surprising, since national and European identity are very multicausal
phenomena.
Figure 1: Model I
Source: own depiction
The country level of model I shows that the effect is stronger in some countries
than in others. In the UK, for example, the effect of cohesion policy spending and
GDP is very strong in reducing the share of citizens that identify only with their
nation. At the same time, the intercept is very high. The intercept represents the
share of citizens that have a national identity in a hypothetical world with zero
GDP and zero cohesion policy investments. This of course does not make much
sense, but it gives an idea of what influences the formation of a purely national
identity in the UK. On the other side of the spectrum are countries such as Spain,
Belgium and Italy, in which national identity is not much influenced by cohesion
policy expenditure or GDP.
The regional level shows that regions within countries don’t vary much, since
the regions are scattered around lines by country. This indicates that the effect of
cohesion policy is strongly dependent on the country, and that this effect is rather
homogeneous between regions of one country. This contradicts H2, since it is not
the regional context that is the most important factor, but the national context.
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Figure 2: Model II
Source: own depiction
Model II shows very similar characteristics but the other way around. All obser-
vations have a positive slope, which supports the conclusion from the fixed-effects
parameters that cohesion policy spending increases the share of citizens with a
mixed identity. The UK now shows the highest effect, meaning that, in the UK, co-
hesion policy spending influences the formation of a mixed identity more than in
countries such as Slovakia, Italy and Belgium. Because of the statistical problems
with model III, the random effects of Model III will not be discussed in detail.
While the model itself seems to be biased, the outputs don’t reveal any evidence for
accepting or rejecting the hypotheses.
After this short attempt to describe the outputs of the multi-level regression
model, the discussion considers these results from the perspective of the conside-
rations made above.
Discussion
Overall, the analysis provides evidence that supports hypothesis I: that cohesion
policy spending has a positive impact on European identity. Leaving model III asi-
de due to the problems with the dependent variable, model I shows a significant
negative effect of cohesion policy on the share of citizens with only national iden-
tity, and model II shows a significant positive effect of cohesion policy on the share
of citizens that identify with both their nation state and the EU. This and the fact
that both models and the independent variables meet the criteria of significance
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allows to accept hypothesis I: that cohesion policy spending positively influences
the level of identification with the EU.
However, European identity does not replace identification with the member
state, as the strongest effect was measured with regard to mixed identity in model
II. Cohesion policy spending rather contributes to acceptance of the EU as a source
of identity alongside the nation state, it does not seem to replace it.
Hypothesis II must be rejected. The distribution of the effects suggests that
there is strong variability among countries, while regions within countries follow
more or less similar patterns. This speaks for a very strong impact of country-level
factors and gives a rather pessimistic picture of European regions breaking out
of their ‘national containers’. This has some consequences for our understanding
of the regional argument on the influence of cohesion policy. The regional context
does not seem to be as important as the national context. There is a danger of a
tautological argument here, since European identity was measured versus national
identity, but the strong similarities between countries suggest making a national
argument instead: that the impact of cohesion policy on European identity depends
strongly on national contexts.
The results also provide a basis for considerations regarding the characterisati-
on of European identity. As the regression parameters hint at a positive influence of
cohesion policy and GDP on European identity, this in turn provides evidence for
the economic-utilitarian argument. Cohesion policy and GDP can only influence
European identity if European identity is (at least partly) underpinned by econo-
mic cost-benefit considerations. The difference between countries also shows that
these cost-benefit considerations play a greater role in forming a mixed identity on
the part of British, Irish and Finnish citizens, while citizens from countries such
as Belgium, Italy or Spain are not as exposed to economic-utilitarian considera-
tions when thinking of their relationship towards the EU. In other words, the EU
must provide concrete and economic added value to British citizens in order to be
accepted as a source of identity, while Spanish citizens do not care as much about
the direct economic benefits of the EU but about other factors, which are outside
the scope of this study. While this conclusion seems more obvious in the case of
the UK, it is neither the aim nor the claim of this study to explain these differences
among EU member states.
At this point, some of the shortcomings of the study should be mentioned, as
there is room for some legitimate criticism of the results presented. In the end, the
research object of any social sciences research is the human being, and reducing
the complexities of human social interactions to numbers carries the danger of
oversimplification. An obvious point of criticism is the validity of the measurement
of the dependent variable. The problems with the Moreno question have already
been mentioned, but, besides that, every single-item measurement can and has
been criticised for falling short in capturing the immense complexities associated
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with an individual’s identification with a supranational entity (Armbruster et al.
2003; Maier/Rittberger, 2008).
Furthermore, the multi-causal nature of European identity makes it necessary
to include more independent variables than those considered in this study. It is
possible that the measured effect is transmitted via undetected third variables, to
which the previous analysis remains blind. One important factor is education, as
discussed above. Not only do different member states have different levels of edu-
cation, but cohesion policy investments are also sometimes targeted at increasing
the educational level of a region. Assuming the cognitive-mobilisation hypothesis,
cohesion policy would only have an indirect effect on European identity by increa-
sing the educational level of a given population.
Finally, a regression analysis as applied in this study measures only correlation
between variables, and, as the correlation measured in this contribution is backed
by theoretical arguments, it seems adequate to derive some conclusions on the
phenomena. While the models have implications for the real world, namely that
it is likely that cohesion policy does have a positive effect on the formation of a
European identity, it would be wrong to interpret the values of the models literally.
In the end it is just a model, which, when translated into real life, might have very
different consequences.
Conclusion
The analysis provides some evidence that economic-utilitarian considerations have
an influence on European identity formation.The positive regression coefficient in
model II and the negative regression coefficient in model I show that increasing
cohesion policy expenditure is positively correlated with the regional share of ci-
tizens that identify with both the EU and their home country. At the same time,
increasing cohesion policy expenditure is negatively correlated with the share of
citizens that only identify with their nation.
The regional distribution of the effect is more complex. While the effect varies
between countries, it is more or less homogeneous between regions of the same
country. One factor seems to be the existing level of identification: countries that
have a smaller share of citizens with a mixed identity are also countries in which
cohesion policy can have a greater influence, and vice versa.
However, the results can be criticised frommany viewpoints, and there is much
more work to be done before we canmake such statements with greater confidence
and precision. There are many conceptual and methodological issues that can be
legitimately subject to criticism. They range from the argument that the Moreno
question is an inadequate measurement of European identity, via statistical pro-
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blems concerning the low variety and low values of the independent variable, to the
uncertainty over other confounding variables.
Academics have only just started to recognise the relationship between cohesi-
on policy and European identity as a field of research, and this study has attempted
to contribute to this discussion. While other studies have already acknowledged a
positive relationship between cohesion policy and European identity (Aiello et al.
2018; Osterloh 2011; Verhaegen et al. 2014), this study is the first to undertake a
Europe-wide analysis of the effect. As a result of this pan-European perspective, it
allowed comparison of the effect between regions and countries. The results show
substantial differences in the effect of cohesion policy on European identity, which
calls for further investigation by means of qualitative or comparative research de-
signs that can find causes or explanations for these differences.
Besides academics, the results of this study should also encourage practitio-
ners, policy makers and European, national and regional civil servants to continue
working on and improving the European cohesion policy. While many unsolved
problems remain, ranging from corruption, inefficiency and unfair procedures,
this contribution enhanced our understanding of the cohesion policy’s influence
on a very important common good – European identity.
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The EU’s Regional Investments After
the Financial Crisis
Paradigm Change or Business as Usual?
Moritz Neujeffski
Introduction
The President of the European Investment Bank (EIB), Werner Hoyer, made a bold
statement in 2016. In the preface of an EIB report, Hoyer praised the novelty of
European Commission President Juncker’s flagship project aimed at rebooting in-
vestments in Europe after the global financial crisis (GFC):
Today, the paradigm shift in the use of public funds – away from grants and sub-
sidies, in favour of loans and guarantees –[…] namely the Investment Plan for Eu-
rope and its pillars European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and European
Investment Advisory Hub (EIAH), offer us an historical opportunity to go the extra
mile and mobilise more private and public sector funding […] (EIB 2016)
The €500bn Investment Plan for Europe (IPE) was the EU’s supra-national answer
to the severe credit crunch in the European real economy induced by the GFC.
Launched in 2014 by the European Commission (EC), the IPE gave leeway to riskier
investment policies and relied on less prominent actors such as the EIB to carry
out the investment recovery.
The influential political scientist Peter A. Hall would, however, probably raise
an eyebrow at Hoyer’s claim. According to Hall, true paradigm shifts go beyond the
introduction of new policy instruments. Rather, they alter ‘the hierarchy of goals
behind a policy’ altogether (Hall 1993: 282). To determine how far the introduction
of the IPE in 2014 marks a paradigmatic shift, this chapter compares the intro-
duction of the IPE with the evolution of the ‘EU’s main investment policy tool’
(European Commission, n.d. a), namely the European Structural and Investment
Funds (ESI Funds). In doing this, it highlights the role of strategic discourses put
forth by the advocates of competing policies in stipulating policy change.
According to Walter Deffaa the former Directorate-General for Regional and
Urban Policy (DG REGIO), the two funds represent ‘different intervention philo-
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sophies’ (Deffaa 2016: 162). The IPE is a leveraged fund, using small public con-
tributions to crowd-in private capital. Based on loans and guarantees, it can be
considered a market-enforcing policy. ESI Funds, on the other hand, are predo-
minantly transfer based, rely on grants and can be considered a market-correction
tool for taming regional inequalities in Europe.
This chapter argues that the resistance of the economically strong member sta-
tes (MS) towards addressing the EU’s ‘fiscal capacity gap’ (Braun/Hübner 2018: 131)
in order to promote macro-economic stability amplified the pressure to rely on
market-based instruments (such as the IPE) to cope with the credit crunch. Even
though the two funds are formally unrelated, the opposition of economically strong
MS to a ‘Marshall Plan for Europe’ or to transforming the Cohesion Policy into a
‘major tool for investment, growth and job creation’ (Friends of Cohesion 2012), as
demanded by the economically weaker MS, created the space for the EC to streng-
then innovative financial policies. Thus, contrary to Hoyer, the very absence of a
disruptive third-order change after the GFC – away from austerity-based policy
frameworks towards expansionary fiscal policies – led to a stronger reliance on
‘private funds which look for profits’ (Deffaa 2016: 162). The argument is akin to
Wolfgang Streeck’s insight that the expansion of market principles is the logical
consequence of a consolidation state in which government debt reduction takes
primacy (2015).
The chapter starts by discussing Hall’s theory of policy change (1993) and Stre-
eck’s political-economic approach to the EU mode of governance. It highlights the
importance of discourse coalitions (Hajer 1993) in stipulating whether policies are
changed or maintained. In subsequent sections, the theoretical framework is then
applied to examine the development of the ESI Funds and the EFSI and the accom-
panying discursive struggles. After introducing the functioning and rationale of the
ESI Funds, this chapter identifies a redefinition of goals towards fostering compe-
titiveness prior to the crisis.The third section then analyses the intergovernmental
negotiations over the 2014–2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) within
the European Council and singles out the discourse of ‘better spending’ introduced
by the net contributors. Fourth, the introduction of the EFSI and the increasing use
of financial instruments within the ESI Funds are also examined. These measures
were promoted by the EC and the EIB in terms of ‘doing more with less’, and this
chapter identifies a similar efficiency-enhancing discourse in this regard.
Policy Change and Paradigm Maintenance
Peter Hall’s influential theory of policy change and social learning (Hall 1993) dis-
tinguishes between three different orders of policy change, where each indicates
a different magnitude of alteration. Whereas first-order changes represent incre-
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mental, ‘routinized decision making’ (ibid.: 280), the implementation of new mea-
sures constitutes a second-order change and is identified with more ‘strategic ac-
tion’ (ibid.). Hall regards both these orders of changes as ‘normal policymaking’
(ibid.: 279) or adaptations of instruments to attain unchanged policy objectives. He
exemplifies this with the occasional adjustment of macro-economic policies under
the Keynesian British governments of the 1970s.
Third-order changes, on the other hand, alter ‘the hierarchy of goals behind a
policy’ (ibid.: 282), are more political in nature and ‘are often preceded by signifi-
cant shifts in the locus of authority over policy’ (ibid.: 280). Third-order changes
often follow societal changes and economic crises as the ‘accumulation of anoma-
lies’ (ibid.) can no longer be explained by the current paradigm.
However, this raises the question of why a third-order change did not occur
after the GFC. As Mark Blyth put it ‘Indeed, if there was ever a perfect case for a
paradigm shift in a Bayesian term surely this was it?’ (Blyth 2013: 206). Furthermo-
re, although many governments across the globe implemented stimulus packages
(e.g. Germany’s car-scrapping premium) and performed massive bank bailouts,
the return to fiscal consolidation strategies to deal with the growing debt-to-GDP
ratios followed shortly afterwards.
In addition, Blyth highlights the constructivist nature of paradigms in invoking
or resisting change, and points to the role of ideas and the shift of authority needed
for a policy change to occur. Rather than the anomalies itself, the struggle over their
interpretation by competing actors (ibid.: 211) is crucial for third-order changes
to come about. Hajer’s concept of discourse coalitions can be fruitfully applied to
examine howdifferent actors offer interpretations strategically to induce or prevent
policy changes. A discourse coalition is an ‘ensemble of a set of story lines, the
actors that utters these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story
lines, all organized around a discourse’ (Hajer 1993: 47). Dieter Plehwe adds that
discourse coalitions need to be understood as ‘social forces acting jointly, though
not necessarily in direct interaction in pursuit of a common goal’ (2011: 130).
In the context of the GFC, gaps in the institutional architecture of European
Monetary Union (EMU), i.e. the inability to revert to currency devaluation coupled
with the absence of some form of transfer system or joint liabilities, posed severe
obstacles for struggling MS. With external devaluation unavailable for less com-
petitive MS, Streeck sees ‘only a financial transfer between rich and poor Member
States’ (Streek 2013: 325) as a viable alternative to an internal devaluation (cutting
wages and social benefits), possibly ‘in form of an active regional-policy […] in fa-
vour of the latter’ (ibid.). In the absence of a paradigm shift in economic governance
towards a Keynesian, expansionary fiscal framework (Blyth 2013a), Streeck predicts
that public investment gaps (e.g. in infrastructure or social housing) must be repla-
ced ‘[…] with private investment backed by the public’ (Streek 2015: 22).This process
of financialisation comprises two distinct developments initiated by the pressure
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of growing macro-economic imbalances: The contraction of public, redistributive
transfer programs between MS (and hence also of market-correction tools) and the
initiation and expansion of market-based alternatives. The conceptual framework
of discourse coalitions provides us with fruitful insight into how a struggle over a
two-stage process proceeds. It helps us to understand how the discourse formation
of EMU, in which MS, market actors, practices and ideas enable and facilitate the
expansion of market-based alternatives as the ‘viable solution’, becomes dominant,
opposed to solutions based on joint liabilities or transfer systems.
In order to understand how these discursive strategies are practised, the fol-
lowing section starts by describing the main rationale of the ESI Funds and then
traces how the notion of competitiveness led to a reorientation of these funds’ po-
licy goals.
The Structural Funds: From Redistribution to Increasing
Competitiveness
Since the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC), the creation
and expansion of a single market has been prioritised, strengtheningmarket forces
in Europe. At the same time, the EU is committed to social inclusion and cohesi-
on objectives, which provided the reasons for public transfers (agricultural policy,
regional and structural funds) According to David Harvey (1982), capitalist produc-
tion brings about uneven geographical developments due to agglomeration effects
and economies of scale, among other factors. This is also true for the EU, and the
four rounds of enlargement since the 1980s increased socio-economic differences
within the EU, as Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) and the eleven Central
and Eastern European Countries (CEE) enteredwithmuch lower levels of GDP than
the northern MS. Policy conflicts between the completion of the single market, on
the one hand, and social inclusion and cohesion between and within the member
states, on the other, have increased as a result.
Social and economic inequalities are acknowledged to have manifold negative
effects for societies and are associated with reduced overall life expectancies (Rasel-
la et al. 2013), decreasing social mobility (Kearney/Levine 2014) and higher levels of
dissatisfaction with the democratic system (Schäfer 2010). Recently, regional ine-
qualities have been interpreted as a cause of intensified political polarisation and
increasing vote shares for Eurosceptic parties (Dijkstra et al. 2018; Manow 2018).
Borin, Macchi & Mancini (2018) suggest that adequate compensation within eco-
nomically disadvantageous regions in the EU has positive effects on approval rates
towards the European project.
The good news: Income inequality in the EU has decreased slightly in recent
years, at least when GDP levels between MS are compared (Dauderstädt 2019: 3).
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This results mostly from the strong catch-up processes of the CEEs. Yet, average
income levels betweenMS such as Bulgaria and Luxembourg remain very high, and
inter-regional inequalities within member states have been rising since the 1980s
(Hadjimichalis 2011: 257; Rosés/Wolf, 2018; Dauderstädt 2019: 3).
To counteract unequal regional living standards, the European Community saw
early on the need for a regional transfer policy and introduced the Cohesion Policy
with the Single European Act in 1985. This is reflected in the Act’s goal to ‘promo-
te its overall harmonious development’, (Article 174, TFEU) especially by ‘reducing
disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the back-
wardness of the least favoured regions’ (ibid.).
Until the European financial crisis, the budget share allocated to the ESI Funds
had grown steadily and is currently equal to one-third of the total EU budget. The
funds are invested locally and can be described as an ‘active form of EU solida-
rity’ (Europa.eu n.d.) Jointly administered by the EU and the MS, the ESI Funds
are usually based on a co-financing system in which contributions by the EU are
matched by the receiving regions. Table 1 displays the main ESI Funds for the cur-
rent funding period (2014–2020).The funds themselves consist of programmes that
are intended to achieve the ESI Funds’ overall goals and policy objectives. Table 2
shows the funds’ growth between 1989 and 2020. Organised along core-periphery
logics, funding is secured through MS allocating around one percent of their Gross
National Income (GNI), which is often interpreted as a rather modest contributi-
on. The budget is redistributed along certain eligibility criteria for regions, which
automatically creates net contributors and net beneficiaries. This funding is vital
for certain less developed regions, as it can make up for four percent of their GDP
(Krieger-Boden 2018: 10), especially through the Cohesion Fund, which targets re-
gions with a GNI per capita average below 90 percent of the EU average.
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Table 1: The European Structural and Investment Funds
Funds (2014-2020MFF period) Rationale
European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF)
corrects imbalances between regions
and fosters cohesion in social and
economic terms
European Social Fund (ESF) Investments in human-capita,
promotes employment
Cohesion Fund (CF) Environment & infrastructure projects
in countries where GNI per capita is
below 90%of EU average
European Agricultural Fund for Rural
Development (EAFRD)
targets the challenges for rural areas
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund
(EMFF)
focuses on EU coastal regions and
fishery-industry
Table 2: ESIF Funding in Million Euros from 1989 to 2020 (five funding periods)
Funding
period
1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 2014-2020





66 003 71 000 83 924
CF - 18 078 30 619 66 186 63 297
YEI - - - - 8 847
EAGGF /
EAFRD
923 17 905 22 200 86 107 100 079
Total 29 564 113 719 240 834 403 841 461 117
Sources: The amounts for the different funds can be found on the Commission’s website:
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu
The budget size, the overall goals and the regional eligibility criteria for funding
are shaped by recurring negotiations between the MS and the supra-national insti-
tutions (especially the EC). The most encompassing policy change can be observed
with the introduction of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. The strategy’s intention to
turn the EU into ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world’ (European Council 2000) altered the Cohesion Policy towards targeting
competitiveness and growth as additional policy objectives. Thus, next to market-
correction objectives, it also introduced market-enhancing ones.
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However, achieving cohesion by increasing regional competitiveness and
growth is contested. Trade-offs exist between enhancing regional equality and
economic productivity, as economic growth generally does not spread out equally
within a country. Rather it is based on cluster effects. These entail geographical
investment concentrations (Krieger-Boden 2018: 11), as productive regions possess
advantages, e.g. more developed infrastructures, skilled labour, and specialised
service providers, which create economies of scale (Pauli 2019). In this context,
Giordano and Dubois (2018) speak of ‘territorial tensions’ (ibid.: 2) that have
emerged (especially within the ERDF) since the 2007 funding period.
Besides the reorientation of goals, the 2007-2013 period also broadened the eli-
gibility criteria for regions to receive funding.Whereas Objective 2 of the Cohesion
Policy was previously only available to former industrial areas, it is now accessible
to all regions to promote competitiveness and innovation (Bodirsky 2015).This was
the second change in the ESI Funds to decrease the redistributive nature of the
policy, since regions that are already productive can now gain funding.
These policy restructuring measures were accompanied by changes in discour-
se, too, as competitiveness became the catchphrase of the day. These discursive
shifts have been embedded within the general rise of ‘new regionalism’ since the
1990s, which confers the notion of corporate competitiveness onto regions. Accord-
ing to this concept of interlocational competition between regions at a global level,
governments should compete in attempting to provide the most business-friendly
environments in a competition over the location of businesses themselves. Greater
regional competitiveness is expected to bring about jobs and economic growth. It
seems uncertain how far this approach can decrease regional disparities if uneven-
ly developed regions are competing more directly over resources. Bradanini (2009)
places the increasing focus on competitiveness and efficiency gains in the broader
context of the development of EU institutions and policies to show how market lo-
gics were given more and more precedence over social concerns. Introducing com-
petitiveness, innovation and growth as a remedy for decreasing regional disparities
can be interpreted as a third-order policy change, as overall objectives have changed
fundamentally. These policy changes, however, need to be analysed in the context
of political struggles between different coalitions and actors within the EU’s mul-
tilevel governance system to enhance our understanding of how policy changes are
pushed through. Thus, the following section examines the negotiations over the
reinterpretation of the Cohesion Policy in more detail, focusing especially on the
notion of ‘better spending’ by net-contributing countries within the EU.
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Political Conflict Lines After the Financial Crisis: The 2014-2020 Budget
Negotiations
TheGFC pushed the European banking system and the real economy to the brink of
collapse. For about twelvemonths, stimulus packages (Blyth 2013) andmassive bank
bailouts were introduced by governments worldwide to counteract the deteriora-
ting economic situation. Anxious that the consequence of growing government
debt-to-GDP ratios would destabilise the Eurozone as a whole, the (relatively) un-
shaken Northern MS soon started to demand that the Eastern and Southern MS
impose strong fiscal consolidation measures. Thus, the negotiations held in 2012
over the ESI Funds in the 2014–2020 MFF were ill-fated from the start. In this re-
spect, the negotiations over the Cohesion Policy in 2011 provide an important entry
point. The Commission’s legislative proposal to restructure the Cohesion Policy in
2011 was soon taken over by the net contributors, who acted as the drivers of po-
licy change. Comparing the economic developments of the net-contributor coun-
tries and the net beneficiaries shows that the latter were affected more severely.
At the time of negotiation in 2012, loan defaults by (non-financial) companies had
increased to over ten percent (median) within the beneficiary countries and remai-
ned relatively stable in the net-contributor countries (see Figure 1). Figure 2 below
shows the growing spread between France, Germany, Spain and Italy in terms of
the ability of their banking sectors to contract loans with non-financial companies.
Especially for the beneficiaries, this caused additional political pressure to stabilise
the economy through governmental investments.
Figure 1: Bank non-performing loans (npl) to total gross loans (%) in the EU, Figure 2: loans
to non-financial companies by banks (stock) (%) in the EU (in billions)
Source: data.worldbank.org The chart displays the median for the net-beneficiaries and the
net-contributors, *Source: European Central Bank (Statistical Data Warehouse)
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Politically, the ‘tortuous battles’ (Kölling/Serrano Leal 2012) over the 2014–2020
MFF intensified against the background of the Eurozone crisis. The hardened
fronts were represented by two groups of member states in the European Council:
The net beneficiaries (Friends of Cohesion) and the net contributors (Friends
of Better Spending) to the ESI Funds (see table three below). They represented
opposing discourse coalitions. Whereas the Friends of Better Spending demanded
strong contribution cuts and stronger conditionalities, the Friends of Cohesi-
on stressed the necessity of redistributive policies and aimed at expanding the
Cohesion Policy.
Table 3: “Friends of Better Spending” and “Friends of Cohesion”
Friends of Better Spending Friends of Cohesion
Germany, France, Finland, Austria, Sweden
and theNetherlands
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portu-
gal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain
The Friends of Cohesion were not the only actors that argued for an expansion
of grant-based transfers. To revive economic activity and stabilise the EMU, social-
democratic and progressive actors such as the German Federation of Trade Unions
(DGB) called for a ‘Marshall Plan for Europe’ (DGB 2012), demanding much higher
transfers between core and periphery countries, with a base calculation of €260bn
annually. For the same purpose, the Friends of Cohesion saw the need to improve
the ‘conditions for sustainable growth and jobs’ (Friends of Cohesion 2012). They
argued that ‘the European budget, and the Cohesion Policy in particular, should
play a strong role in this regard’ (ibid.) and conceived the ESI Funds as the toolkit
for an anti-cyclical approach ‘to invest out of the crisis’ (ibid.) as well as to utilize
the Cohesion Policy for this as it ‘remains a key investment tool for our countries’
(ibid.).
The Friends of Better Spending constituted the discourse coalition at the other
end of the spectrum. Germany’s resistance to setting up shared liabilities (e.g. Eu-
robonds) and its demand for growth-friendly consolidation has been widely studi-
ed (Blyth 2013a; 2013b; Moravcsik 2012; Plehwe 2018). In terms of overall funding,
the Friends of Better Spending called for a €100bn cut in the Cohesion Policy (of €1
trillion in planned spending) within the period 2014-2020 (Sweden demanded even
stronger cuts). Spearheaded by Merkel and Sarkozy, the Friends of Better Spen-
ding stuck to the discourse of enhancing growth and competition discussed in the
previous section: ‘Structural and cohesion funds should be used to support essen-
tial reforms to enhance economic growth and competitiveness in the Euro Area’
(Merkel/Sarkozy, 2011). In addition, they suggested placing the ESI Funds under
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the fiscal consolidation rules so that ‘In the future, payments from structural and
cohesion funds should be suspended in Euro Area countries not complying with
recommendations under the excessive deficit procedure’ (ibid.). Additional propo-
sals were put forward to revise the eligibility criteria so that certain amounts would
safely go to transitioning regions of the more developed MS. The notion of ‘better
spending’ was thereby utilised to frame the Cohesion Policy as inefficient, to le-
gitimise a restructuring of funding and to reduce overall funding. Through this
efficiency-enhancing ‘storyline’, the better spenders achieved a reduction in overall
spending within the Cohesion Policy and the introduction of conditionalities via
the linkage to the European Semester.
Yet, this could not do away with the credit crunch. Streeck’s insight that the
logical consequence of budget consolidation is to engender a stronger reliance on
private capital is observable in European regional investment as well. In their joint
declaration, the Friends of Better Spending also called for stronger involvement of
the European Investment Bank (Friends of Better Spending 2012: 2), which pre-
viously had a role in advocating public-private partnerships (Liebe/Howarth 2019).
The following section analyses how the EIB became involved in two market-enhan-
cing developments. By first carrying out the Juncker Plan and second promoting
the usage of financial instruments within the ESI Funds, the EIB played a crucial
part in buttressing a new understanding of regional development policy. Both the
Commission and the EIB relied on a similar efficiency-enhancing discursive frame
as deployed by the better spenders to gain support for their ambitions.
The Return of Keynes or ‘Juncker-Voodoo’?
To undo the Gordian Knot of investing in the real economy while being prevented
from investing in the real economy, the newly elected Commissioner Jean-Claude
Juncker proposed an Investment Plan for Europe in 2014. Based on three pillars,
the Commission set up the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), in-
itiated the European Investment Advisory Hub to support investment and sought
to remove regulatory investment barriers.The EFSI’s initial size of €315bn to invest
in innovation, infrastructure and SMEs was extended to €500bn in 2016. But what
seems like a strong response to the credit crunch and exceeds the Structural Funds’
volume (€450bn in 2014–2020) needs to be put in perspective.
The EFSI does not comprise fresh publicmoney but uses an initial sum of €21bn
partly drawn from the existing EU budget1 to provide guarantees for private invest-
ments. It aims to mobilise private capital by securing against potential investment
1 €8bnwas taken from theHorizon 2020 budget, €8bnwas provided in forms of EU guarantees
and another €5bn was provided by the EIB.
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defaults and thereby to leverage the limited pubic resources at a ratio of 1:15. Mer-
tens and Thiemann have termed this initiative, which is connected to the Capi-
tal Markets Union (CMU), an extension of market-based finance (Mertens/Thie-
mann 2018), yet it is state led, and has revived the ‘securitization markets’ (ibid.:
3). Against the backdrop of the GFC, in which asset-backed securities (especially
on mortgages [MBS]) in combination with high leverage ratios caused a financial
meltdown, it seems surprising that the Commission relied on such instruments to
regain macro-economic stability (Braun/Hübner 2018: 118).
Through the EFSI, the Commission created the supranational institutional
structures for an active state-led investment policy that could potentially be equip-
ped with higher levels of public funds in the future, while current state-aid rules
and market-failure provisions could be relaxed (Mertens 2019). However, although
the Commission has already declared the Juncker Plan a success story, critics have
pointed to various problems. First, progressive proponents of a real Marshall Plan
for Europe regarded the Commission’s initiative as insignificant (0.4 percent of
EU-wide GDP) to turn the tide in the real economy. Second, the EFSI entails large-
scale investment in public-private partnerships (PPP)2 and fosters the blending
of public and private funds (Counter Balance 2017). PPPs turn public goods into
commodities and are often more expensive for the public in the long run due to
higher interest rates, among other factors (Whiteside 2011; 2017). By means of
guarantees from the MFF and by installing investment platforms, the EIB shares
investment risks with investors and covers the riskier tranches. ‘In this way, EFSI
works as a guarantee facility and a giant PPP for a variety of projects ranging
from transport, R&D and housing to the energy sector’ (Mertens/Thiemann 2018:
194). Third, the EIB did not earmark investments for regions that were particularly
exposed to the crisis. Pauli has argued that a ‘strategic’ plan, should especially
address the growing disparities between EU regions that have been ‘left behind’
and the more prosperous ones (Pauli 2019). In this regard, the European Court of
Auditors criticised the fact that investments ‘went to a few larger EU 15 Member
States with well-established national promotional banks’ (European Court of
Auditors 2019: 62).
It would be misleading to describe the Juncker Plan as a replacement for the
grant-based system of ESI Funds. Both fulfil different purposes and represent ‘dif-
ferent intervention philosophies’, according toWalter Deffaa (2016: 162), the former
head of DG REGIO. Yet, financial instruments, which the EFSI is based on, have
been gradually introduced within the ESI Funds, too. Mertens and Thiemann have
traced the growing relevance of the EIB in promoting financial instruments within
2 This is managed by the European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC) which ‘support[s] the public
sector across Europe in delivering better public-private partnerships (PPPs)’.
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the ESI Funds since the end of the 1980s (Mertens/Thiemann 2019).3 Faced with
limited public spending, the Commission argued that ‘grants […] can be efficiently
complemented by financial instruments, which have a leverage effect and are closer
to the market’ (European Commission n.d.b). The Commission encouraged MS to
double the amount of FIs within the ESI Funds funded projects (European Com-
mission 2015). By the end of 2018, the amount invested via financial instruments
had already exceeded the total amount invested in the previous funding period
(European Commission 2018).
Most importantly, links have been established to utilise ESI Funds within the
realm of the EFSI. Both the Commission and the EIB have advocated this on dif-
ferent occasions. In 2016, Walter Deffaa stated that ‘ESIF are expected to play a
key role in helping to ensure the delivery of the IPE under all three pillars’ (Deffaa
2016: 162). The advisory centre for PPP projects within the EIB established guide-
lines on how to better combine financial instruments and ESI grants by relying
Public-Private-Partnership structure.
To convince member states, the EC and the EIB utilised a similar efficiency-
enhancing ‘storyline’ (Hajer 1993: 47) as the Friends of Better Spending, promoting
financial instruments to ‘do more with less’. Whereas the Friends of Better Spen-
ding aimed at decreasing redistribution and grant payments, the EIB sought to
expand market-based finance. ‘Doing more with less’ even amplifies the notion of
better spending, as it more directly advocates efficiency gains. In 2018, the EIB
organised the ‘doing more with less’ conference (EIB 2018), with high-ranking EU
officials and a special panel on ‘Financial Instruments in Cohesion Policy’ (ibid.).
The connection to the notion of ‘better spending’ was acknowledged by the German
Ministry of Finance, too, which regards the EFSI as ‘a continuation of the “Better-
Spending”-concept for the EU budget’ (German Ministry of Finance 2015). In an
Interview, EIB President Hoyer offered the same interpretation, stating that the
EFSI ‘is logical and is consistent with the commission’s policy of “better spending”’
(Berschens 2016).
Choosing a market-based approach to tackle the credit crunch and explicitly
referring to the better-spending notion can be interpreted as a conscious decision
against traditional anti-cyclical solutions. By relying on a similar efficiency- and
competitiveness-enhancing discursive strategy and by sticking to austerity, the two
actor coalitions have enforced the usage of ‘private investment backed by the public’
(Streeck 2015: 22): the Friends of Better Spending by lessening the redistributive
3 Introduced for the first time in 1994, they were extended between 2007 and 2013 within pro-
grams such as JESSICA. Anguelov et al. (2018) describe how through JESSICA the potential
return of investments became an important selection criterion for choosing fundable urban
infrastructure projects.
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component of the ESI Funds and the EIB and the EC through enforcing the EFSI
and the greater usage of financial instruments.
Conclusion and Outlook
This chapter has examined how far a third-order paradigm shift from redistribu-
tive regional investments to market-based financial instruments can be identified
with regard to regional investments in Europe. To accomplish this, it has analysed
major reforms within the ESI Funds prior to and after the GFC and has compared
this instrument to the Investment Plan for Europe. By employing the concept of
discourse coalitions it has been possible to identify which competing actors have
pushed for or prevented reforms. As has been shown, amajor shift to attain greater
cohesion by promoting regional competitiveness was already introduced prior to
the GFC by coupling the ESI Funds to the Lisbon Strategy. While this did not alter
‘the hierarchy of goals’ (Hall 1993: 282) altogether, it did constitute a substantive al-
teration of policy objectives, which was deepened by the 2014–2020 MFF reforms.
Against this backdrop, Hoyer’s claim of a ‘paradigm shift […] away from grants
and subsidies, in favour of loans and guarantees’ (EIB 2016) must be interpreted
as a result of the very absence of a third-order policy change. Rather than a clear-
cut shift, it represents a continuous strengthening of market-based instruments
and the endorsement of more competitiveness. In other words: Business as usual.
The introduction of the EFSI and the expansion of financial instruments that rely
on market-based tools are the logical consequence of what Streeck (2015) calls the
consolidation state.
Both the ESI Fund reforms and the introduction of the EFSI were advocated
based on efficiency-enhancing discourse strategies. First, in terms of the notion of
‘better spending’ to counter the demands of the Friends of Cohesion that the ESI
Funds be transformed into an anti-cyclical investment tool. Second, by the Com-
mission and the EIB to frame the EFSI and the expansion of financial instruments
as ‘doing more with less’. Connections between the two concepts were explicated
by both the German Financial Ministry and EIB President Werner Hoyer. The con-
tinuous expansion of market-based finance is thus paralleled by a stable discourse
coalition to push things through.
In the current negotiations, Brexit and the phasing out of rebates for net-con-
tributorMS place additional pressure on the ESI Funds.The Friends of Better Spen-
ding have already called for the further reduction of Cohesion Funds by ten percent.
Since investments to foster the single market are likely to increase (Bachtler/Men-
dez 2019: iii), the transformation of the originally transfer-based and market-com-
pensating character of the ESI Funds is likely to continue.
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The post-2020 ‘InvestEU’ fund will act as a continuation of the EFSI and bring
‘a multitude of financial instruments under one umbrella’ (Kelly 2018). Expanded
to €650bn, InvestEU objectives will also include social investments (especially in
social housing). Because this attracts fewer profits, the expected leverage ratio has
already been reduced to 1:13.7. In this institutionalised form, EFSI 2.0/InvestEU
could function as a bargaining option for opponents of the ESI Funds. For instance,
the neoliberal thinktank EPICENTER has already suggested that in order to avoid
‘a mere public hand-out [EFSI] […] should play a more prominent role in future
regional development projects’ (Burleigh 2017). The Friends of Cohesion seem to
have accepted the new role private capital will play in the future of the ESI Funds.
In their 2018 declaration, they highlighted the need for EU resources ‘to promote
public and private investments’ (Friends of Cohesion 2018: 2).
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Cross-border Cooperation in Central Europe
A Comparison of Culture and Policy Effectiveness in the
Polish-German and Polish-Slovak Border Regions
Urszula Roman-Kamphaus
Introduction
Cross-border cooperation is widely recognised as playing an important role in re-
gional development concepts. Cooperation is useful in coordinating policy and
jointly exploiting common development potential. Some border regions are seen
as handicapped by their peripheral location and because national borders tend to
hinder flows of trade, information and people (Anderson et al. 2003; Bufon 2003).
In such a context, competent cross-border cooperation can help to create syner-
gies, provide networking opportunities and stimulate development. It is for these
reasons that cooperation is increasingly important in EU cohesion policy (Mirwaldt
et al. 2009); since the start of the 2007–2013 funding period, cross-border coope-
ration has been funded by the EU as one of the fundamental objectives of cohesion
policy: European Territorial Cooperation. Because territorial cooperation, and es-
pecially cross-border cooperation, is likely to play an increasingly important role
in the future, it is worth examining the determinants of effective cooperation.
Cross-border cooperation is conditioned by the distinctive context of each bor-
der region. European borders differ considerably in their physical, political and
economic circumstances (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Europäischer Grenzregionen 2008).
Comparisons between early West European cross-border initiatives and certain
more recent efforts in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), in particular, have shown
that effective cooperation is often more difficult to achieve in CEE (Kepka & Mur-
phy 2002; Yoder 2003). This is because conditions such as cross-border linkages or
financial resources tend to be less favourable in CEE than in many Western Eu-
ropean border regions. For cooperation to have a positive effect, it must be tailored
to build on regional strengths while simultaneously addressing local problems.
Previous studies (Perkmann 2003; Yoder 2003) have identified a range of back-
ground conditions that shape cooperation in specific regions. However, these stu-
dies have relied almost entirely on in-depth case study research that does not
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permit generalisation. Systematic comparative analysis to determine what factors
promote policy effectiveness has so far been conspicuously absent. This suggests
that comparing carefully selected cases could help to determine the impact on the
ground of different contextual factors. Consequently, this chapter compares coope-
ration experiences in the Polish-German and Polish-Slovak border regions. These
two regions face similar political, economic and legal problems. However, in terms
of cultural interlinkages across the border, the Polish-Slovak border benefits from
a far more favourable context than does the Polish-German border region. Thus,
comparing these two cases makes it possible to identify the impact of different
cultural and social backgrounds on the effectiveness of cooperation.
The analysis relies on documentary evidence such as the programmes themsel-
ves, implementation documents and annual reports from the two regions. In or-
der to interpret this basic information, the analysis also relies on 36 semi-structu-
red interviews with policymakers conducted between March 2009 and September
2011.The next section,which traces the development of cross-border cooperation in
Europe, is followed by a review of previous enquiries into contextual factors. The
fourth section compares the Polish-German and Polish-Slovak cross-border pro-
grammes in the 2000–2006 and 2007–2013 funding periods with regard to three
dimensions of policy effectiveness: policy definition, policy implementation and
policy innovation.The comparative conclusions reveal that close cultural links faci-
litate policy definition and, above all, implementation in the Polish-Slovak border
region but that the absence of such links in the Polish-German border region has
inspired policymakers to innovate.
Cross-Border Cooperation in the European Context
Cross-border cooperation is defined here as institutionalised collaboration bet-
ween subnational authorities such as regions or municipalities that adjoin each
other across international borders. There are many different forms of cooperation
across borders, but EU-funded cross-border cooperation is particularly intensive
and has become widespread since 1990.
Cross-border cooperation began in the 1950s and 1960s in West European regi-
ons such as the Dutch-German borderlands, the Upper Rhine valley and the Lake
Constance region (Scott 1996; Blatter 2004). The Dutch-German ‘Euregio’, where
subnational authorities agreed to mutually beneficial cooperation across the bor-
der, was launched in 1958 as the first initiative of this sort. There was a perception
that the borderlands suffered from their peripheral position – both geographically
and politically – in the Netherlands and Germany. Cooperation was seen as a me-
ans of addressing these negative effects. In institutionalising cooperation, Dutch
and German border municipalities first engaged in relationship-building across
Cross-border Cooperation in Central Europe 165
the border and then lobbied jointly for concrete goals such as improvements in
cross-border infrastructure.The Euregio has subsequently been described as a mo-
del for cross-border cooperation and was the inspiration for several similar initia-
tives in the 1970s (Scott 1996; Perkmann 2003).
In the 1980s and 1990s, European institutions began to provide legal and fi-
nancial support for cross-border cooperation (Perkmann 1999). First, a number of
multilateral agreements were concluded through the Council of Europe, such as the
European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation, which was signed in
1980 and committed the member states to facilitating and fostering cross-border
cooperation. Second, the EU started supporting cross-border cooperation financi-
ally in 1990, when the INTERREG Community Initiative was first introduced as the
main funding instrument for territorial cooperation (Ferry & Gross 2005).
Following the introduction of legal and financial support instruments, cross-
border initiativesmushroomed all overWestern Europe. According to one estimate,
there were 15 cross-border regions by the end of the 1970s, 30 by the end of the 1980s
and 73 by the end of the 1990s (Perkmann 2003). Today, there is hardly any European
border that is not covered by a cross-border agreement. Cross-border cooperation
takes place on the territory of what are known as ‘Euroregions’, voluntary asso-
ciations of municipalities that lie adjacent to state borders. Examples include the
original Dutch-German Euregio, the Transmanche region that stretches across the
English Channel and the Pyrenees-Mediterranean Euroregion, which links French
and Spanish regional authorities.
Partly due to the proliferation of cross-border initiatives, INTERREG has be-
come ever more important since its introduction in 1990, both in terms of funding
and the scope of its activities, which have been expanded over time to cover diverse
forms of territorial cooperation. Cooperation has also acquired a high profile in EU
cohesion policy. Thus, since the adoption in 1999 of the European Spatial Develop-
ment Perspective, an attempt to harmonise spatial planning at the European level,
and with the gradual embracing of the ‘territorial cohesion’ objective in the 2000s,
cross-border cooperation has been seen as goodway of promotingmore even spati-
al development (Mirwaldt et al. 2009). With the start of the 2007–2013 funding pe-
riod, territorial cooperation was upgraded further, as INTERREG became the third
core objective of EU cohesion policy (Objective 3), after convergence and competi-
tiveness and employment. In the same period, the budget for the implementation
of all 52 cross-border programmes was €5.6 billion from the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF), the main financial instrument of EU cohesion policy.
In Objective 3 programmes, just as in INTERREG previously, a formal agree-
ment between regional authorities is followed by the definition of multi-annual
programmes that lay down the medium-term priorities of a particular cross-bor-
der region. These programmes are implemented through projects in such areas as
planning, tourism and services infrastructure. Like all Structural Funds program-
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mes, they are notoriously difficult to implement because institutional structures
are complex and because the European Commission has established strict regula-
tions for managing and implementing its funds (Bachtler et al. 2005). For example,
while a managing authority has overall responsibility, substantive managerial and
supervisory competences lie with a monitoring committee. Various other commit-
tees, authorities and working groups are responsible for processing applications
and for ensuring compliance with the EU’s demanding financial rules.
While the first cross-border ventures were bottom-up initiatives that arose out
of local needs, the creation of a European opportunity structure was crucial in
bringing about the proliferation of cooperation initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s
(Church & Reid 1999; Perkmann 1999, 2002, 2003). The influence of European sup-
port in stimulating new cross-border ventures is particularly apparent in Central
and Eastern Europe.
Until 1989, the communist states were cut off by the Iron Curtain. There was
very little cross-border cooperation within the communist bloc and certainly no
intensive, multi-dimensional cooperation of the sort described above in certain
Western European regions (Kepka & Murphy 2002; Halás 2007). After the end of
the ColdWar, with preparations underway to extend the European integration pro-
cess eastward,Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia almost immediately instigated
cooperation with Western Europe and subsequently with each other. The trilateral
Neisse-Nisa-Nysa Euroregion between Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia (the
Czech Republic after 1993) was founded in 1991 as the first such venture. Others
soon followed.
Many CEE cross-border initiatives suffered from historical disadvantages that
made it difficult to apply the Western model. There was only a weak tradition of
regionalism in CEE states (Batt & Wolczuk 2002; Kepka & Murphy 2002), and lo-
cal and especially regional authorities either did not exist or lacked the powers to
conclude and implement cross-border agreements. National administrations com-
monly sought to control cross-border ventures, often because they viewed regional
autonomy as a challenge to the integrity of the state (Keating & Hughes 2003). Slo-
vakia’s PrimeMinister Vladimír Mečiar, for example, attempted to centralise power
and obstructed cross-border cooperation until the end of his period in power in
1998. Mečiar may have been an extreme example, but scepticism about subnational
empowerment and cross-border cooperation could also be detected in other CEE
states, including the Czech Republic (Bazin 2003). As a result of the top-down na-
ture of cross-border cooperation in CEE, this cooperation was sometimes accused
of being insensitive to local peculiarities (Popescu 2006).
Borders were much harsher barriers in CEE than anywhere inWestern Europe.
In the communist bloc, they had been largely closed to citizen traffic (Batt & Wol-
czuk 2002; Kepka & Murphy 2002). Moreover, many of these borders were histori-
cally associated with deep-seated conflict. For example, the Hungarian-Romanian
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border was linked with territorial losses after the World Wars, the Czechoslovak-
German border had seen forced population transfers, and Poland’s border with the
Soviet Union was associated with both. As a result, cross-border flows were ex-
tremely limited after 1989, and CEE had no tradition of cross-border interaction
comparable to most border regions in Western Europe (Yoder 2003).
How does the CEE context affect the governance of cross-border cooperati-
on and, by implication, the success of the programmes? In order to answer this
question, the next section considers a number of crucial background conditions,
introduces the Polish-German and Polish-Slovak case studies, and develops three
criteria to evaluate cooperation.
Explaining the Governance of Cross-Border Cooperation
Conditions on the ground have a decisive influence over the effectiveness of coope-
ration. Informed by policymakers’ assessments, previous analyses have identified
a range of crucial background conditions. These overlap and cannot always be told
apart easily but, broadly speaking, there are five types of factors: regional and local
self-government; legal background; socio-economic factors; funding; and culture
First, it has been shown that strong local authorities are better able to ensu-
re successful territorial cooperation than weak ones (Bachtler et al. 2005: 135). In
cooperation between regions belonging to different states, problems often result
from differences in administrative structures and subnational competences that
hinder formal institution-building or coordination (Assembly of European Regi-
ons 1992).
Second, cross-border cooperation typically takes place on an uncertain or va-
guely defined legal basis. As most cooperation initiatives have no legal personality
and no public law status, they sometimes lack the legal basis to implement de-
cisions (Assembly of European Regions 1992). New legal instruments, such as the
European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) introduced in 2007, are not
yet used widely.
Third, socio-economic factors include the level of development, welfare gaps
that coincide with a border and weakly developed cross-border infrastructure. De-
velopment gaps can make programmes more dynamic (Bachtler et al. 2005) but
they can also give rise to competition and mutual suspicion. An absence of links
between socio-economic actors, as well as compartmentalised markets, tends to
inhibit cooperation (Krätke 1999).
Fourth, insufficient financial resources pose a major obstacle to territorial
cooperation. There are often no genuinely common funds, making it difficult and
time-consuming to take budgetary decisions (Assembly of European Regions 1992).
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EU-funded territorial cooperation suffers from the bureaucratic effort involved in
implementing these programmes (Bachtler et al. 2005).
Fifth, culture refers, on the one hand, to a region’s cross-border networks, a
sense of regional identity or widespread language skills – all factors that facilitate
day-to-day transactions. On the other hand, it also refers to administrative culture,
as cooperation is more likely to be successful between partners that share similar
organisational and management styles (Ratti 1993; Hofstede 2001).
While previous studies have been able to identify influential factors, most have
so far largely ignored the tools of social science to determine how these factors
influence cooperation on the ground. To this end, comparative analysis is necessa-
ry. It is sometimes argued that different countries’ idiosyncrasies come together
and interact to produce a complex combination of explanatory factors, making in-
ference difficult (Przeworski & Teune 1970; Macintyre 1971). However, a thorough
review of existing research and corresponding case selection make it possible to
identify the impact on the ground of diverging independent variables, even if they
may not fully explain all aspects of cross-border cooperation.
Comparing a small number of cases makes it possible to combine the rigour
of comparative enquiry with the thoroughness of in-depth analysis. There are two
main ways of comparing a small number of cases. In what are known as ‘most-
similar systems designs’, very similar cases that differ in terms of outcome are
contrasted, so as to identify the influence of the divergent independent variables.
Conversely, ‘most-different systems designs’ compare different cases with a simi-
lar outcome, pinpointing the influence of the common features (Landman 2003).
This chapter employs a most-similar design in comparing the Polish-German and
Polish-Slovak border regions. As Table 1 shows, these two borders face similar po-
litical, economic and legal problems. However, in terms of cultural interlinkages
across the border, the Polish-Slovak border region benefits from a far more fa-
vourable context than the Polish-German border region.
Table 1 shows that the two border regions resemble each other in many respec-
ts. As in many CEE border regions, the environment is less than favourable. First,
subnational competences are mismatched in an organisational sense at both bor-
ders insofar as German Länder have more competences than Polish województwa,
while Slovak kraje are still less influential. In terms of the legal basis, a number
of EGTCs are in the process of being established at both borders. Until they are
finalised, the uncertain legal footing represents a problem.Third, both regions are
characterised by a relatively low level of development in comparison to the national
average, including infrastructure development. There are also considerable socio-
economic disparities at both borders. Finally, since 2007, both regions have bene-
fited from funding through Objective 3 (European Territorial Cooperation) of the
ERDF.
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In terms of cross-border culture, however, the Polish-German and Slovak-
German border regions could not be more different. In the Polish-German border
region, whatever cross-border networks had existed prior to World War II were
destroyed as a result of the war, boundary shifts and population transfers (Urban
2004). The border was closed to citizen exchanges for most of the communist
period. Thus, when the border was opened in 1991, Polish and German citizens
were almost completely estranged (Matthiesen & Bürkner 2001; Rada 2004). By
contrast, cross-border networks largely survived the communist period in the
Polish-Slovak border region, even though cross-border contact and cooperation
were limited during this period. The border was gradually opened after 1989, and
the two sides were able to benefit from linguistic, cultural and social similarities
(Halás 2007).
Table 1 shows that both regions grapple with several fairly difficult background
conditions. These are broadly similar in both regions. Only in terms of culture
is there a major difference between the unpromising environment of the Polish-
German border region and the dense interconnections across the Polish-Slovak
border. This suggests that the two border regions are suitable cases for compa-
rative analysis of a ‘most-similar’ type (King et al. 1994; Landman 2003).
The question remains of how to operationalise the rather abstract dependent
variable effectiveness of cooperation. On the one hand, past evaluations have used pro-
cedural indicators such as data on financial and physical progress, though these
need to be complemented by rich information in order to make sense of the raw
numbers (Bachtler et al. 2005). There is some merit in using these indicators: they
are readily available and easy to compare across different contexts. Moreover, slow
progress is usually indicative of deep-seated problems in a programme. On the
other hand, these measures say very little about the governance of EU funds or
how well cooperation is suited to the local context. Another measure is needed to
take account of this factor. In what follows, it is suggested that cooperation experi-
ences can be conceptualised along different dimensions and that these dimensions
can be used to assess the governance of cooperation. Here, the focus is on three key
aspects, namely policy definition, policy implementation and policy innovation.
The first dimension is the policy definition stage. For territorial cooperation
programmes, this refers to the steps after programmes are approved by the Eu-
ropean Commission. After approval, details such as the type and amount of avail-
able support, eligibility and selection criteria as well as committees and other ru-
les governing the allocation of funds must be defined. The question of how long
it takes to agree these implementation procedures is important because it deter-
mines when the first projects can begin. For the 2000–2006 funding period, the-
re was enormous variation across Europe. A two-year transition period, in which
projects from the previous funding period are concluded and the parameters for
the new period are established, is nothing unusual (Bachtler et al. 2005). Even so,
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in the 2007–2013 funding period, certain West European programmes, such as
the Scottish-Irish cross-border programme or the Danish-German Syddanmark-
Schleswig-K.E.R.N initiative, were able to start funding projects as early as 2008.
A programme start after 1 January 2009 indicated a serious delay.
The second step is to review the implementation of the programmes. Reviewing
financial and physical progress is generally accepted as a cornerstone of evaluating
EU cohesion policy, including cross-border cooperation (Bachtler et al. 2005: 52).
In other words, in the 2007–2013 period, what are the most up-to-date commit-
ment and payment rates at the time of writing? How many projects are already
being implemented and howmany have been concluded?This is important as a ge-
neral indicator of implementation progress. At the same time, delays in spending
money can lead to automatic loss of funds. According to the EU’s ‘n+2/n+3 rule’
funds are automatically lost if they are not spent within two or three years of being
committed. New member states, as well as Greece and Portugal, have three years
to make payments (‘n+3’), while West European member states mostly comply with
the ‘n+2 rule’. Thus, swift progress in committing and paying out funds is cruci-
al, and delays are usually a symptom of deep-seated problems associated with the
programme. Analysing progress by type of priority is also helpful in gauging the
substantive progress of the programme.
The final aspect of cooperation being considered here is policy innovation.
Cross-border cooperation is not normally evaluated according to how well it copes
with a given context, and conventional measures of policy effectiveness do not
capture this aspect. Nevertheless, it is one of the central claims of this chapter that
adaptation to the local environment is a precondition of successful cross-border
cooperation. Because differences in background condition each programme, it is
important to address local weaknesses and to resolve swiftly any possible problems
in the programme. In order to assess the effectiveness of cooperation, therefore,
this chapter considers the ways in which programmes were modified to address
local problems.
Inwhat follows, the Polish-German and Polish-Slovak cross-border cooperation
programmes will be compared along these three dimensions. Particular attention
will be paid to cultural factors that distinguish the two regions.
Comparing Polish-German and Polish-Slovak Cross-Border Cooperation
Figure 1 and Table 2 display some basic information about the Polish-German and
Polish-Slovak border regions. The Polish-Slovak border is slightly longer than the
Polish-German border, however; the two border regions have a comparable popu-
lation of just over six million inhabitants.
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There are four Euroregions with Polish-German participation that were created
in the early 1990s. The Polish-Slovak border region consists of three Euroregions
that are slightly younger than those at the Polish-German border.
The EU began funding Polish-German cross-border cooperation in 1994
through INTERREG IIA and PHARE CBC. Poland joined the EU in 2004 and thus
became eligible for INTERREG, later Objective 3, funding. In the Polish-Slovak
border region, the experience gained in this period contributed to the 2004–2006
INTERREG IIIA programme and the 2007–2013 Objective 3 programme.
Table 2 shows that there are three programmes in the Polish-German border
region, corresponding to the three German Länder bordering Poland, while there
is only one programme at the Polish-Slovak border, reflecting the more centrali-
sed character of Polish-Slovak cooperation. As a result, the available ERDF funds
for Polish-Slovak cross-border cooperation are less than half of those the three
Polish-German programmes have at their disposal. The implications of this will be
analysed below.
Policy Definition
The three Polish-German programmes started very late, in the course of 2009.
New legal standards made it necessary to re-conceptualise the Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern-Zachodniopomorskie programme, for example, and the ensuing
preparation of key documents took so long that the first funding decisions could
only be taken in the autumn of 2009. Similarly, the implementation document
for the Polish-Saxon programme was adopted in April 2009, and the monitoring
committee decided on the first project applications only in September of that year.
The Brandenburg-Lubuskie programme began slightly earlier, in March 2009.
Overall, therefore, all three programmes were seriously delayed.
Policymakers in the region were unanimous in condemning these delays. For
example, one Euroregional representative marvelled: ‘Incredible, it’s already 2009.
No projects were supported in 2007 and 2008. […] Money was supposed to be avail-
able as early as 2007 but it is still not available.’1 Another explained: ‘When wemade
the transition from Phare CBC to INTERREG, there was a similar delay, until 2005.
Now we have the same problem: it’s already 2009 but still nothing.’2
Germans and Poles offered different explanations for the delays: German poli-
cymakers criticised the high staff turnover in the Polish administration, which im-
peded coordination on a personal basis and the development of trust. Conversely,
Polish officials blamed their German counterparts for their inflexibility and lack of
1 Author’s interview with policymaker, Frankfurt (Oder), 2 March 2009.
2 Author’s interview with policymaker, Jelenia Góra, 1 April 2009.
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creativity. According to one interviewee, different administrative cultures had led
to infighting over the ‘rules of the game’:
In the Dutch-German border region, where they had a seamless transition [be-
tween the programmes], cooperation is a matter of course. Here, we still don’t
have a common administrative culture and common culture of communication.3
In other words, policymakers claimed that cultural differences and dissimilar ad-
ministrative cultures gave rise to internal disagreements that, in turn, led todelays
in the start of the programme.
Conversely, work on the implementation document for the 2007–2013 Polish-
Slovak cross-border cooperation programme began in December 2006, a year
before the launch of the new programme. In the course of 2006, 13 meetings
were held of the working group responsible for drawing up the programme. Even
though the working group had prepared the key documents at the start of 2007,
it took a whole year to distribute them among potential beneficiaries to enable
them to apply for funding. Only thanks to the high interest among potential
beneficiaries did the first call for projects start in August 2008. A first list of
accepted projects was published by the monitoring committee in April 2009.
In other words, although project applications were accepted within the accept-
able two-year window after the programme start, almost two years were lost in
the allocation of funds. Regional and local policymakers responsible for the im-
plementation of the programme blamed indolence and a lack of organisation in
the managing institutions, notably the Polish Ministry of Regional Development.
As a representative of the contact point at the marshal’s office in Małopolska com-
plained: ‘All documents for applicants were prepared in 2007; I do not understand
why it took them so long to print them out and distribute them among benefi-
ciaries.’4 It has been suggested that, prior to 2004, cross-border cooperation was
seen by the ministry as an excellent source of funding. However, this became a
much lower priority once Poland joined the EU and thus became eligible for the
much more lucrative Structural Funds. This would explain why the Ministry did
not make a stronger effort to get the new programme underway.5 Dissatisfaction
with the managing authority was also pronounced on the Slovak side:
Recruitment of new employees to the [Joint Technical Secretariat] in Kraków
started only after the first project call in August 2008. Everything took longer
than it should […] that is why there was a delay in assessing the projects.6
3 Author’s interview with policymaker, Dresden, 2 April 2009.
4 Author’s interview with policymaker, Kraków, 1 June 2010.
5 The author is grateful to Maciej Smętkowski for raising this point.
6 Author’s interview with policymaker, Žilina, 1 July 2010.
Cross-border Cooperation in Central Europe 173
The second reason identified by policymakers was the transition from INTERREG
IIIA to European Territorial Cooperation. New rules adopted by the EU for the
2007–2013 period caused some confusion:
I have been working on the Slovak-Polish border for almost ten years, and each
programme is a bit different. On PHARE CBC, we have all been learning, then IN-
TERREG came and now it is different again. Much more emphasis is now put on
the trans-border effect […]7
Representatives of the Joint Technical Secretariat who are responsible for conduc-
ting project calls pointed to the extremely high level of interest in the programme
among Slovak and Polish beneficiaries as a reason for the delay: ‘Already in the first
competition, €20 million have been available for allocation. The level of interest
was overwhelming.’8 High demand may have caused some delays but it also per-
mitted the Polish-Slovak programme to advance quicker than the Polish-German
programme by 2009, as the next section will show.
Policy Implementation
To give an overview of the 2000–2006 period, Table 3 presents the programme re-
sults for the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern-Zachodniopomorskie programme, which
one of the three Polish-German programmes.
The programme had seven priorities, but technical and tourist infrastructure
development (Priority B: 144 projects) as well as culture and cooperation (Priority
F: 107 projects) together made up over 75 percent of the programme. These two
priorities tended to have the most generous allocations in all three programmes;
infrastructure because projects such as road or bridge construction are extremely
expensive, and culture because there is a lot of demand for projects in this area,
even though these are often inexpensive (see subsection 4.3 on the fund for mi-
croprojects). Table 3 also shows that the final outcome of the programme was very
similar to what was initially envisaged. Overall, €111 million of ERDF money were
spent on 430 projects. The Polish partners were only eligible for INTERREG money
after Poland’s EU accession in 2004, but these figures suggest that approximately
60 projects were carried out each year on average.
As Table 4 shows, during the three years of the Polish-Slovak INTERREG IIIA
programme, 312 projects worth some €26 million (around €20 million from the
ERDF fund) were carried out, averaging over 100 projects a year. This means that
7 Author’s interview with policymaker, Bielsko–Biała, 2 June, 2010.
8 Author’s interview with policymaker, Kraków, 1 June 2010.
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all the money allocated for this programme was spent, making it one of the most
successful programmes in CEE.
Table 4 also indicates that the programme was divided into two substantive
priorities: infrastructural development and socio-economic development. These
priorities were subdivided into seven measures. The most popular measures in-
cluded Measure 2.1 for human resources development and promotion of entrepre-
neurship (31 projects), Measure 2.2 for the protection of the natural and cultural
heritage (42 projects), and Measure 2.3, which supported microprojects (189 pro-
jects).This means that the Polish-Slovak programmewas somewhat more balanced
than the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern-Zachodniopomorskie programme, which fo-
cused heavily on infrastructure and cultural cooperation.
In the Polish-German border region during the 2000–2006 programming pe-
riod, it emerged that it is difficult to meet targets when there is a large number
of many precisely defined funding categories. As a result, all three Polish-German
programmes reduced their funding categories to two or three in the 2007–2013
period.These broader priorities cover a variety of themes. For example, the Polish-
Saxon priority of cross-border development encompasses sub-priorities such as
economics and science, tourism, traffic, the environment and spatial and regional
planning.
Table 5 illustrates progress in the 2007–2013 Saxony-Dolnośląskie programme.
It shows that, by December 2010, only eleven projects had been accepted in Prio-
rity 1, equivalent to a 25 percent commitment rate. According to the 2010 annual
report, this is partly because the programme overestimated the need for cross-bor-
der funds among local enterprises, who have access to several different sources of
financial support (Sächsische Aufbaubank 2011). Demand for Priority 1 increased
in 2010 compared to earlier years. Nonetheless, with 75 percent of the funds allo-
cated to Priority 1 still available at the end of 2010, slow progress in this priority
raised concerns, and the monitoring committee introduced the possibility of shif-
ting funds from Priority 1 to Priority 2 if necessary (Sächsische Aufbaubank 2011).
Conversely, with 35 projects in Priority 2, projects in the area of social integration
were well underway. Most were in the sub-areas of education and culture. Examp-
les include the establishment of a cultural centre and a network of teachers from
the region.The commitment rate in Priority 2 amounted to over 57 percent. By De-
cember 2010, the payment rate was 0.08 percent for Priority 1 and 5.2 percent for
Priority 2, reflecting the differential progress in the two areas.
Slow progress is not surprising given the delayed start of all German-Polish
programmes. However, there is some variation between programmes, as Table
6 indicates. The table shows progress in the Brandenburg-Lubuskie and the
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern-Zachodniopomorskie programmes that share the
same priorities. As the table also indicates, progress has varied between priorities.
With 49 projects, the Brandenburg-Lubuskie programme had achieved a 53 percent
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commitment rate and a 4.8 percent payment rate at the end of 2010. This was
much higher in Priority 1, concerning infrastructure, than in Priority 2, which is
designed to stimulate cross-border economic links and economic and scientific
cooperation. Here, the commitment rate amounted to only 37 percent, something
that the programme authorities blamed on a lack of potential beneficiaries in the
region (Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego 2011a). In 2010, two projects were
completed in Priority 1, namely the modernisation of a leisure and sports facility
and the fitting out of a Polish-German meeting centre.
In the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern-Zachodniopomorskie programme, which
had committed more than 62 percent of the €125 million of available ERDF funds,
39 projects were accepted. This high overall percentage is due largely to the 74
percent commitment rate in the category of human resources and cooperation.
Slow progress in payments raised concern about the n+3 rule: ways of preventing
decommitment were debated in the monitoring committee for the Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern-Zachodniopomorskie programme though, in the end, n+3 targets
were met at the end of 2010 (Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Tourismus
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2011).
Table 7 illustrates progress in the Polish-Slovak cross-border cooperation pro-
gramme for 2007–2013 up to 31 December 2010.Ninety-one projects within priority
axes 1 and 2 were accepted, but one applicant dropped out before signing the finan-
cial agreement. By December 2010, 90 projects had been contracted for financial
support, as well as 369 microprojects (234 in the first call and 135 in the second call),
which are covered under one umbrella programme.
The first call was very successful and received overwhelming interest from po-
tential beneficiaries.The value of applications amounted to €178 million, exceeding
the total ERDF budget of €157million.Most applications were submitted in priority
axis 2 on social and economic development, notably in the sub-priorities of pro-
tecting the cultural and natural heritage, developing cross-border cooperation in
tourism and networking. At the start of 2010, a second call was publicised, and 42
new projects worth over €53 million were accepted. The second call met with great
interest from applicants.This time, there were 203 applications, and their value to-
talled €254 million. Second time applicants had more time to acquaint themselves
with the programme’s rules, find a partner and prepare projects and the required
documentation.Many projects submitted for the second call were projects that had
been rejected during the first call due to technical shortcomings.Most applications
were again submitted in priority axis 2.
After two calls, costs in priority axes 1 and 2 amounted to more than €117 mil-
lion from the ERDF, equivalent to 97 percent of available funds for the first and
second priorities of the entire programme. By December 2010, €132 million had
been assigned to projects, equivalent to more than 89 percent of the total ERDF
budget for the programme, and far more than in the Polish-German programmes.
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The high commitment rate is due to the very great interest among potential
beneficiaries in the Polish-Slovak programme as well as enduring basic infrastruc-
tural and development needs in the region. However, it is likely that cultural sim-
ilarities constitute one of the most important reasons for the success of the pro-
gramme. After a short stay on the Polish-Slovak border, even an untrained observer
will notice a multiplicity of similarities in material and folk culture on both sides
of the borderline as reflected in such things as architectural styles, national dress,
and methods of land cultivation and animal husbandry in the mountainous terri-
tories. Another bond that connects many along much of the Polish-Slovak border
is the identity of the ethnic groups inhabiting them. Górale (Highlanders) on both
sides of the border tend to identify with each other more than with other Poles or
Slovaks they share citizenship with, as they have a common dialect, traditions and
origin. This is also connected to the specificity of borderlands as peripheries:
This is due to discrepancies between the sense of identity of the centre and that
of the periphery. Related observations have also beenmade by Ewa Orlof [6], who
examined the Polish-Slovak borderland and ties between the Polish and Slovak
Highlanders. Her research shows that in both the Tatras and Podhale, the High-
landers, regardless of nationality, have more in common with each other as a so-
cial group living in the border area than with respect to the centre of Poland or
Slovakia. (Masłoń 2014:69 [author’s translation])
Communication between people from each side of the border is easy because, un-
like in the Polish-German border region, there is no major language barrier. Infor-
mation exchange is straightforward as a result. In informal settings such as joint
training, professional interpreters are not needed. Moreover, previous experiences
such as local festivals or school exchanges helped to establish linkages between lo-
cal authorities, rendering them more likely to cooperate formally and jointly apply
for EU funds.9 Interviewees at the European level actively stressed the meaning
and significance of the ‘local culture’:
Definitely the long tradition of CBC helps. The best projects come from these bor-
der regions that share long tradition of CBC. Also, the cultural similarity helps to
achieve the successful cooperation. […]10
Apart from payments towards priority axis 4 of the Polish-Slovak programme
(Technical Assistance, which is not a substantive priority and thus not shown in
9 Around 80 percent of projects are conducted by partners who already cooperated with each
other either in INTERREG projects or earlier during spontaneous events (Author’s inter-
view with policymaker, Krakow, 2 July 2010; author's interview with beneficiaries in Žilina,
1 September 2011).
10 Author’s interview with a senior officer at the European Commission DG Regio CBC Unit con-
ducted in Brussels, June 2013.
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Table 6), there had been 137 payments amounting to €13.5 million by December
2010. This represents a nine percent payment rate, far higher than in any of the
Polish-German programmes (Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego 2011b).
Policy Innovation
The Polish-German border region faced a special challenge from the outset, owing
to the fact that the region differs in cultural and historical terms from many West
European border regions.The citizens who live in those other border regions have,
over time, developed dense cross-border networks. A multitude of exchanges take
place across these borders every day, facilitated by widespread language skills (Eder
& Sandtner 2002; Kepka & Murphy 2002; Strüver 2005). By contrast, few linkages
across the Polish-German border survived World War II and the Cold War. In the
early 1990s, there were no shared cultural traditions, no widespread language skills,
and only extremely limited cross-border social networks (Jajeśniak-Quast & Sto-
kłosa 2000). In many cases, citizens showed outright hostility: on the day the visa
agreement came into force, the first Polish coaches arriving in Frankfurt on Oder
on were greeted by stone-throwing neo-Nazis (Rada 2004).
This lack of cross-border networks is important not only as a shortcoming in
its own right but also because it tends to undermine regional cross-border deve-
lopment proposals (Krätke 1999; Guz-Vetter 2002). Thus, in the early 1990s, policy-
makers realised there was a need to bring people from the two sides of the border
together in informal settings. This would enable them to get to know each other,
and the hope was that such encounters would counter negative stereotypes and
contribute towards trust-building in the border region. However, at the time the-
re were no funds available to support the kinds of initiatives policymakers had in
mind, including sporting events, exhibitions or local fairs.The Phare CBC regulati-
ons on the Polish side were a particular hindrance because projects had to be worth
at least €2 million to qualify, which was far too much for the purposes of small-
scale encounters.
As a result, a ‘fund for microprojects’ was set up in 1995. Funds of around €2
million were reserved for small projects on both sides of the border (Jałowiecki &
Smętkowski 2004). The implementation was simplified in comparison to regular
projects and left to the Polish-German Euroregions (Mirwaldt 2012). Although it
is too early to tell whether microprojects can bring about a sense of mutual trust
among Poles and Germans in the border region, the fund has been deemed a great
success. In the 2000–2006 funding period, for example, over 2,700 microprojects
were carried out in the region, bringing together thousands of Poles and Germans.
Examples included a Polish-German children’s’ party in Euroregion Pro Europa Vi-
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adrina and a photo exhibition in Euroregion Neisse–Nisa–Nysa.There is a general
consensus that such encounters have a positive effect. As one policymaker put it:
Such organised encounters in a majority of cases really [do] trigger further en-
counters, where people [fromdifferent sides of the border]meet at a fair, connect,
decide to hold their own fair, get together in the meantime. […] And the effect is
long-term because one meeting leads to another.11
So popular is the idea of a microprojects facility that the European Commission
now recommends the setting-up of such a facility in its guidance documents. Ne-
arly all CEE cross-border programmes feature a fund formicroprojects, evenwhere
cultural cross-border connections between citizens and administrations are alrea-
dy strong, as in the Polish-Slovak border region. In other words, one of the major
problems holding back the Polish-German border region – its lack of socio-cultural
linkages across the border – also brought about major policy innovation.
Few innovations were introduced to the 2000–2006 and 2007–2013 Polish-
Slovak programmes. Unlike the Polish-German border region, where a lack of
linkages across the border initially defined most other cross-border ventures,
the Polish-Slovak border region had to grapple with several minor hurdles, and
the only major problem resulted from insufficient available funds. As a result,
no major innovation comparable to the Polish-German invention of the fund for
microprojects was introduced.
However, certain rules and conventions have been adapted slightly to local
needs. First, experiences from the implementation of INTERREG IIIA at the
Polish-Slovak border indicated that more emphasis should be placed on the trai-
ning of future beneficiaries. Most applicants had already been beneficiaries in the
earlier INTERREG IIIA programme, and some projects in the 2007–2013 period
were a continuation of previous successful INTERREG projects. However, under
Phare CBC and only three years of INTERREG, beneficiaries had few opportunities
to learn how to put together high quality applications. In particular, they had trou-
ble defining the transborder effect of their project correctly, a crucial condition for
projects to be funded. In order to respond to this problem, special emphasis was
placed on training the applicants during the 2007–2013 programme. Training was
offered by the Joint Technical Secretariat in Kracow and by regional authorities
on both sides of the border, particularly before new calls were publicised and
in specially organised conferences. Additionally, regional contact points in each
region support future applicants.
A second decision that shaped implementation procedures was to limit the eli-
gible territory under INTERREG IIIA. Earlier, it had been possible, for example, to
submit applications for infrastructural projects that would be undertaken quite far
11 Author’s interview with policymaker, GorzówWielkopolski, 4 May 2009.
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from the border. However, these projects had no realistic chance of being funded
because their distance from the bordermade it impossible to argue that they would
have a genuine transborder effect. With the start of the INTERREG IIIA program-
me, the eligible territory was therefore limited to certain areas closely adjoining the
Polish-Slovak border: the Bielski, Nowosądecki and Krośnieńsko-Przemyski sub-
regions (podregiony), on the Polish side, and the Žilina and Prešov regions (kraje)
in Slovakia. Policymakers claimed that excluding projects which had no chance of
being selected saved time during the assessment of applications.
Finally, following proposals from beneficiaries, a new procedure to implement
changes within projects was approved in 2010. This introduced a high-speed IT-
based notification system to systematise and speed up the process of altering pro-
jects during their realisation. Additionally, the process of reimbursement under-
went a reform, which simplified the formal requirements of financial reports (Mi-
nisterstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego 2011b).
In sum, the Polish-Slovak programme was able to build on its regional
strengths, notably the close cultural connections across the border. Policyma-
kers were also able to deal with certain problems connected specifically with
the programme. However, the region has not witnessed any momentous policy
innovations, and one of the main problems in the Polish-Slovak programme – the
insufficient amount of funding – remains unsolved.
Conclusions
The main aim of this chapter has been to analyse the effect of different contex-
tual factors affecting the governance of cross-border cooperation. This was done
by comparing the Polish-German and Polish-Slovak cross-border cooperation pro-
grammes for 2000–2006 and 2007–2013. These two regions are very different in
terms of the cultural connections that span the border, and comparison made it
possible to identify the effect of this difference on three dimensions of policy ef-
fectiveness: definition, implementation and innovation.
In terms of policy definition, the Polish-German and Polish-Slovak program-
mes were delayed far beyond the 2007 start date. Only in early 2009 did the first
projects begin in the Polish-Slovak and in the Brandenburg-Lubuskie programmes.
In the Mecklenburg-Vorpommern-Zachodniopomorskie and Saxony-Dolnośląskie
programmes, it took until autumn 2009 for the first projects to be accepted. Policy-
makers presented various reasons for the delays. In the Polish-Slovak case, prepa-
rations beganwith plenty of time to spare.The programme could have startedmuch
earlier but for the delay in sending the relevant documentation out to beneficia-
ries. High demand among potential beneficiaries was another reason for the delay
in the Polish-Slovak programme: the competent authorities were so overwhelmed
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by the interest from applicants that they took longer than usual to make project
decisions. Usually, though, high demand on the part of potential beneficiaries is
seen as a very good sign. At the Polish-German border, delays were blamed on a
lack of successful communication and divergent administrative cultures between
authorities on both sides of the border.
As for policy implementation, progress has been variable in the three Polish-
German programmes. With 46 projects and a 41 percent commitment rate,
Saxony-Dolnośląskie has been the slowest to develop. Here, the late start no doubt
had a negative impact on progress. Conversely, the Brandenburg-Lubuskie and
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern-Zachodniopomorskie programmes were broadly up
to date by the end of 2010 and boasted overall commitment rates of 53 percent
and 62 percent, respectively. However, demand has been highly uneven among
different priorities. In the Saxony-Dolnośląskie and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern-
Zachodniopomorskie programmes, for example, progress was much better in
the area of culture than in the areas of infrastructure or development, and po-
licymakers had to take special measures to stimulate demand in the neglected
priorities.
In contrast, progress has been swift in the Polish-Slovak border region. Af-
ter just two years of accepting project applications, the programme had already
achieved an overall commitment rate of 89 percent. One reason was the excep-
tionally high demand, as applicants submitted many high-quality project appli-
cations. Longstanding cross-border networks, easy communication and cultural
connections between potential beneficiaries on both sides go a long way towards
explaining the high number of sound applications. Moreover, with its low level of
development, lack of cross-border infrastructure and high demand for social initia-
tives, the border region’s needs are immense. As a result, it is hardly surprising that
available funds are exhausted quickly. At the same time, it is necessary to point out
that the swift progress in the Polish-Slovak programme is due partly to the signi-
ficantly smaller budget involved compared with the Polish-German border region.
Local authorities have been very vocal in criticising this lack of funds.
Thus, the Polish-Slovak programme has so far been more successful in terms
of policy definition and implementation than the Polish-German programmes. As
regards policy innovation, however, the roles are reversed. It was at the Polish-
German border that a major policy innovation in European cross-border coopera-
tionwas conceived.The lack of historical cross-border networks and a common cul-
ture of communication that has held the region back in other regards inspired local
policymakers to create the fund for microprojects. Conversely, the rather more fa-
vourable cultural background in the Polish-Slovak border region has not made any
major innovations necessary. Few innovations were introduced in the 2000–2006
and 2007–2013 programmes. Policy innovation has been more incremental than in
the Polish-German border region and has involved some minor adjustments in the
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areas of training, area delineation and project administration. In other words, in
this one sense at least, it seems as though a difficult background can sometimes
also inspire policymakers to find genuine solutions to local problems.
The analysis has confirmed that it is not enough simply to list the background
conditions thatmight have a positive or negative impact on cross-border governan-
ce. Rather, comparison of different programmes is crucial in determining exactly
what impact these different conditions have on the way cooperation functions on
the ground.This chapter has done this for culture as a contextual factor, and it has
shown that different cross-border cultures have a very important impact on diffe-
rent aspects of policy. For policymakers, the important lesson is that even the most
daunting regional weaknesses can be turned into strengths and give innovative
impulses to otherwise struggling programmes.
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Kamphaus, Urszula (2020) for this publication. Data taken from Ministerstwo
Rozwoju Regionalnego (2011b).
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Figure 1: MAP OF THE POLISH-GERMAN AND POLISH-SLOVAK EUROREGIONS
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Table 2: Key data on the Polish-German and Polish-Slovak border regions
Polish-German border Polish-Slovak border
Population 6.17million 6.01million































Priority A– Economic development
and cooperation
6,658,512 6,353,819 89
Priority B – Improving technical and
tourist infrastructure
67,591,565 66,509,620 144
Priority C – Environment 6,978,988 6,842,924 40





investments in culture and
encounters, small projects fund
18,568,272 18,329,007 107
Priority G – Special support for border
areas in the accession states
2,610,440 2,610,440 6
Total 113,254,179 111,317,292 430
Note: Technical Assistance is excluded. Source: Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und
Tourismus Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (n.d.): “Ergebnisse der grenzüber-greifenden Zusam-
menarbeit im Regionalen Programm Mecklenburg–Vorpommern/Brandenburg–Polen (Wo-
jewodschaft Zachodniopomorskie) im Zeitraum 2000–2006”, February 1, 2011 (http://www.
interreg4a.info/index.php?id=29&L=fyxomzehqhpckpda).
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Priority 1: Infrastructuredevelopment 11,515,546 15,677,180 50
Measure 1.1: Technical and
communication infrastructure
6,347,132 8,594,453 26






Measure 2.1: Human resources






Measure 2.3: Support for local
initiatives (Micro-projects)
1,981,131 2,658,339 189
Total 19,291,271 26,178,629 312
Note: Technical Assistance is excluded. Source: Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (n.d.):
“Współpraca polsko-słowacka. Przeszłość, Teraźniejszość, Przyszłość”, February 1, 2011
(http://pl.plsk.eu/files/?id_plik=2103).











Priority axis 1 – Cross-
border development
49,754,945 12,478,491 25.1 11
Priority axis 2 –
Cross-border
social integration
49,049,395 28,024,040 57.1 35
Total 98,804,340 40,502,531 41.0 46
Note: Technical Assistance is excluded. Source: Sächsische Aufbaubank (2011) “Jahresdurch-
führungsbericht 2010” Dresden: Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und
Verkehr.
190 Urszula Roman-Kamphaus
Table 6: 2007– 2013 OPs Mecklenburg-Vorpommern-Zachodniopomorskie and
Brandenburg-Lubuskie
Note: Technical Assistance is excluded. Sources: Ministerium für Wirtschaft Arbeit und
Tourismus Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2011): “Durchführungsbericht 2010.” Schwerin, Min-
isterium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Tourismus Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Ministerstwo
Rozwoju Regionalnego (2011a): Raport Roczny 2010, Program Operacyjny Współpracy Trans-
granicznej Polska (Wojedództwo Lubuskie)–Brandenburgia 2007–2013 w Ramach “Europe-
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Table 7: 2007–2013 OP Poland-Slovak Republic: Budget, Commitments and Number of















67,685,338 67,685,338 100.0 26
Priority axis 2 – So-
cio-economic devel-
opment
53,518,639 50,090,473 93.6 64
Priority axis 3 – Sup-
porting local initia-
tives (microprojects)




Total 147,963,297 132,598,817 89.6 91
Note: Technical Assistance is excluded. Source: Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (2011b):
Raport Roczny 2010, Program Wspólpracy Transgranicznej Republika Polska–Republika Slo-
wacka 2007–2013, Warsaw: Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego.

IV.
Still Dreaming of a “Europe of Regions”? On the
Interplay of Regions in the EU

New Multi-Level Governance in the EU?
The European Committee of the Regions and
Regional Diversity
Justus Schönlau
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
represent the institution for which he works
Introduction
The European Committee of the Regions (CoR), which celebrated the 25th anniver-
sary of its first plenary meeting in 2019, has been described as the ‘institutionalisa-
tion’ of multi-level governance in the European Union (Warleigh 1999). Despite not
being recognised as an ‘EU institution’ as such, the CoR is indeed the key institu-
tional element within the EU Treaties (Art 300; 305-307 TFEU) that formally brings
representatives of ‘regional and local bodies who either hold a regional or local
authority electoral mandate or are politically accountable to an elected assembly’
(Art 300.3 TFEU) into the EU decision-making process. In this regard, the Com-
mittee therefore embodies the general principle, enshrined in Art 4.2 TEU, that
the EU shall respect the member states’ identities ‘inherent in their fundamental
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government’
(emphasis added). The pairing of ‘regional and local’ in both treaty references is,
of course, one of the constitutive elements of the Committee of the Regions and
contributes to its internal heterogeneity – to the extent that it has been an issue
for debate from the early days of the CoR whether this is a source of strength or of
weakness (Christiansen 1996, Piattoni/Schönlau 2015).
While it will be shown in this chapter that, in fact, the dichotomy between ‘lo-
cal’ and ‘regional’ seems to be less significant for the institutional development and
daily work of the CoR than some may have thought, the Committee has also had to
grapple with the even more fundamental question of the extent to which a purely
consultative body can contribute in a significant manner at all to building genuine
multi-level governance (Domorenok 2009). Against the background of the recent
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EU crises, which have raised both longstanding and new questions of identity and
legitimacy regarding the European integration project, the present chapter will ad-
dress some of the CoR’s activities beyond its consultative role in the Treaties.These
activities are to be understood both as the attempt of the Committee to expand its
own remit and influence (Schönlau 2017), but also as a catalyst and channel for the
assertion of sub-national interests in the integration process. Obviously, the degree
to which individual territorial entities or their representatives are active in trying
to influence EU policy-making, whether via the CoR or using other means, is de-
termined to a large extent by external factors such as their constitutional position
within the national context, the interplay and potential conflicts between histori-
cal or cultural identities at the national and regional or local levels, and other key
socio-economic and political factors.
In this situation, as I will argue, an internally diverse body such as the Commit-
tee of the Regions with its nominally weak consultative role has been able to show,
through concrete action in various policy fields, how unity can be built out of diver-
sity. In fact, as will be shown, the CoR has been able to use the notion of ‘multi-level
governance’ (MLG) to foster not only more sensitivity to the needs and concerns of
sub-national levels of governance among other institutional players at EU level, but
also to promote the role of local and regional authorities in shaping EU policy, and
by this action also to advance its own role in the institutional framework (Schönlau
2017, Piattoni/Schönlau 2015). These trends have, in fact, been reinforced by the
growing recognition that current policy challenges require joint efforts by and at all
levels of governance. This is particularly true for the issue of climate change, whe-
re the central role of cities and regions in understanding, developing, promoting
and implementing the profound transitions which are necessary to meet the chal-
lenge is increasingly being acknowledged not only at EU level, but also nationally
and on the global stage. At the same time, the EU as a level of governance, despite
being recognised as a central element of the necessary solutions in a complex and
inter-connected world, faces serious concerns in terms of the effectiveness of its
regulatory action and thus finally about the very legitimacy of its existence.
In this context, the sub-national levels of governance have been identified as
crucial subjects and arenas of policy communication and consensus building, and
the Committee of the Regions is developing various tools to try to contribute to
rebuilding citizens’ trust in the notion and instruments of European integration.
The Committee’s action in this respect focusses on the two opposite ends of the EU
policy process: democratic input to the debates about the general direction of in-
tegration and the development of new legislation, on the one hand, and the imple-
mentation of existing EU legislation at the local and regional levels, on the other.
In the former case, the CoR has been active in the run up to the 2019 European
elections in organising ‘citizens’ dialogues’ in the context of the other instituti-
ons’ debate on the future of Europe, and is now seeking to develop a concept for
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a more ‘permanent and structured’ form of involving citizens at local or regional
level (CoR 2018). With regard to the latter, the CoR has launched a pilot-project
entitled ‘RegHubs’, a network of regional and local contact points to gather feed-
back from practitioners on the ground regarding the difficulties they face when
implementing EU legislation: This is intended as a contribution to the European
Commission’s ‘better law-making’ agenda.1
The present chapter will thus, after a brief overview of the CoR’s role and histo-
ry, present two examples of how the Committee translates the concerns and am-
bitions of sub-national actors into concrete policy action. The first example is ta-
ken from the area of climate change, specifically the CoR’s role in the ‘Covenant
of Mayors’, and the second concerns the RegHubs initiative. In this context the
Committee, representing all levels of sub-national governance, needs to constant-
ly balance a wide variety of interests and perspectives, and overcome its internal
geographical, structural, political and cultural cleavages. In seeking to achieve this,
the position of the CoR as a player with a consultative role in the EU’s institutio-
nal system enables it to experiment with new forms of cooperation, thereby also
promoting direct contacts between its members and their territorial units, and fos-
tering an understanding of shared interests and endeavours. In this regard, it is
argued, practical multi-level governance beyond the structures formally foreseen
by the Treaties helps to find common solutions and make the European project
more resilient to internal and external crises.
The European Committee of the Regions as Institutionalised Multi-Level
Governance
When the Committee of the Regions was created during the inter-governmental
conference that led eventually to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, the concept of
multi-level governance had not yet been ‘codified’ in the academic literature, let
alone in the political discourse – in fact, when coining the term, Gary Marks and
Lisbet Hooghe referred to ‘the Maastricht debates’ (Marks 1993; Piattoni 2009) as
its origin. In trying to determine how a committee to represent sub-national le-
vels of governance should be structured in terms of membership, it became clear
early on that the CoR itself would have to contain more than just one level of go-
vernance – whether or not this took the form of two separate chambers (Wassen-
berg 2020;Warleigh 1999). Yet some thought the diversity of members’ institutional
roles, representing local, provincial or regional authorities at either legislative or
executive levels according to each EU member state’s preferences, would be a po-
tentially debilitating weakness rather than a strength (Christiansen 1996). Based
1 https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/Pages/network-of-regional-hubs.aspx (CoR 2019c)
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on the initially narrow set of policy areas for which the CoR was given the right of
‘mandatory consultation’, and the widely diverging degrees of competence in the-
se policy fields between different sub-national levels in different member states, it
was presumed that the CoR could only ever provide lowest-common denominator
suggestions that it would be all too easy for the other EU institutions to ignore
(Hönnige/Kaiser 2003). Moreover, in view of the duality of its organisation into
national delegations and political groups (Pazos-Vidal 2019), the CoR’s weak insti-
tutional basis as an offshoot of the European Economic and Social Committee, and
the EU’s absorption with larger issues, notably enlargement and subsequent treaty
changes, it seemed unlikely that the Committee would be able to exert significant
influence.
With the benefit of hindsight, however, the CoR’s institutional development ap-
pears quite different: In fact, each change to the EU Treaties (the 1996 Amsterdam
reforms,Nice 2000 and,most importantly, the Convention on the Future of Europe
that eventually led to the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009) has brought a gradual growth
in the CoR’s areas of competence and institutional standing. In particular, the re-
cognition of the CoR’s right to defend its own prerogatives before the European
Court of Justice and its role in defending the principle of subsidiarity not just po-
litically, but also legally (see below) following the Lisbon Treaty, mark significant
steps (Schönlau 2017). Moreover, the Committee has managed to increase its insti-
tutional capacity significantly over that period in terms of internal organisation,
administrative structures, staff and budget (Piattoni/Schönlau 2015).While certain
goals formulated by the CoR early on in this regard (such as the formal recogni-
tion as an ‘EU institution’, for example) have not yet been achieved, some recent
observers do agree that the body’s ability to aggregate the views and experiences
of sub-national levels, and to feed them into the EU policy process through both
formal and less formal means, has seen noticeable improvements (Decoster et al.
2019; Pazos-Vidal 2019).
These advances in the CoR’s capacity and standing have been achieved, not
least, because of the ‘institutional activism’ of the Committee’s members and ad-
ministration (Schönlau 2017), and are a result, in several instances of the develop-
ment and testing of new forms of activity aimed at increasing the CoR’s expertise
and credibility on specific subject matters. Combining this with the conscious con-
struction of political connections, the CoR’s networking opportunities in the EU’s
institutional system and the CoR members’ claim to legitimacy as democratically
elected representatives of sub-national governments, it has gradually been possible
to increase the visibility of the CoR and its recognition by the other EU instituti-
ons. While it remains a challenge for the CoR to adequately respond to the dual
and sometimes conflicting expectations of providing both technical information
(for instance on the impact of EU legislation on the ground) and a distinct form of
additional democratic legitimacy (Christiansen/Lintner 2005; Piattoni/Schönlau),
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a balanced combination of the two seems to be increasingly appreciated by the
European Commission and the European Parliament.
These trends have indeed been increasingly visible in recent years, as a result
of the multiple crises and political challenges that the EU is facing. Given the com-
plexities of regulatory and policy-making tasks in various areas, where political
contestation, diverging national interests and limited problem-solving capacities
at several levels require ever more sophisticated coordination and interaction, the
other EU institutions are increasingly aware of the need to involve sub-national
authorities with their distinct experiences, capabilities and legitimacy, and the CoR
is seen as one of the useful conduits for that. This is why we are now turning to
two separate and quite distinct examples of CoR activism, which each in their turn
show how concerted and institutionally aggregated input from the diversity of sub-
national structures in the EU member states can be used to reinforce multi-level
governance in the service of European integration.
The CoR and Multi-Level Climate Action2
The range of activities aimed at addressing climate change is a good example of
how the CoR has tried to put the rather abstract concept of multi-level governance
into practice in a specific policy area. This applies in particular to its role in sup-
porting and promoting the Covenant of Mayors. The idea that sub-national actors
and networks play a crucial role in developing and implementing action to mitiga-
te climate change was on the agenda long before the Lisbon Treaty added climate
change to the areas of ‘mandatory consultation’ for the CoR (Betsill/Bulkeley 2007).
Since its first opinions on the Kyoto protocol (CoR 1997), the Committee has mo-
ved from general assertions of the role that local and regional authorities should
play in climate policy, to more concrete demands and proposals on being directly
involved in policy shaping and implementation. Already in the 1997 opinion, the
CoR called for support for the coordination of local and regional climate initiatives
at EU level and coordinated surveys of local energy consumption and greenhouse
gas emissions as a basis for setting local targets (CoR 1997: 4.8).
Initially, however, it seems to have been difficult to get the European Commis-
sion to follow these suggestions: in its 2001–02 opinion on the proposed Council
Decision on EU ratification of the Kyoto-Protocol, the CoR complained that its ‘pro-
posals for initiating a dialogue with local and regional authorities […] have largely
been ignored by the Commission’ (CoR 2001: 2.1), and in the following years the
2 The following section builds in large parts on Schönlau, J. (2017). ‘Beyondmere “consultation”:
Expanding the European Committee of the Regions’ role’, Journal of Contemporary European
Research 13/2, pp. 1166-1184, in particular pp. 1177-79.
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enthusiasm for concrete steps to involve cities and regions directly in EU clima-
te governance via the CoR seems to have diminished, even within the CoR itself.
Interestingly, the impetus for the next steps in this direction came from the Eu-
ropean Commission, rather than the CoR: in the EC’s 2006 Action Plan on Energy
Efficiency, the idea of a Covenant of Mayors was launched, to bring ‘together in
a permanent network the mayors of 20-30 of Europe’s largest and most pionee-
ring cities’. (European Commission 2006 545: 18). Di Martino notes in this context
that the Committee of the Regions was subsequently even ‘invited by DG-TREN to
implement the Covenant, running its central office and through it the Covenant
relations with regions and cities’, but declined this invitation (Di Martino 2012: 3).
The European Commission’s idea of involving just ‘20-30 mayors of Europe’s
largest and most pioneering cities’ did, of course, create certain problems for the
Committee of the Regions, which represents not only large cities, but also smaller
ones, as well as regions and intermediate authorities of various sizes and compe-
tencies. Moreover, there were probably also some general reservations in the CoR
regarding the available administrative, financial and human resources within its
own structures, which may explain why the CoR did not accept the Commission’s
offer to run the Covenant. The Covenant of Mayors thus was launched in 2008 of-
ficially in partnership between the Commission and the CoR, but administered,
under a contract granted by the European Commission, by a consortium of EU-
level NGOs.3
Soon after the Covenant was established, the CoR, in this position of not being
directly involved, but rather supporting the Covenant in institutional terms, adop-
ted an opinion entitled ‘How Regions Contribute to Achieving European Climate
Change and Energy Goals, with a Special Focus on the Covenant of Mayors’. In it,
the CoR expresses its political support, but also raises some of its key concerns: spe-
cifically, it insists on the need ‘to make explicit the opportunity for all sub-national
authorities, including regions, to be members’ (CoR 2008: cover page; emphasis
added) and calls for local action plans to be embedded in ‘regional and national
plans’ (ibid), thus highlighting the challenge of ensuring coordination and syner-
gies across the multiple levels of governance that need to be involved.
Since the launch of the Covenant in the run-up to the Copenhagen COP15
UN Conference of Parties in 2009, the Committee of the Regions has consistently
sought close contact with, and provided political support for, the Covenant. Yet it
has also tried in parallel to assert its institutional role by demanding a stronger role
for cities and regions in all aspects of EU climate policy (including adaptation to cli-
mate change, as well as source-basedmeasures in areas such as energy, agriculture
3 The “Covenant Office” is run jointly by Energy Cities, CEMR, Climate Alliance, EUROCITIES,
FEDARENE and ICLEI Europe (Covenant of Mayors 2019a).
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and biodiversity), and by sending CoR delegations to every year’s COP negotiati-
ons (CoR brochure 2009b). The CoR has also adopted resolutions every year, which
form the basis for the political activities of the CoR-COP delegations. At the same
time, it has enhanced its institutional cooperation with the European Commissi-
on, the EP and other EU institutions and network partners. The Committee is also
active in trying to promote the very idea of Covenant-like structures, not just in
opinions dealing directly with climate change and energy policy, but also in other
policy areas, such as resource efficiency, noise and water management (CoR 2015a;
CoR 2012; CoR 2011).
The COP 21 agreement made at Paris in 2015 and the ensuing debate about the
implementation of the Paris commitments within the EU has triggered a new pha-
se of activity around the Covenant. In its opinion on the future of the Covenant
(CoR 2015a), the CoR not only committed to become more active in spreading the
idea of the Covenant beyond the EU’s borders, but also to create a network of CoR
‘ambassadors’ for the Covenant (CoR 2015a: points 14, 19). By means of this struc-
ture, which was formally launched by the Committee of the Regions together with
EU Commissioner on Energy, Miguel Arias Cañete, in June 2016, CoR members
representing territorial units that have signed up to the Covenant have agreed to
explain and promote the initiative to their peers at local and regional level, aided
by information material provided by the Committee of the Regions.4
In preparing the launch of the Covenant Ambassadors, the CoR had also carried
out a consultation of its own networks of local and regional authorities to identify
their needs and expectations of a future Covenant. It also commissioned a substan-
tial study on technical issues of ‘Multi-level governance and partnership practices
in development and implementation of Sustainable Energy Action Plans (SEAPs)’,
which are the central element of Covenant signatories’ commitments.5 In parallel,
the Committee of the Regions has also pushed, through its own opinions and a se-
ries of events and activities, to have the central issue of energy poverty recognised
at European level and included formally in the Covenant of Mayors. This, in fact,
did happen in 2016, acknowledging the crucial impact that climate actionmay have
at all levels of society.6
In the more general context of promoting genuine multi-level governance in
climate policy in the European Union, not exclusively linked with the Covenant of
Mayors, but closely related, the Committee of the Regions has argued since 2017
4 84http://cor.europa.eu/en/news/Pages/Local-and-regional-leaders-become-new-EU-climate-
action-ambassadors.aspx (CoR 2019d; accessed July 2, 2019)
5 The CoR report is available at http://cor.europa.eu/en/events/Documents/SEAP.pdf (accessed
2 July 2016)
6 See the Covenant website at https://www.covenantofmayors.eu/support/energy-poverty.
html (Covenant of Mayors 2019b)
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for the idea of a system of ‘locally determined contributions’ (LDCs) to comple-
ment, and to be recognised as part of, the ‘nationally determined contributions’ to
CO2 reduction which form one of the central pillars of the Paris Agreement (CoR
2017). This call, which has also been taken to the various COPs, was most recently
reiterated in the context of the debate about the EUmember states’ Integrated Na-
tional Energy and Climate Plans (INECPs), which constitute the building blocks of
the EU’s collective contribution under the Paris Agreement rulebook. Once again,
the CoR is demanding consistent and early involvement of local and regional aut-
horities in the elaboration of these plans, as well as recognition of their roles in
delivering them and targeted support for a range of sub-national actors in order
to build consistent multi-level governance (CoR 2019a).
In view of the ongoing review of the Covenant of Mayors, which has been car-
ried out ahead of its first target deadline in 2020, and as a means of adapting the
Covenant to the rapid evolution of EU and global climate policies, the CoR was al-
so compiling new suggestions for the further development of the Covenant (CoR
2019b). Considering the remarkable success of the Covenant in terms of signatories
(more than 9500 by 2019), but also some concerns about its geographical balance
(the spread of Covenant signatories is rather uneven, ranging from just 74 in Po-
land, to more than 4800 in Italy),7 and the ability and willingness of all signatories
to sign up to more demanding targets for 2030, the Committee insists on the need
for more coordinated action from the European Union to support the signatories,
and particularly smaller communities. The CoR has also successfully lobbied to in-
volve regions in the Covenant structures, giving them special tasks to coordinate
the participation of ‘their’ cities, towns and villages, thus bringing to bear the Com-
mittee’s own representation of multiple and diverse layers of governance.
This example of the CoR’s activity in the area of climate change serves to illus-
trate how the institution managed to exploit ‘opportunity structures’ (in the shape
of the European Commission’s recognition of the role of local and regional aut-
horities in developing and implementing climate policy) and to progressively gain
attention and build credibility as a partner (Princen 2011).This made it possible for
the CoR to enhance its own political and institutional role as part of the EU’s policy-
making structures, while also promoting the very concept of practical multi-level
governance.The issue of climate change as an emerging and rapidly developing po-
licy area for the European Union provides particularly fertile ground to experiment
with new solutions, and for a relatively new player such as the CoR to bring both
the local expertise of its members and their political capital into an institutional
framework of multi-level governance, thereby also expanding its own role.
7 Figures taken from the Covenant’s ownwebsite https://www.covenantofmayors.eu/about/co-
venant-community/signatories.html (Covenant of Mayors 2019c)
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The RegHubs and Implementing ‘Active Subsidiarity’
The CoR’s pilot project of a ‘network of regional hubs for EU policy implementation
review (RegHubs)’ is a second area of activity where the CoR’s role as an important
link between the multitude of sub-national entities in the EU and the EU insti-
tutions is visible.8 The project was launched in 2018 as a follow-up to the CoR’s
participation, with three members, in the European Commission’s task force on
subsidiarity and proportionality, and aims to promote the new notion of ‘active
subsidiarity’ developed by the Task Force (Lambertz 2018). In fact, the Committee
of the Regions has seen itself as an important institutional player in the attempts
to fill the EU’s contested notion of subsidiarity with life from its beginnings in
1993 (contemporary with the inclusion of ‘subsidiarity’ in the EU Treaties) (Piat-
toni/Schönlau 2015: 91-98). Moreover, for the CoR, subsidiarity has always been
closely linked to the concept of multi-level governance; from the CoR’s perspective,
both include all levels from the local to the EU, not just the division of competencies
between the EU and the member states (Piattoni/Schönlau 2015: 49-54).
The particular institutional role of the Committee in this respect was, of course,
formally recognised with the addition of the explicit reference to local and regional
authorities in Art 5 (3) of the TEU and the addition of ‘Protocol No2’ on subsidia-
rity to the Lisbon Treaty. These grant the CoR the right to take action before the
European Court of Justice in cases of presumed breaches of subsidiarity (interes-
tingly not on proportionality!). In an attempt to operationalise this role, and to
feed into the subsidiarity-compliance assessment through CoR opinions, in 2007,
the Committee created a network of regions, intermediary and local authorities (at
legislative or executive level), national parliaments, regional associations and other
partners who voluntarily participate in subsidiarity assessments based on a ‘grid’ of
questions developed by the CoR administration (Piattoni/Schönlau 2015; Lambertz
2018). These consultations should, in parallel to the Early Warning Mechanism for
National Parliaments, provide the basis for delivering political messages on sub-
sidiarity compliance, and, in extremis, for legal action by the CoR. Yet, similarly
to the national parliaments’ role, the CoR has only very rarely formulated concrete
subsidiarity concerns supported by a majority in its plenary, and only in two con-
crete cases has even ‘threatened’, but never taken, legal action (Pazos-Vidal 2019).
This situation, and the debate about whether it proves that the subsidiarity
principle is, by-and-large, respected by the EU’s legislative action, or rather that
the subsidiarity control systems are ineffective, formed the backdrop to EU Com-
mission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s 2017 initiative to launch a Task Force (TF)
on subsidiarity and proportionality under the leadership of Commission 1st Vice
President Frans Timmermans.The TF was to be composed of three representatives
8 https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/Pages/network-of-regional-hubs.aspx (CoR 2019c)
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each of the European Parliament, the national parliaments and, significantly, the
Committee of the Regions (Juncker 2017). While the European Parliament decided
eventually not to participate in the exercise, the Committee of the Regions, in the
persons of its president, Karl-Heinz Lambertz, the chairman of its own subsidia-
rity steering group, Michael Schneider, and the 1st vice-president of its Commissi-
on responsible for governance issues, Francois Decoster, took up the opportunity
enthusiastically (Lambertz 2018). The Task Force elaborated a series of recommen-
dations and proposals during its six-month term, which were published in July
2018 (European Commission 2018a) and further discussed in a European Commis-
sion Communication on subsidiarity and proportionality (European Commission
2018b) and in the Commission’s 2019 report on better law making (European Com-
mission 2019). Both in the assessments of those directly involved in the task force
(Lambertz 2018, Schneider 2019), and upon analysis of the CoR’s contributions to
the debates of the task force, it appears that the Committee’s representatives did
have a substantial impact on the overall results. In fact, numerous recommenda-
tions of the TF are addressed directly to the CoR (eight out of 36 proposed ‘follow-
up actions’), or to local and regional authorities (15 out of 36) (Lambertz 2018: 83).9
Among these recommendations, No 8 is particularly relevant for our investiga-
tion. It calls on the European Commission to ‘develop a mechanism to identify and
evaluate legislation from the perspective of subsidiarity, proportionality, simplifi-
cation, legislative density and the role of local and regional authorities’ (European
Commission 2018a: 20). The proposed follow-up actions contained within this re-
commendation include the suggestion that the ‘Committee of the Regions should
launch a pilot project for a new network of regional hubs to collect and channel
systematically the views and hard information about the implementation of legis-
lation’ (ibid).This proposal, put forward by the CoR members themselves in the TF,
now forms the basis for the pilot project set up in late 2018 (CoR Bureau Decision
of 08.10.2018). Under this project, the Committee has called primarily for regional
authorities to put themselves forward with a commitment to cooperate in the net-
work. According to a method similar to that used in the subsidiarity monitoring
network, the CoR has develop detailed questionnaires on issues arising from the
implementation of existing EU legislation. The network partners each identify a
‘contact point’, who is responsible for linking with a variety of stakeholders in each
region (not only the relevant parts of the administration, but also associations, re-
search institutions and civil society organisations involved in, or affected by the
legislation in question) and compiling the answers (RegHub Code of Conduct).10
9 The Task Force report contains five broad ‘conclusions’, nine ‘recommendations’ and no less
than 36 ‘follow-up actions’ to be taken by various institutions.
10 Available at https://cor.europa.eu/en/events/Documents/ECON/reghub.pilotphase.codeof-
conduct.final.pdf (CoR 2019e)
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The pilot project (for the years 2019-20) foresees the development of a working
programme by the CoR under the guidance of its political ‘subsidiarity steering
group’ in which all five political groups in the CoR are represented, in dialogue
with the network partners. At least three consultations are foreseen per year. The
responses to the selected topics (at the time of writing, a first consultation on pu-
blic procurement has been concluded and a second one on cross-border healthcare
is under way) are to be discussed among the network-representatives in workshops
organised (and funded) by the Committee of the Regions, and then compiled into a
technical implementation report to be transmitted to the European Commission.11
The CoR clearly hopes that, if the pilot phase is evaluated positively and the re-
sults and input from sub-national governments are considered useful, the RegHub
network could eventually be expanded to cover all EU member states and a much
larger number of regions. For the pilot project, the CoR received 53 applications
involving 88 regions, and selected 36 participants covering 18 member states. Such
an extension would, however, require direct administrative and financial support
from the European Commission, both for the processing of the input at EU level,
and to assist smaller and administratively weaker sub-national units in participa-
ting.
While it is still early to judge on the final outcome of the consultation processes
and the evaluation of the usefulness and feasibility of the pilot project both in terms
of time and of geographical and thematic reach, the example of the RegHubs shows
how the idea of involving local and regional authorities through the CoR more di-
rectly in EU policy making is taking hold. Following on from the intense debates in
the TF on subsidiarity and proportionality, where the CoR was responsible for a key
part of the operational input and ideas,12 and where it was somewhat dispropor-
tionally represented with three out of six task force members due to the European
Parliament’s decision not to join, this pilot project seeks to demonstrate the added
value of multi-level governance in action. By focusing on the retrospective evalua-
tion of difficulties faced by a range of sub-national players in implementing EU
legislation, the CoR aims to tap into the first-hand experience of the network part-
ners. It is also actively promoting the creation of sub-networks involving a number
of institutional and non-institutional actors, in the interest of improving the effec-
tiveness and thus also the legitimacy of European policy making.
11 See the section of the RegHubWebsite titled ‘Howdoes itWork?’ At https://cor.europa.eu/en/
our-work/Pages/network-of-regional-hubs.aspx (CoR 2019c)
12 See the CoR’s own website on its contributions to the Task Force, at https://portal.cor.euro-
pa.eu/subsidiarity/TaskForce/Pages/welcome.aspx (CoR 2019f)
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Conclusion: Multi-Level Governance to Meet the Challenges of Diversity
and Complexity
The European Committee of the Regions reflects in its composition and the mul-
titude of views, experiences and propositions of its 350 members (and 350 alter-
nate members)13 the diversity of sub-national governance in the European Union.
While being conceived, and often expected, to deliver ‘the view’ of the EU’s cities
and regions, it has to try to aggregate and balance these differences through de-
mocratic processes and transform diversity into constructive and concrete policy
action to promote effective multi-level governance, and through it the legitimacy of
the European integration process. Being formally limited to an advisory function,
the CoR has sought over the years to expand its impact on EU policy making in
various ways.This chapter has presented two examples of this, both of which build
on the same resources (i.e. the experiences and the political legitimacy) belonging
to a range of sub-national structures of governance, which the CoR seeks to bring
to bear on different parts of the EU’s functioning.
The current debates on the EU’s emerging and rapidly evolving climate poli-
cy require innovative tools to involve villages, cities, provinces and regions in the
extremely complex processes of transition that are necessary. Through its involve-
ment in, and support for, a structure like the Covenant of Mayors, the CoR, in close
cooperation with the European Commission and key stakeholders at EU level, tries
to push for appropriate mechanisms of multi-level governance to be built, invol-
ving not just the European, but also the national and global levels. The potential of
cities and regions across the EU to experiment with new solutions on climate chan-
ge and the still constantly changing policy frameworks allow the CoR to build on
its own role and experience as a network facilitator and communication channel.
At the same time, the ongoing discussions on the EU’s legitimacy and in parti-
cular its respect for the principle of subsidiarity have directed the CoR’s attention
towards a different aspect: the question how to open the ‘black box of EU law in
action’ (Versluis 2007). By offering to set up a network of institutions and organi-
sations affected by EU legislation in order to gather first-hand information on its
implementation at the lowest levels, the CoR underlines the need for effective com-
munication and information links vertically across all levels.While this activity is so
far just a pilot project, it seems to hold significant potential to build new structures,
which could significantly reinforce traditional notions of multi-level governance.
Based on these two examples, the Committee of the Regions indeed appears
to be a significant agent in efforts to institutionalise multi-level governance while
reaping the benefits of regional diversity, and thus to support the good functioning
and ultimately the legitimacy of the European integration project.
13 After the Brexit the CoR has now 329 members and 329 alternates.
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Identity and Placism in Europe
Claire Wallace
Introduction
For some decades, increasing European integration has occurred alongside enlar-
gement inspired by a ‘European Dream’ of spreading peace, tolerance and human
rights through developing a common set of values, currency, mobility and a social
model. This dream was to a great extent shattered by first the financial crisis and
then an immigration crisis.The re-emergence of nationalism as a threat to the Eu-
ropean Dream means that an alternative vision of Europe has emerged. However,
in addition to national identification, regional identification at a sub-national le-
vel appears to have grown. This contribution is going to discuss the examples of
Russians in Latvia and Scottish regions to exemplify these trends. However, these
identities have not necessarily displaced either national or European attachment,
as analysis of the Eurobarometer illustrates. Rather, we could point to an increa-
sing sense of the importance of place in people’s sense of belonging, which seems
to encompass all geographical scales.
The increasing recognition of localism in regional governance and in academic
writing is also reflected in people’s sense of identity in European countries (Rou-
dometof 2019). Meaningful identities are constructed around local communities,
giving rise to a sense of localism, which we might also describe as ‘placism’. This
sense of local place-making is encouraged by EU policies and funding such as LEA-
DER and also by national governments, such as in the UK, that are keen for civil
society to compensate for cuts in state spending. For example, if local communities
organise their own ‘litter picking’ exercises, it makes it less obvious that the state
has cut back on street cleaners. How does this fit with more general long-term ten-
dencies? For decades, the supra-national governance of the European Union as a
centrifugal force was seen as a way of eroding the nation state. The rise of various
regionalisms could be said to be doing the same thing as a countervailing centri-
petal force. However, more recently, the rise of nationalism in Europe seems to
contradict these tendencies with an increasingly recidivist emphasis on the nation
state.
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This chapter will examine these pressures with respect to two particular examp-
les: Scotland within the UK and Russian minorities in Latvia. It will then consider
more generally the role of place identity in Europe.
The European Dream: The Rise of Post-National Europe
I have been teaching European Studies for two decades. A key question we peren-
nially address is whether European governance might be replacing national go-
vernance and what implications this has for identities. One implication is that a
new form of supra-national governance is emerging and, along with it, a new kind
of post-national cosmopolitan identity. This formed part of the intellectual Zeit-
geist of the late 1990s and early 2000s, as many social scientists rode the waves
of Europhile optimism. Major social theorists devoted a lot of printed pages to
analysing what this might mean both theoretically and empirically (Giddens 2007;
Eder/Spohn 2005; Beck 2006). Gerard Delanty, for example, suggested that Eu-
ropean identity could only be founded upon a sense of cosmopolitanism (Delanty
2000; 2009; 1995). And this cosmopolitanism was post-national.
More generally, Jurgen Habermas argued that ‘constitutional patriotism’ was a
viable alternative to the dangerous nationalisms that had brought so much ruin to
Europe (Habermas 2002). European integration helped to further this rational pro-
ject of international co-operation based upon Enlightenment ideals. Many people
found it convincing. For example, Jeremy Rifkin in his book ‘The European Dream’
argued that it was ‘the most humane approach to capitalism ever invented’, embo-
dying a vision of peace, harmony and social solidarity (Rifkin 2004). One element of
this dream was the redistribution of resources across different regions – from rich
ones to poor ones – with the idea of raising the level of development for all. Ano-
ther element was the emphasis on cross-border regionalism to help cement links
between countries at a sub-national level as part of a project to create a ‘Europe
of the Regions’. An essential element for the consent to this European solidarity
was the idea of European identity, something which was often promoted at a Eu-
ropean level. For citizens to share the European Dream, they needed to identify
with Europe and the EU project.
However, European identity proved elusive. It was only ever espoused by a mi-
nority of people and the idea of cosmopolitanism was a vague ideal pursued by
social theorists rather than something embedded in popular consciousness. Neil
Fligstein’s analysis of the Eurobarometer suggested that in 2004 only 3.9 percent
of people identified as European, and this has remained rather consistent ever
since the Eurobarometer was introduced in 1973 (Fligstein 2008). Inclusion of the
so-called ‘Moreno question’ in the Eurobarometer helped to boost this figure by
allowing people to choose European alongside national identity. This meant that
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people choosing ‘mostly European’ (European + own nationality) could be counted
as 12.7 percent and ‘sometimes European’ (own nationality + European) was as high
as 56 percent in answer to the question ‘In the near future will you think of yourself
as…?’. However, 87.3 percent saw themselves as having mostly a national identity
(Fligstein 2008: 141).
Nevertheless, there are important national variations.The UK had a consistent-
ly low score for ‘European’ and a correspondingly high score for national identity,
while Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and Luxembourg (seen as the core European
countries) had lower national identity scores and higher European ones – although
this was still a minority perspective. Being at the heart of Europe helped to make
people more European, and these countries were among the founders of what la-
ter became the European Union.The UK had always been an outlier in this respect
with a strong tradition of Euroscepticism.
The most pro-European parts of the population in all countries were young
people, the highly educated, the highly mobile and those that spoke more than one
European language (Fligstein 2008). Adrian Favell in his book ‘Eurostars’ suggested
that EU mobility, multilingualism and the opening of professional opportunities
were creating an elite strata of young cosmopolitan professionals who also married
one another, hence cementing this ‘post national’ social layer basedmainly inmajor
cities such as Brussels, London and Paris (Favell 2008). In the natural course of
generational replacement, it was believed that European would displace national
identities – or at least rival them.
There was a growing realisation that many areas of national life involved cross-
border liaisons requiring international mobilisation and regulation. As well as se-
curity issues (terrorism, organised crime), this included environmental issues such
as pollution, global warming and food security. Migration issues also required co-
operation across different countries, taking into account refugee flows, trafficking
and uneven settlement. There was a realisation that the regulation of the global
forces of capitalism needed to be addressed supra-nationally to avoid countries
competing with each other in a race to the bottom. By introducing the regulation
of working hours, maternity leave and childcare across the European Union, work
standards could be maintained at a higher level than in much of the world, kee-
ping the European Union countries as bastions of ‘quality work’, as explicated in
the publications of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions.
This Enlightenment optimism reached its zenith in the Lisbon Treaty of 2000
when, at the start of a new millennium, the EU aimed to become ‘the most compe-
titive knowledge economy in the world’ and further European integration appeared
to be inevitable. Concern with the quality of work infused welfare models and the
idea of the ‘European Social Model’ was born as a universal safety net to cover
European populations. Those countries that had lacked a comprehensive welfare
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state (such as Greece) started to introduce one, although there were variations in
how this was done (Taylor-Gooby, Leruth et al. 2017). The EU set out its European
Pillar for Social Rights as a framework for subsequent legislation in 2017, focusing
mainly onworking conditions and equal opportunities for women and childcare for
the moment but also including more vaguely defined access to old age pensions,
health care, decent housing, social protection, childcare support and a minimum
income as a set of rights. The Lisbon Treaty itself has been modified to improve
and streamline the European institutions.
One form of post-national integration was through the ‘Cohesion funds’, which
aimed to redistribute funds towards more deprived regions and was one of the
largest elements of EU funding. It took money from richer countries to support
poorer ones on a regional basis according to a model of social cohesion introduced
by Jacques Delors in the early 1990s.
Finally, an important aspect of European integration for some countries was
the introduction of the Euro in 2001, which introduced a common currency along-
side fiscal and other controls.These weremonitored by the European Central Bank,
which aimed to maintain the stability of the Euro across all the widely divergent
economies of Europe. Despite the threats to the Euro over the years, the curren-
cy has remained strong. Euro coins represent the principle of ‘Unity in Diversity’
by being both internationally homogeneous and nationally various in terms of the
pictures and logos found on them. Economic integration was balanced by cultu-
ral integration through introduction of a rousing European anthem, flag, cultu-
ral heritage data base,1 an increasingly comprehensive central statistical agency
(Eurostat) and educational exchange programmes such as ERASMUS, which soon
become widely established.
These integrationist tendencies were especially reassuring for small member
states, many of them in Eastern Europe. Their guarantee of security was to be-
come part of a supra-national defence force (NATO) and the EU also took care of
many onerous and expensive aspects of national sovereignty, such as embassies
and delegations, trade negotiations, transport and cross-border relations, as well
as relations with external powers.
The increasingly complicated accession process forced states hoping to become
members to recognise the rights of national minorities within their borders. This
was enshrined in the mantra of peace, tolerance and human rights which formed
the guiding principles of both the EU and the Council of Europe – a larger and
even more idealistic collaboration of European states that also included Russia.
Enlargement had beenwelcomed as a way of spreading the European social and
economicmodel to Eastern European countries, forming a bulwark against the still
threatening East (especially a newly resurgent Russia) and guaranteeing adherence
1 https://www.europeana.eu, 1 September 2019.
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to democracy and a liberal market economy.This was seen as a contrast to the aut-
horitarian and dysfunctional neighbouring countries such as Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova, who seemed to be moving in a different direction. The aim was to make
everybody in Europemore prosperous, as this also offeredmarket opportunities for
Germany, the UK and other exporting countries that would help to boost their eco-
nomies. By taking on a raft of much poorer countries (and often vary small ones),
the aim was to raise the level of all of them up to more ‘European’ standards. The
‘cohesion funds’ that redistributed wealth within the European Union were often
spent first of all on infrastructure projects such as road building, but also onmoder-
nising state and welfare services.The trend continued with the accession of Roma-
nia and Bulgaria in 2007 and then Croatia in 2015.Many other countries are still on
the pre-accession waiting list, including Turkey, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Macedonia, so there is still a great appetite to join the EU. Furthermore, the poli-
cies and principles of the EU could be spread through normative encouragement
and ‘moral example’ to a widening circle of countries such as those of North Africa
and Eastern Europe via the European Neighbourhood Policies and the ‘soft power’
of science and cultural diplomacy (Whitman 2011).
Altogether then, the ‘European Dream’ of post-national integration seemed to
be reflected in an inevitable process of consolidation around a work-based soci-
al market economy that drew elements from German, French and Scandinavian
welfare states. With this extensive infrastructure in place, what remained was for
European citizens to see themselves as European. But this did not seem to hap-
pen quite so easily. This dream was also reflected in real improvements in living
standards and life satisfaction across European countries, with the poorer and ne-
wer states starting to converge with the rest (Mascherini 2018), widening the gulf
between them and neighbouring countries that did not join the EU.
Return of the Native: The Nationalist Backlash
TheEuropeanDream started to fracture after 2008,when the various cracks started
to become canyons. The economic crisis, originating in the US, had drastic reper-
cussions in Europe that led to the crisis of the Euro currency. Desperate attempts
to shore up the Euro took place through the European Central Bank, but the fis-
cal crisis particularly affected some of the smaller and weaker economies such as
Hungary, Greece and Ireland. The stronger economies who bailed them out were
keen to impose fiscal austerity, resulting in substantial cuts to welfare and rising
unemployment (Tsoukalis 2016).This threatened the dream of the ‘European Social
Model’ along with the idea that a broad and well cushioned safety net would be
spread universally across European countries. Now in some European countries,
this net was snatched away again (Taylor-Gooby, Leruth et al. 2017). Altogether, the
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European Dream of solidarity, cohesion and co-operation across European regions
was under threat, as tax payers in wealthier European countries such as Germany
and Britain resented paying for poorer ones.
Mobility of labour had been a key ambition of EU economic policy with the aim
of balancing labour supply and demand within its borders. In the early years of the
free movement of labour, there was disappointment in Brussels that more labour
mobility had not occurred. Yet after the ten new accession countries joined the EU
in 2004 and the UK, Sweden and Ireland opened their doors to them, there was
a large influx of workers from the Baltic States and Poland, especially to Ireland
and the UK. Other countries had restricted this mobility by means of a phased
programme of gradual opening. The influx of so many East European workers,
where there had been no previous migration system of traditions in place, took
many in the UK by surprise, and the Labour Party under Tony Blair, whose liberal
social policies had allowed this movement, later regretted it. The UK, also faced
with strong fiscal austerity after bailing out the banks with vast sums of money
known as ‘quantitative easing’, was not prepared for this influx.
Hardly had this crisis been mitigated when an immigration crisis hit the EU
in 2015. The ranks of migrants trying to penetrate fortress Europe were joined by
one million asylum seekers who turned up at the EU borders following the collap-
se of regimes in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq and Syria – where protracted civil war
and failed states replaced authoritarian regimes. The arrival of these migrants, so-
metimes on boats across the Mediterranean, sometimes through well established
trafficking routes through the Balkans, brought about the collapse of the already
weak European system for refugees and asylum seekers.
The various Dublin Regulations were designed to delegate authority for proces-
sing asylum seekers according to a common convention and distribute the refugees
around Europe on a principal of solidarity. However, the borderland countries of
the EU were soon overwhelmed with the numbers of extra-EU migrants and were
unable to process their applications, let alone support themwhile they waited.The-
se were also, coincidentally, the poorer countries of the EU and those most hurt by
the economic recession – countries such as Greece and Hungary. The asylum see-
kers themselves preferred to head for wealthier countries, so they were often in
practice just ushered through. Then Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany,
aware of the fact that asylum seekers were arriving in increasing numbers anyway,
opened the doors to this new wave of refugees in a gesture of ‘Wilkommenspolitik’.
The result was an influx of one million asylum seekers into Germany. Accommo-
dation prepared for them in other countries to spread the load remained empty.
Although the numbers subsequently declined (partly due to better management
of the external borders of the EU through agencies such as Frontex), it created a
political crisis for Angela Merkel and other mainstream politicians.
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These developments fuelled the popularity of anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim
parties. But this was also a turn against the liberal globalised capitalism that
the EU represented (albeit a ‘social’ version of it). Populist parties cried out for
protection of jobs and living conditions for native workers, welfare chauvinism
and increased protectionism.
Hence, history, rather than ending in a universal globalised liberalised market
economy, as had been predicted by Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama 1992), was re-
discovered. Nationalism based on nativist sentiments came boiling to the surface
everywhere, and nationalist parties were in the ascendancy in EU countries.
In Britain, this populist, anti-EU current of opinion helped the UK Indepen-
dence Party (UKIP) to enjoy a surge in popularity. With pressure from UKIP, the
Conservative Party tried to capture some of this popularity by offering a referen-
dum on leaving the EU. Against the expectations of David Cameron, the Tory lea-
dership and most experts, Britain voted to leave the EU on 23 June 2016. This mis-
calculation led to a seismic shift in British politics. The strident anti-EU rhetoric
that haunted the referendum burst into mainstream politics, with politicians on
all sides expressing extreme and uncompromising views in colourful language and
even making blatantly false claims.The protracted withdrawal negotiations proved
more difficult than many had expected, during which the divisions in the Conser-
vative Party were ripped open rather than healed.
The call to leave was led by capricious and charismatic politicians such as Boris
Johnson and Nigel Farage. There were demands to ‘take back control’ of national
sovereignty as a way of controlling immigration, fishing rights and trade. Taking
back control was seen as anti-EU but also borrowed anti-French and especially anti-
German rhetoric in popular media. Calls for a revival of the ‘Blitz spirit’ and the
use of swastikas in social media recalled victory in the Second World War (but of
course only the British part of it), building on comic stereotypes of continentals
popularised in comedies such as Monty Python, Dad’s Army and ‘Allo ‘Allo. One of
the characteristics of the social media revolution is its ability to blend apparently
contradictory images, memes and tropes in convenient sound bites to reinforce
popular prejudices. The idea was promulgated that Britons would be better off if
they didn’t have to send a share of their national budget to be redistributed in
Brussels (even though many British regions benefited from these funds, especially
in leave-voting areas).
The referendum exposed fundamental divisions in British society as well.While
young people, and especially students, had voted to remain in the EU, older people
and those from traditional working class areas voted to leave (Clarke et al. 2017;
Evans/Menon 2017). New divisions along generational and educational lines joined
the more traditional ones of social class. These new divisions suggest that with the
replacement of older cohorts with younger ones and the general spread of educa-
tion, these anti-EU sentiments might fade, and an EU identity might strengthen
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in the fullness of time (see our analysis in the next section). However, the peop-
le who espouse anti-EU sentiments were often the victims of globalisation, and
could recall an imaginary past when the Second World War was seen as a glorious
victory for England while Britannia ruled the waves through the British Empire
(Dorling/Tomlinson 2019). The view of the Second World War as a catastrophe for
European nations, especially Eastern Europe, which paid the highest price in terms
of loss of life, was not accepted north of the English Channel. Rather, vitriolic social
media flaming on these historical tropes stoked nationalist fires and an ascendant
English nationalism was reborn out of them.
Frank Furedi, writing mainly about Hungary, suggested that two different his-
torical narratives had emerged and were in conflict with one another (Furedi 2018).
On the one side was the EU narrative of an Enlightenment, rationalist administra-
tion built on of the smoking ruins of a Europe destroyed by nationalism in the
Second World War. The EU ‘founding fathers’ looked around them in 1945 and vo-
wed to never let this happen again. Instead of being built on conquest, the new
Europe was built out of treaties and negotiations, which were often slow-moving
and obscure. These took a long time to implement and sometimes failed to be ra-
tified, due to the problems of managing consensus among a large collection of
countries. This trend was followed by post-War politicians, with France and Ger-
many leading the way. For this EU narrative, history begins after the SecondWorld
War and continues through a series of deals and compromises often named after
the places in which they were negotiated (the Schengen Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty
and so on). It represents the march of progress through increasing co-operation,
legal frameworks, integration and enlargement. This version of history, however,
often fails to connect with people’s emotions and primary loyalties.
The second narrative of history is represented by the more nationalist move-
ments and refers back to an historical continuity with the past. This does connect
with a visceral emotional sense of identity rooted in a particular national narrative.
This reconnection with the past helps to provide a sense of anchoring and conti-
nuity, even when it celebrates selective national traditions. In Britain for example,
the more glorious parts of history, such as the Elizabethan and Victorian ages, are
taught in school and evoked in popular rhetoric. This is reinforced by a seemingly
bottomless appetite for films, box sets and mini-series celebrating the Royal Fami-
ly. Even more distant and mythical ideas of the past, such as that of King Arthur
and so on, are also presented as popular tropes. These have a much more power-
ful appeal, because, in the words of Furedi ‘On their own administratively created
rules and procedures [for example by the EU] lack the moral resources to motiva-
te and give meaning to human life, and the major questions about the meaning of
existence are left unresolved.’ (ibid.: 99). He points out that, for Eastern Europeans,
history is of special significance in their nationalist movements against the former
Communist regimes.
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So the revival of nationalism has had a particularly powerful resonance in con-
temporary Europe. It is often counterposed to EU post-nationalist centralisation.
But what about the regionalism encouraged at the other end of the ‘place-making’
spectrum. Where does it leave us?
It is clear by now that the creation of a Europe of the regions in the sense of
cross-national coalitions of sub-regions was largely a failed project. Despite spon-
sorship of various cross-border co-operation projects, these alliances have not ma-
de deep impressions compared with more primordial ethnic and national identifi-
cations. Cross-national ties between ethnic minorities and kin states may have the
potential to mobilise popular sentiments, but as we shall see, ethnic minorities are
more keen to build identities around their own ethnically and culturally defined
geographical areas. So in practice, place-making regionalism takes place mainly at
a sub-national level.
Here we will look more closely at two examples: Latvia and Scotland. Although
Latvia is strongly regionally and ethnically polarised, there are signs that this is
decreasing. On the other hand, recent events have pushed Scotland in the direction
of further regional differentiation from the other “nations” of the UK.
Latvia: Weakening of Regional Identities?
Historically, Central and Eastern Europe comprised a patchwork of ethnic groups.
After the First and SecondWorldWars,many of the borders were moved or crystal-
lised, leaving some ethnic minorities in the ‘wrong’ country. While the Communist
powers that dominated the region recognised some ethnic minorities in a formu-
laic way, they forcibly suppressed or assimilated others.The ending of Communism
saw a resurgence of nationalism in the 1990s, as both nation states and ethnic mi-
norities clamoured for recognition, leading to new conflicts, as in the former Yu-
goslavia, and new nation states, as in the breakup of Czechoslovakia.
Rogers Brubaker, in his seminal studies, characterised these tensions as ones
between ethnic minorities, host states (where ethnic minorities were situated) and
kin states, to which the ethnic minorities were related by language, ethnicity and
culture (Brubaker 1996). The host states and kin states with nationalising tenden-
cies tended to problematise the ethnic minorities. For the host state, they could
be seen as a ‘fifth column’ of unreliable citizens with loyalties elsewhere, whilst for
the kin state they could be seen as a wider group of citizens for aggrandising na-
tional political leaders. Some Hungarian leaders, for example, started to envisage
a ‘greater Hungary’ and gave some citizenship rights to the Hungarian diaspora.
Brubaker’s studies focused mainly on the Hungarian population within Romania.
However, his concepts can also be applied to the Baltic States. In Latvia, the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 also meant the end of Soviet occupation, as
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ethnic Latvians saw it, enabling them to win their sovereignty after many decades
of domination by foreign powers. However, this left many ethnic Russians still li-
ving within the borders of the new states, amounting to around one quarter of the
population in Latvia and around one third in Estonia. To these small states with a
large and threatening neighbour (now the Russian Federation), this was regarded
as a potentially de-stabilising situation.
The ethnic Russians in Latvia are in fact comprised of a variety of nationali-
ties sharing a common language and reflected in different waves of settlement.
Some have been there for centuries as dissident ‘Old Believers’ from the Orthodox
Church. Some arrived with the Soviet armies of occupation and then stayed on,
and their backgrounds reflected the ethnic diversity of the former Soviet Union,
including Ukrainians, Armenians, Georgians, Belarusians and so on. Others had
arrived to staff the factories built by the Soviet Union, which was also keen to co-
lonise the Baltic States with ethnic Russians. Still others had retired to the Baltic
States, whose gentle climate and sandy, pine-fringed beaches lapped by the Baltic
Sea were regarded as the Russian Riviera. For this reason, ‘New Russians’, rich with
post-communist booty, bought and renovated villas in spa resorts such as Jūrma-
la or enjoyed holidays and honeymoons there. For Russians, the port of Riga was
originally a Russian port. They did not see themselves as occupiers, but rather as
having liberated this region from German occupation after the Second World War.
These different readings of history and identity lead to tension when Latvia
and Estonia made their native languages the official ones and a condition of citi-
zenship. While some Russians left at this time, most felt that this was their Baltic
homeland, and many of the older population were unwilling or unable to learn a
new language. They remained in Russian-speaking enclaves with their own news
channels and media. However, gradual integration of ethnic minority populations
is being achieved through the introduction of Latvian and Estonian as languages
of education in schools, starting with primary schools. So children at least grow up
bilingual.
The Accession of the Latvia firstly to the Council of Europe in 1995 and then to
the European Union in 2004 forced the Latvian state to recognise national mino-
rities. Indeed, this was a condition of membership of the EU. This meant that, in
addition to the triadic tension between kin state, host state and ethnic minority,
there was now a supra-national actor setting the rules – the European Union (Gal-
breath 2006).The recognition of non-Latvian speakingminorities was a problem in
this respect, and a compromise was reached by according them the status of ‘non-
citizens’ who nevertheless held various rights and responsibilities as members of
the European Union. These non-citizens numbered 365,417 in 2019.
An unexpected effect of this enlargement was the spread of English as the lin-
gua franca in European countries and the opening of opportunities to work in the
UK and Ireland, two of the few countries to fully open their labour markets to new
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EU migrants in 2004. The result was that large numbers of Latvians went to work
abroad, especially in the UK, whose strong economy and higher wages (at the time)
were attractive to Latvians struggling in a transition economy. As a result of this
and of demographic changes, the population of Latvia has shrunk by one fifth since
it joined the EU, according to the EU information news website POLITICO.2 The
dominant languages were no longer only Latvian and Russian, but for young people
(who could mostly speak both these languages anyway), English offered a passport
to travel.
Research carried out into ethnic minorities on the European borderlands bet-
ween 2008 and 2011 as part of the European Framework Programme3 investigated
the situation of the Russian minority in Latvia. The research revealed generational
differences, with the mental geography of younger Latvians being focused on the
European Union rather than the Soviet Union, as was the case in earlier generati-
ons (Patsiurko & Wallace 2014). Joining the Euro currency in 2014 reinforced these
tendencies. However, even the older generation of Latvians did not see themselves
as wanting to join Russia. Rather, they sought recognition as Russian speakers wi-
thin Latvia. Respondents in our surveys and interviews expressed a fierce loyalty
to their Latvian region rather than to Russia, even when they felt alienated by the
nationalising host state.The concentration of traditional Russian-speakingminori-
ties around the Latvian region of Latgale was reinforced by the settlement patterns
around the factories where they were brought to work, or religious centres whe-
re Orthodox rather than the dominant Protestant churches could be found. This
reinforced the idea of Latvia as a multicultural state that also includes Poles, Be-
larusians and Germans, which was enshrined in the constitution, even if this was
not always enthusiastically embraced by a country that had recently established its
independence with an appeal to nationalist struggle.
The situation was helped by the fact that the Russian Federation did not ac-
tively promote the position of the Russian minority in the same way that Hungary
and Poland did for theirs. The new newly resurgent Russian Federation, however,
felt threatened by the growing westernisation of the Baltic States, especially when
they joined NATO in 2002. There is evidence of a strategy to bombard receptive
populations with cyber-attacks and fake news as a new kind of destabilising pro-
paganda, for which the Russian-language media was particularly appropriate. For
the Baltic nations, even the austerity that resulted from EU integration was an ac-
ceptable compromise for the guarantee of security vis-a-vis their big neighbour.
2 https://www.politico.eu/article/latvia-a-disappearing-nation-migration-population-decline/
(Sander 2018)
3 ENRI-East European National and Regional Identities on Europe’s Borderlands Project num-
ber 217227. April 2008-September 2011. (clairewallace.info 2019)
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Nevertheless, there was an uneasy reconciliation of Latvian and Russian populati-
ons.This is exemplified in the two different celebrations of the end of WorldWar II
that take place in Riga every year – one on March 16 to commemorate soldiers that
fought in the Latvian Legion and one on May 9, the traditional day for Russians
(Beitnere-La Galla 2016).
The EU has thus enabled the recognition of the Russian-speaking minorities
in Latvia who have strong regional identification. The reforms carried out since
independence, including schooling in Latvian, have helped to integrate at least the
younger generations of Latvians into the Latvian state. Differences in language,
religion and historical memory, however, mean that this is a partial integration,
but it is one that has remained peaceful.Themantra of tolerance, peace and human
rights has been implemented, albeit not without tension. However, the tensions
have not erupted into hostility.
The UK: Strengthening Regional Identities
On June 23, 2016, 51.9 percent of those voting in the UK-wide referendum opted to
leave the EuropeanUnion.This slightmajority resulted in an effervescence of natio-
nalist feeling. Analysis of voting patterns suggests that was older people, working
class people, people with lower levels of education and poorer people who helped to
tip the balance (Clarke et al. 2017). The vote was a response to unprecedented and
unexpected EU immigration, globalisation and alienation from elite technocratic
politics as represented by the EU (Evans & Menon 2017). This English nationalism
was encouraged by populist parties such as UKIP. It was seen as a ‘howl of protest’
from marginalised groups.
There were strong regional differences in voting patterns.Themajority of peop-
le in London, Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain in the European Uni-
on.The political differentiation between Scotland and England started to widen, as
the majority party in Scotland, the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), supported re-
main, and there are pressures for a second referendum on independence. By virtue
of this vote, the United Kingdom became less united than ever. The independence
referendum that had taken place in Scotland in 2014 had only been marginally re-
jected, and one of the arguments at the time was that an independent Scotland
could not be part of the EU unless it had petitioned to re-join. Other countries
faced with secessionist regions, such as Spain, were strongly opposed.
Ironically, the re-emergence of a specifically English nationalism was in part a
response to the rise of Scottish nationalism some decades earlier.However, Scottish
nationalism – at least in its present incarnation – attempts to be a civic and in-
clusive style of nationalism. It is championed by the SNP, which consistently holds
the majority in the devolved Scottish Parliament and sends a significant number
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of MPs to Westminster. One of the long-term aims of the SNP is independence.
Hence, Brexit paves the way for the break-up of the United Kingdom, with the new
Brexit deal granting Northern Ireland a special status that is more closely aligned
with the Republic of Ireland and the Scots feeling that their needs have been con-
sistently ignored.
This regionalisation of identities taking place within the UK disguises the fact
that there are also strong place loyalties within Scotland. Our research into digital
place-making took us to the Outer Hebrides, where a very strong sense of regional
identity is reinforced by the relative isolation of small crofting communities and
use of the Gaelic language. The strong sense of place was developed partly by the
active role of the local historical associations, known as comainn eachdraidh, which
form a central part of the community, with a large proportion of each community
being members. Several of the comainn eachdraidh took over the old school houses
in the centre of the village and converted them into museums, cafes, local shops
and meeting places for young and old. The flowering of this kind of civil society
encouraged a sense of place-making. The importance of a sense of history and
ownership is sometimes extended to community buy-out of the land surrounding
the hamlets, something that is enabled under Scottish law (Beel & Wallace 2018).
The historical associations were evidence of the construction of a very strong sense
of place identity.
This regionalisation of identities at a sub-national level is clear in the different
examples. But how generalisable is it?
Changing Place Attachments in Europe
In order to answer this question, we can turn to the Eurobarometer, and for this
purpose we shall analyse the ‘attachment’ question, since it has been repeated in
every EB and we have a good time series. Here we compare Latvia, the UK and the
EU average. Unfortunately, there are no separate figures for UK or Latvian regions
when comparing this time series, so instead we have looked at ‘attachment to town,
country village’ as the nearest proxy measure.
Figure 1 shows attachment to Europe. We can see that although attachment to
Europe fell after 2006, following the financial crisis and the subsequent rise of anti-
EU populist parties, there has been a steady increase in attachment since 2014. In
the UK, attachment to Europe has in fact risen since the referendum – before that,
people in the UK had little opinion about Europe. Indeed, attachment to Europe is
the highest that it has ever been in the UK – at the very time that Britain is about to
leave! This paradoxical finding needs to be seen in the context of the polarisation
of public opinion within the UK, with anti-EU feeling also being strong among
different subsets of population (Clarke et al. 2017).
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Figure 1: Attachment to Europe
Source: European Commission/European Parliament (2019)
Figure 2: Attachment to country
Source: European Commission/European Parliament (2019)
Figure 2 shows attachment to country among the populations of the EU, UK
and Latvia. It is undoubtedly the case that the attachment to one’s own country
is the strongest of these place attachments, with more than 90 percent expressing
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attachment to their country in 2018. However, while attachment to one’s country
is on the rise in Europe, it is down in the UK from just over 92 percent in 2016 at
the time of the referendum to nearer 90 percent in 2017 and 2018. In 2007, there
was an exceptionally low score for attachment to the UK. In Latvia there has also
been a rise in attachment to country since 2012, rising to its highest point in 2017
and 2018.
Figure 3 shows another option: attachment to village, town or city as a proxy
for regional identity. Here we see that this place identification has also been on
the rise since the mid-2000s. Whilst there is a rise in Europe generally, there is a
steady climb in the UK and a rather dramatic rise in regional attachment in Latvia.
Does this reflect the resurgence of regionalism or a rise in place attachment as a
source of identity more generally? It is difficult to verify either question from this
data.
Figure 3: Attachment to village/town/city
Source: European Commission/European Parliament (2019)
Conclusions: More Local, More National AND More European?
It could be that what we are seeing is a rise in ‘localism’ in tandem with globalisati-
on, reinforcing the phenomenon of ‘glocalisation’ as identified by Roland Robertson
(Robertson 2012). As people become more disembedded by globalisation, so local
attachment or regional and ethnic identities become more important for them.
However, this is not necessarily a primordial attachment. Savage and colleagues
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have identified the importance of ‘elective affinity’ among incomers in terms of
placement attachment to places of settlement rather than places of origin (Savage,
Bagnall et al. 2005; Wallace/Vincent 2017). It is not clear from this data if there are
ethnic, religious or cultural elements to this place attachment, but they may play
some part. Research on local social relations and social networks and how they in-
fluence place attachment in the context of globalisation needs to be undertaken.
There are calls for the idea of ‘place’ to be reintegrated into sociological studies, es-
pecially in understanding the role of newmedia and communications (Roudometof
2019).
There are a number of factors that might help to promote localised place at-
tachments. First of all, social media has a strong local component in the form of
Facebook groups and pages and buy, sell and swap-type sites. Hence, social me-
dia can help to reinforce a sense of place (Miller 2016). Secondly, while national
media have been in decline, local media have often taken on a hyperlocal dimensi-
on, including stories, news and posts with purely local significance alongside local
newsletters and events. Local social media have replaced village noticeboards for
passing on information and events (Wallace/Townsend 2019;Wallace/Vincent 2017).
This corresponds with recent analysis carried out by the World Values Survey,
which suggests that although vertical trust in political institutions has declined
throughout Europe, horizontal trust of those around you, including both known
and unknown people, people of the same nationality and other nationalities, and
people of other religions, has in fact increased (Wallace/Haerpfer 2019). In fact,
the world is becoming more rather than less tolerant despite the recent ‘cultural
backlash’ of authoritarian populism (Norris/Inglehart 2019).
We might conclude that this ever more local focus in the development of ‘pla-
cism’ represents the rise of increasingly narrow regionalisms. However, this takes
place within the general oversight of supra-national institutions such as the EU.
The EU offers some guarantee of security for small states and regions that have
been overrun by larger aggressive neighbours for many centuries.
The EU also provides a regulatory framework – for example for food, trade and
research – that small states and regions would find difficult to accomplish alone.
The larger structure of the EU is therefore the guarantor for the existence of smaller
states and regions.
EU governance also secures the protection of national minorities such as Rus-
sians in Latvia from oppression by nationalising host states.This might not always
be very successful, as the partial integration of Russian speakers in Latvia suggests.
However, it can help to prevent the escalation of hostilities.
We might call this identification with geographical regions ‘placism’. There is
an increasing attachment to places large and small, but also an increased sense
of localism. Therefore, it is not just small that is beautiful. Large can be beautiful,
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too, by offering small nations and sub-regions security and affirmation. In fact, it is
these larger configurations that make placism possible and give it a new impetus.
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‘Europe of the Regions’
A Genealogy of an Ambiguous Concept
Ulrike Guérot
Once again, the future of the EU is up for debate. Ursula von der Leyen, who took
over the EU Commission in late 2019, has announced a Conference on the Future of
Europe, starting in 2020 and lasting for two years. Citizens and civil society are to
have their say as equal partners alongside European institutions.While the concre-
te scope and objectives of the conference still have to be agreed on, von der Leyen
has already declared her readiness to follow up on what the conference decides –
be it legislative action or even treaty changes. While the latter requires consensus
among member states – something hard to imagine in the current situation – the
public space was already flooded with manifestos and proposals for a European
Constitution1 in the weeks around the May 2019 European Parliament elections.
Before that, in March 2017, EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker had
presented five scenarios for the future of the EU in a white paper and put them up
for discussion.2 Without awaiting the outcome of the ongoing consultation pro-
cess, Juncker set up the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing Less
More Efficiently’ a few months later, which presented its recommendations in Ju-
ly 2018.3 Those who can still remember the last major debate on the future of the
EU, which was officially opened by the Laeken Declaration in 2001 and resulted in
the EU Constitutional Treaty of 2004, cannot help wondering about the contrast:
hopes of a better, more democratic Europe have given way to fear of the future
and short-sighted cost-benefit thinking or even national egoism, while visionary
drafts have been replaced by half-hearted reform proposals. The rejection of the
EU Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters in 2005 and more than ten
1 See, for example: the Amsterdam Declaration of the Pan-European Party VOLT (Volt 2019)
(https://www.volteuropa.org/amsterdamdeclaration) and many more. For an overview, see
Ulrike Guérot (2019), Was ist die Nation?, Part III, Hannover: Steidl, or Ulrike Liebert (2019),
Europa erneuern. Eine realistische Vision für das 21. Jahrhundert, Bielefeld: transcript.
2 See: European Commission (2017): White Paper on the Future of Europe. Reflections and sce-
narios for the Eu27 by 2025, 1 March 2017, COM(2017)2025.
3 See: Report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing LessMore Efficiently’,
10 July 2018. (CoR 2019b)
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years of permanent crisis – economic and financial crisis, euro and sovereign debt
crisis, Ukraine conflict, refugee crisis, Brexit – have left deep marks and further
undermined the already precarious legitimacy of the EU.
Significantly, the Commission’s white paper and the final report of the Subsi-
diarity Task Force do not mention the EU’s democratic deficit or European citizens
at all. Instead, the discussion once again focuses on the position of the member
states in the EU, as it did in the 1990s, when the treaties were subject to constant
reforms. Thus three sets of questions are at the forefront: 1. the distribution of
competences between the EU and the member states (‘how much or what should be
decided at European level?’); 2. the design of the European decision-making process
and, in particular, the relationship between intergovernmental and supranational
institutions and procedures (‘how and by whom should decisions be taken in the
EU?’); 3. the scale and speed of European integration for individual member sta-
tes, that is, the room for differentiated (dis)integration (‘which states may, which
states should take what steps towards integration?’). However, one thing is never
questioned in these never-ending discussions: that the EU is and should remain
primarily a union of (national) states. Though – unfortunately – a political reality
so far, this view clearly neglects an important aspect that has been enshrined in
the constitutional foundation of the EU itself since the adoption of the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992, namely that the EU is not only a Union of States, but also a Union of
Citizens.4 As German historian Hartmut Kaelble recently put it, European citizens,
although they are the sovereign of the political union of Europe, have also so far
been the ‘dismissed subjects’ of European integration.5
The EU – Still Only a Union of (Nation) States?
After years of European integration and despite persistent complaints about ‘being
bossed around’ by ‘Brussels bureaucracy’, the member states do indeed remain the
key players in the EU – and they are not thinking of disempowering themselves
for the sake of the European idea by merging into a full-blown European political
union.The German constitutional lawyer Josef Isensee sums up the prevailing legal
opinion with a vivid metaphor: The member states are not only the builders of the
European Union, but also provide “the building land” and “the building material,
which they take from their own houses.TheUnion is thework of itsmember states.”
(Isensee 2016: 7, author’s translation)
The member states are the ‘masters of the treaties’. They decide which com-
petences to transfer to the European level. In most cases, however, this does not
4 Cf. especially Art. I-XII of TEU.
5 Hartmut Kaelble (2019).
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mean that they would give away these competences, but simply that they exercise
them jointly, with the participation of the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment. In any case, with their seats in the European Council, which (unanimously)
lays down the strategic guidelines for European policy, and in the Council of the
EU, which is involved in most law-making procedures, the member states are gua-
ranteed control over the European political process. This is even more true of key
financial and personnel issues such as the negotiation of the multiannual financial
framework and the filling of top positions.
Hence the EU merely provides the framework within which the member states
pursue common objectives. The transfer of competences to the EU is a permanent
loan, which, as Brexit shows, can in principle be revoked at any time. Moreover,
member states are wary of handing over policy areas that are at the core of national
sovereignty (e.g. defence, taxation – with the important exception of currency) or
critical to securing citizens’ loyalty (e.g. welfare and social affairs). Last but not
least, European integration in no way challenges the member states’ monopoly on
the use of force. Instead, the EU depends on the provision of resources by the
member states for its defence and security policy.
Nation-state thinking permeates even utopian blueprints for the future of Eu-
rope. Significantly, the final point of the ‘ever closer union’ is conceived of in statist
terms, namely as ‘United States of Europe’, a ‘European federal state’ or a ‘confede-
ration of nation states’. These old debates, which were particularly relevant in the
1990s, focus exclusively on relations between the European level, on the one side,
and the nation state, on the other. They thus completely dismiss two things: first,
the role of the citizens themselves in the European polity; and, second, the role of
sub-state entities in large federal states, such as Germany and Italy.
The first source of dismay – the lack of the republican component in the EU –
can only be touched upon briefly here: In essence, during the past seventy years of
European integration,much focus was spend on the question of the federal structu-
re of the EU. But little if any energy was spent to reflect on the necessary republican
component of a political union of Europe – i.e. the necessary legal equality of its
citizens. Independently of whether a state is centralized (France) or federal (Ger-
many), any political union must comply with the general principle of the political
equality of all its citizens, which is not the case in today’s EU, where European citi-
zens remain fragmented in national ‘law containers’ (Ulrich Beck). Federalism only
organises the competition and cooperation between sub-state entities. In itself, it
does not provide legal equality for citizens, which is the necessary, though not suf-
ficient condition for any democracy. Going forwards, the federal and the republican
principle must be interlaced in the EU if it really wants to become a democratic,
political union. This discussion emerged already during the talks around the Eu-
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ropean Constitution of 2003, especially between Germany and France,6 but is not
the focus of this contribution.
This chapter rather focuses on the level of (European) federalism, by questio-
ning whether today’s EU member states in their current state are the only pos-
sible entities that can ‘carry’ the political edifice of the EU. This becomes evident
when looking at the battle for political independence in Catalonia and Scotland.
Though the two cases differ strongly in terms of political context, political leaders
of both these sub-national regions have openly proclaimed the goal of ‘individu-
al’ EU membership for Catalonia and Scotland, respectively, alongside the political
independence they seek. Sub-state entities or regions are also vigorously coming
back to the European discussion table in other cases, as, for instance, when all of
Europe focused on Wallonia in 2016 in the context of the debates about CETA, the
EU trade agreement with Canada.There is thus a growing desire on the part of sub-
entities of federal EU member states to increase their ability to act on their own
in matters of European governance, i.e. independently of the channels provided
through their federal states.
The discussion of the role of regions in Europe is, however, not new. It already
peaked in the early 1980s, when, for instance, the – at that point new – German
Green Party sought to strengthen regional Europe in order to foster regional agri-
culture and the promotion of ‘sustainable farmingmethods’ as well as decentralised
energy provision. Conservative parties such as the EPP also began to hold regional
party gatherings as early as the time of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, claiming that
European regions, not today’s member states, should be the constitutional carriers
of a political union of Europe.7 This concept of a ‘Europe of the regions’ did indeed
challenge the prevailing paradigm of Europe as a union of today’s (nation) states.
As the EU seems to have reached a dead-end and there is a need for alternative
visions for European integration, it might be worth taking a closer look at the now
widely forgotten concept of the ‘Europe of the regions’ and its intellectual history.
‘Europe of the Regions’ in the EU Political Debate
The ‘Europe of the Regions’ refers to a wide range of ideas and reform plans that
are more or less compatible with the existence of the EU in its current form.
6 Cf. Pascal Savidan (2004) La République ou Europe? For details of this discussion cf. Ulrike
Guérot (2016, 2019).
7 In 1991, 178 conservative representatives of European regions gathered inDüsseldorf and pre-
pared a ‘Regional Manifesto’ for a political union of Europe, among them Jordi Pujol. This
document still can be found in the Landesarchiv Düsseldorf. This shows that the Catalan
question, in particular, is hardly new. (Landtag Nordrhein Westfalen 1991)
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Demands for a mere political upgrading of the regions through earlier and clo-
ser integration in the decision-making process of the EU –whether at European or
member-state level – can be quite easily accommodated within the current insti-
tutional architecture of the EU. The proposals of the Subsidiarity Task Force8 and
the Committee of the Regions (CoR)9 currently under discussion clearly fall into
this category. Most of these proposals revolve around the principle of subsidiarity,
which was enshrined in European primary law with the Treaty of Maastricht. The
Task Force and the CoR have called for existing control mechanisms such as the
‘subsidiarity early warning system’ to be improved by extending deadlines or in-
troducing a standardised test grid. Under the new concept of ‘active subsidiarity’,
work is also underway on new procedures for the consultation of local and regional
policy actors at earlier stages of the law-making process. By contrast, the current
President of the CoR, Karl-Heinz Lambertz, has proved more innovative with his
recent push for the creation of a ‘permanent EU mechanism for structured citizen
consultations and dialogues’10 in which regions and cities would play a key role as
the transmission belt between citizens and EU institutions. However, it remains
to be seen how this initiative will be welcomed by the member states. Hence it is
interesting to note in this context that the two above-mentioned essential flaws of
the classical federal discussion of the EU, which focuses only on ‘Europe vs. the na-
tion state’ – the regional (sub-state) dimension of Europe and the missing republican
component, i.e. the linkage of the EU with its citizens – seem closely linked: the
regions and towns are where citizens live, and that is where citizens increasingly
want to decide about European issues.
A more comprehensive understanding of the ‘Europe of Regions’ is advocated
by proponents of a decentralisation or ‘federalisation’ of the EU with regions as ac-
tors in their own right in the European multi-level system. In the 1980s and early
1990s, German Bundesländer – above all Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and North
Rhine-Westphalia – championed this concept and contributed to its (short-lived)
popularity in regionalist circles. By doing so, they reaffirmed their claim to be re-
cognised as fully fledged political actors in the emerging European polity alongside
the member states, at least in those policy areas that traditionally fall within the
competence of federated states and legislative regions. These efforts resulted in
8 See: Report of the Task Force on Subsidiarity, Proportionality and ‘Doing LessMore Efficiently’,
10 July 2018. (CoR 2019b)
9 See, in particular: Karl-Heinz Lambertz (2018): State of the European Union: The View of its
Regions and Cities, 9 October 2018, and European Committee of the Regions (CoR 2019a):
Building the EU from the ground up with our regions and cities (Bucharest Declaration), 15
March 2019.
10 See: Karl-Heinz Lambertz and Luca Jahier (2018): Bringing the EU closer to its citizens: The call
for an EU permanentmechanism for structured consultations and dialogues with citizens, 14
December 2018.
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important legal and political innovations, namely the inclusion of the principle of
subsidiarity in the treaties and the creation of the Committee of the Regions by
the Maastricht Treaty. However, this lagged behind the original concept and did
not affect the structure of the EU as a union of states.
(Some) regional actors have thus embraced the concept of a ‘Europe of the Regi-
ons’ with a view to regaining ground lost to national governments in the course of
European integration. However, the initial advocates of the concept had much mo-
re in mind than merely strengthening the regions in a union dominated by nation
states. What they demanded instead was no less than a paradigm shift: overco-
ming the nation state and building a European federation based on independent
regions. The original concept thus involved a radical territorial reorganisation of
Europe involving the dismantling of (large) nation states and – where appropriate
– the redrawing of regional borders along historical, cultural, linguistic and func-
tional lines. These utopian and revolutionary ideas date back to the beginnings of
European unification – or even precede them in some cases – at a time when the
memory of the political and moral bankruptcy of nationalism was still alive after
two devastating world wars. Interestingly, this initial conception of the ‘Europe of
the regions’ is now experiencing a renaissance with the work of Robert Menasse
(2016) and myself (Ulrike Guérot 2016) reacting to the current crisis of the EU, the
revival of nationalism and the return of the ‘regional question’ in (Western) Europe
(e.g. Scotland, Catalonia, Tyrol).
‘Europe of the Regions’ – A Polysemic Concept
The first proponents of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ share the same criticism or rejec-
tion of the nation state. In their view, modern nation states are artificial entities,
the random outcome of history, violence and power politics, which compensate for
their lack of territorial and cultural cohesion by imposing a homogeneous ‘national’
identity on their citizens through linguistic, educational and cultural policies. By
being integrated into nation states, voluntarily of by force, as the case may be, regi-
ons are thus bound to lose their political autonomy and cultural specificity. Beyond
this common anti-nationalist and anti-centralist stance that the early advocates of
the ‘Europe of the regions’ have in common, three different understandings of the
concept can be identified, rooted in different intellectual traditions:
• the personalistic conception;
• the ethnic conception;
• the anti-authoritarian (herrschaftskritisch) conception.
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The Personalistic Conception
The idea of a ‘Europe of the regions’ originated in French intellectual circles of the
1930s among the group known as ‘personalists’. This group of young intellectuals
around Alexandre Marc saw in the deeply troubled times of the interwar period a
crisis of civilisation. Distancing themselves from both rampant totalitarian ideolo-
gies and liberal individualism, they claimed to represent a ‘third way’, beyond left
and right, communism and capitalism. The ‘new order’ (ordre nouveau) they were
calling for combined conservative concepts, in particular organic and corporatist
views of society, with forward-looking ideas, such as the need for European unifi-
cation, in an original synthesis.The basic element of this new order is the concrete
human being (in contrast to the abstract individual of liberalism) considered as
an autonomous and responsible person integrated into various organic or natu-
ral units: the family, the community, the profession and the region. Accordingly,
the personalists advocated federalism as a basic principle for the organisation of
society as a whole, that is, not only in the political realm but also in the economy,
social relations and all other areas of society (integral federalism). Hence, the social
and political order should be built ‘from below’, according to the principle of sub-
sidiarity – from the corporatist ‘intermediary bodies’ (corps intermédiaires) and the
‘regional homeland’ (patrie régionale) up to the European continent. In this respect,
it is very important to note that the renowned liberal thinker Hannah Arendt was
deeply influenced by Alexandre Marc and his non-ethnic concept of a ‘federation of
small federations’ (borrowing from Montesquieu) in Europe, when sketching out
her political grammar for the founding of federal entities.11
After the SecondWorldWar, the Swiss writer Denis de Rougemont (1906–1985),
who had joined the personalists in the early 1930s and became a central figure in
the pro-European movement, elaborated on personalist thought. Rougemont in-
spired the creation of the Union of European Federalists (UEF) in 1946–1947 and
took part in the Haagen Congress in May 1948, where his ‘Message to Europeans’,
a passionate plea for European unification, was adopted by acclamation. Although
the UEF soon lost momentum, and the dream of a supranational European fede-
ration gave way to the realpolitik of the Cold War, Rougemont tirelessly continued
to campaign for a federal Europe.
In view of the stagnation of the European unification process and the conti-
nuing primacy of national interests in the young European Economic Community,
he intensified his criticism of the nation state from the 1960s onwards. According to
Rougemont, nation states are a relic from bygone times and either too large or too
small, as the case may be, to cope with current challenges: ‘L’Europe unie ne peut avoir
réponse à tout, mais [...] les souverainetés nationales ne peuvent plus avoir réponse à rien,’
11 Cf. Wolfgang Heuer (2016).
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he summed up in 1979.12 Moreover, as sovereign entities, the member states would
never be willing to merge into a European federation, whose creation Rougemont
regarded as a historical necessity. Deeply disappointed by the intergovernmental
process of European integration, he then pinned his hopes on the young regional
movements that were starting to gain political momentum in the 1960s and ad-
vocated the creation of a European Federation based on the regions. This shift of
emphasis is reflected in the term ‘Europe of the Regions’, which he introduced in
1962 and continued to develop.
Rougemont’s definition of the region is quite original – today no less than fi-
ve decades ago – and deserves a more detailed description. It does not coincide
with the existing political-administrative regions, nor with the old historical pro-
vinces and territories, nor with the so-called ‘ethnic regions’, which are defined by
language and culture. In his view, regions are rather ‘multifunctional associations
of persons that are formed on the basis of economic, social and cultural interde-
pendencies [...]’. (Ruge 2004: 505, author’s translation) The regions thus do not
constitute ‘nation states on a smaller scale’ (mini États-nations). As ‘clusters of muni-
cipalities’, they are supposed to support the municipalities in carrying out concrete
tasks in the service of the citizens (e.g. provision of basic needs) which exceed their
material and political capacities, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
This being so, the municipalities are free to decide how they want to associate –
possibly across national and administrative borders – so that regional boundaries
may vary (géométrie variable) depending on the policy area at hand.
Thus, while functional aspects are important to Rougemont, preserving local
autonomy is even more crucial. The region should enable the municipalities to re-
main as autonomous as possible despite their limited size and resources, attemp-
ting to solve the equation: ‘Comment être assez grand pour être fort, tout en restant assez
petit pour rester libre?’13 In line with the key role played by autonomy and responsi-
bility in personalist thought, Rougemont conceives of the regions as areas of civic
participation. The human desire for political self-determination can only be fulfil-
led at the local and regional level, as it is only there that the citizens can have a real
influence on problems they understand and that directly concern them. National
centralism and bureaucracy, by contrast, generate political passivity and cultural
homogenisation.
Just as nation states cannot meet the diversity of local and regional needs, they
cannot, conversely, cope with tasks of a larger scale. ‘Aujourd’hui, il faut penser par
problème, pas par nation’, posits Rougemont.14 Transnational or continental problems
therefore require European solutions. Such solutions can only be provided by a
12 Cited in Reszler 2008.
13 Quoted in Saint-Ouen (2000).
14 Quoted in Saint-Ouen (2000).
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European federation that does not consist of national sovereign states but is rather
conceived of as a free association of functional regions. In such a ‘Europe of the
regions’, Rougemont expects nation states to eventually become redundant, their
powers being transferred ‘upwards’ to the European level and ‘downwards’ to the
regions.
The Ethnic Conception
While Rougemont was sceptical about ethnic claims and warned of the danger of
‘ethnic regions’ turning into culturally homogeneous and centrally governed ‘nation
states on a smaller scale’ (mini États-nations), other thinkers pushed the emerging
regionalist discourse in a clearly ethnic or culturalist direction.Themost influential
of them, Guy Héraud (1920-2003), a French constitutional lawyer and ardent sup-
porter of the Occitan cause, was close to Alexandre Marc and Denis de Rougemont,
with whom he occasionally collaborated. However, his worldview and thinking we-
re fed by other sources: the protection of European minorities and ‘ethnic groups’.
Héraud thus engaged in the ‘Federalist Union of European Ethnic Groups’ (FUEV)
and was co-editor of the journal Europa Ethnica, which was founded in 1961.
Héraud advocated a ‘Europe of ethnic groups’, a term he introduced in 1963 –
almost at the same time as Rougemont’s ‘Europe of Regions’ – in his book L’Europe
des ethnies. There, Héraud laid down his plans for a three-tiered federation con-
sisting of (linguistically and culturally homogeneous) ethnic groups, which would
be members of the European Federation, on the one hand, and subdivided into
smaller ‘mono-ethnic’ regions, on the other. In later drafts, he made regions the di-
rect constitutional units of the European Federation. According to Héraud, ethnic
groups are defined and united primarily by common language and culture (and, in
his earlier writings, by mentality [‘ethnotype’]). In this sense, individuals or even en-
tire ethnic groups have only limited freedom to decide for themselves which ethnic
group they belong to: ‘[...] a people is what it is. No one can change their ethnotype.
It is therefore wrong that by an arbitrary profession of ethnicity (usually based on
complexes) one should take oneself for what one is not and attaches oneself to a
community that is not, in nature, one’s own.’15
Despite his undeniable proximity to Rougemont – both shared the rejection of
the sovereign nation state and the idea of a strongly decentralised federal Europe –
Héraud’s theses are permeated by a very different spirit.While Rougemont focuses
on the autonomous and responsible person, Héraud subordinates individual self-
determination and democracy to the right of existence and self-determination of
ethnic groups. Unlike Rougemont’s, Héraud’s criticism of the nation state is not of
15 Quoted in Melkevik (1994), author’s translation.
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a principled nature, but due to the historical fact that the formation of nation sta-
tes in Europe went hand in hand with the suppression of ‘stateless ethnic groups’
and other minorities. The right to self-determination of ethnic groups he advo-
cated involves the right to, and indeed the demand for ‘a state of one’s own’ as a
guarantee of the collective existence and independence of ethnically homogeneous
groups.Héraud’s ‘Europe of ethnic groups’ and all similar concepts of Europe based
on ethnicity16 are thus fundamentally ambivalent: A European Federation appears
less as a goal to be pursued for its own sake than as a mean for the emancipation
of stateless peoples and ethnic minorities from the supposedly oppressive grip of
the nation state. Héraud therefore seems to be more concerned with the disman-
tlement of existing, mostly polyethnic nation states than with overcoming the idea
of nation state as such.
The Anti-Authoritarian (herrschaftskritisch) Conception
Leopold Kohr (1909-1994), a political scientist and national economist of Austri-
an origin, is not always counted among the spiritual fathers of the ‘Europe of the
Regions’, perhaps because he did not use the term ‘Europe of the regions’. He ne-
vertheless anticipated the idea. In an article from 1941, ‘Disunion Now’, Kohr advo-
cated the unification of Europe according to the Swiss model, i.e. not along lingu-
istic or national boundaries, but on the basis of a balance between smaller inde-
pendent units (Kohr 1941). This, however, would require the division of the major
European states – above all Germany, but also France, Italy and others – into smal-
ler states of seven to ten million inhabitants, which would then be unified under
the umbrella of a ‘Pan-European Union’. ‘If Europe is to be united’, he later wrote in
his main work,The Breakdown of Nations, ‘great powers must first be dissolved to
a degree that […] none of its component units is left with a significant superiority
in size and strength over the other.’ (Kohr 1978: 183) For federations of states to be
successful, they must consist of smaller units of relatively equal size and power.
Where this condition does not hold, Kohr warns, a federal union cannot last: ‘If a
federation has several great-power participants, it will break apart. It will end in
disintegration. If it has only one, it will turn the smaller members into tools of the
biggest. It will end in centralization.’ (Kohr 1978: 179)
Unlike Rougemont and Héraud, Kohr’s call for small political units is based on
empirically verifiable (or at least ‘falsifiable’) statements about the influence of state
size on democratic government, international relations and the stability of federal
unions. His critique of excessive size – ‘oversize’ in his terminology – as the root of
all evil plays a central role here.Thus, he states concisely – although admittedly in a
16 See, in particular, Fouéré (1968).
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somewhat undifferentiated fashion: ‘[...] there seems to be only one cause behind
all forms social misery: bigness. [...] bigness, or oversize, is really much more than
just a social problem. It appears to be the one and only problem permeating all
creation. Wherever something is wrong, something is too big.’ (Kohr 1978: xviii)
The harmful effects of oversize are particularly obvious in the field of interna-
tional relations, as Kohr explains in his ‘power theory of aggression’. In his view,
the primary cause of war does not lie in political, ideological or economic con-
flicts, but simply in the accumulation of a ‘critical’ mass of power. Power is often
abused and rarely remains unused: Whenever a society is large enough and has
accumulated a critical mass of power, it will use it, especially when it feels safe
from reprisal. According to Kohr, this explains why most nations, regardless of ra-
cial background, degree of civilisation or ideology, have at some point in history
committed atrocities. Kohr’s proposed solution is as radical as his diagnosis: ‘The
solution [...] does not seem to lie in the creation of still bigger social units and
still vaster governments [...]. It seems to lie in the elimination of those overgrown
organisms that go by the name of great powers, and in the restoration of a healthy
system of small and easily manageable states such as characterized earlier ages.’
(Kohr 1978: xix) Smaller states tend to be more peaceful and conciliative, not becau-
se they are more virtuous per se, but for the simple reason that they have less power
and are more aware of their vulnerability. If small states nevertheless do provoke
wars, they can easily be kept in check by coalitions and therefore do only limited
damage. Hence, the coexistence of many small states appears to be a prerequisite
for peace, or at least the containment of war.
In addition to the concern for peace, Kohr has a number of other arguments
against the excessive size and power of states.He is thus part of the long tradition of
political thinking about the ‘optimal size of states’, which, from Plato and Aristotle
to Montesquieu and Rousseau, emphasizes the advantages of small states.17 Kohr’s
plea for small states is as one-sided as his condemnation of the great powers: ‘the
worst of small states provides greater happiness to man than the best of large ones’
(Kohr 1978: 98). Small states are inherently more democratic, since the government
does not confront the individual with the strength and pomp of a powerful state
apparatus, but with means of power limited from the outset by the modest size
of the country. The government of smaller states is therefore less inclined to lose
sight of its true purpose – serving the individual.However hard they may try, great
powers are, by contrast, constitutively incapable of a truly democratic government
because they must serve (mass) society (Kohr 1978: 101). Accordingly, Kohr sets the
upper limit for a ‘healthy and manageable’ society at eight to ten million people
(Kohr 1978: 108).
17 For more recent contributions to the debate see Dahl & Tufte (1973), Alesina and Spolaore
(2003) and Jörke (2019).
242 Ulrike Guérot
Among the advantages of smaller states, Kohr also mentions the fact that the
administration of public affairs requires less effort and attention, because they are
more straightforward, and stir less ambition and power struggles, the stakes being
less high. Largely liberated from the temptations and trouble of ‘great politics’, in-
dividuals have more leisure for the cultivation of the arts and sciences (‘the glory of
the small’), as the cultural heyday of the Italian andGerman states in the period befo-
re national unification shows. Smaller units are also advantageous in the economic
sector. According to Kohr, competition between many small economic actors was a
decisive factor for the emergence of capitalism in early modern Europe. Today, on
the contrary, a few large players, some of which even enjoy monopolies, dominate
huge markets, at the expense of diversity and creativity. Thus, according to Kohr,
the main cause of the instability and crisis susceptibility of the modern economy is
not to be found in the ‘immanent laws of the capitalist mode of production’ (Marx),
but rather in its vast scale.
Institutionalised Solidarity
Obviously, this lasting and to some extend idle debate, this increasing arm-wrest-
ling between regions and nations on their place and say in a European polity de-
pends largely on the definition of what a nation state is.18 This is obviously a vast
debate, but stands at the centre of the classical discussion of federalism in Europe.
Does a nation state depend on an autochthonous, ‘pre-political’ substance (identity,
ethnicity, language, culture); or is a ‘nation state’, in the end, more the product of
processes of socialisation, of collective law-making and the joint exercise of power?
Modern, functional definitions of nation states tend to advantage the latter. A nati-
on state, in this view, is basically where the level of solidarity is institutionalised. In
other words: independently of ‘pre-political’ origin, language or culture, a nation
– or demos – is composed of those who collectively decide on societal affairs.19
Reviving ideas and thoughts towards a regional genealogy of Europe, therefore,
does not – and should not – aim at making new nations out of old regions, e.g.,
with respect to Catalonia or Scotland. Rather, the notion is to conceive a horizontal
network of European regions andmetropolitan areas, protected under the common
roof of a political European entity that guarantees not only the same democratic
conditions for decision-making for all European citizens in European affairs, but
18 Cf. for an overview of this: Ulrike Guérot (2019), Was ist die Nation?, especially parts I & II.
19 On this, cf. Marcel Mauss (2017), Die Nation oder der Sinn fürs Soziale: Frankfurter Beiträge
zur Soziologie und Sozialphilosophie, Institut für Sozialforschung, Band 25, Campus: Frank-
furt/ New York 2017. Cf. also the ongoing research on the social and not the identitarian di-
mension of a nation, e.g. in France thewritings of the leading experts onMarcelMauss, Bruno
Karsenti & Cyril Lemieux (2017): Socialisme et sociologie.
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also the same social rights for all, if they are ultimately supposed to be equal before
the law. This ‘federation of small federations’ should then be constitutionalised as
a Federal Republic of Europe.
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